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EDITORS' NOTE
In the dry theoretical discourse of the typical law school property
class, parcels are named "Blackacre" and individuals are named "A" and
"B." Not surprisingly, the classroom discussion does not address how
the beliefs and experience of "A" and "B" inform their relationship to the
land they own, lease, live upon, and use. Property rights and culture are
intimately connected, however. Each individual views the landscape
through a distinct cultural lens. For those groups and individuals who
have developed a long-term relationship with the landscape, the land
becomes an integral part of the culture.
The vast and diverse landscape of the American West lends itself to
an array of cultural perspectives. For American Indians, certain locations
within the landscape are places of creation and sacred power. For mem-
bers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints-Mormons-
certain locations are places for reflection on important events in the
church's history. For farmers and ranchers, certain locations are the
source of the family's welfare and independence. For conservationists,
certain locations are precious enclaves that must be preserved within an
increasingly urbanized west. For natural resource developers, certain
locations are both an answer to the nation's energy woes and an opportu-
nity for economic reward. When these locations and cultural perspec-
tives overlap, conflict frequently results.
The Denver University Law Review and the University of Denver
Native American Law Students Association (NALSA) teamed up to
bring individuals with these different perspectives into dialogue with one
another. The Symposium, entitled "Borrowing the Land: Cultures of
Ownership in the Western Landscape," was held on February 17, 2006 at
the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Although the weather
outside was unusually frigid that day, the discussions inside were warm
and stimulating. The event drew more than 100 attendees from Arizona,
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. The articles in
this volume emerged from the Symposium.
Professor Charles Wilkinson, one of the event's two keynote speak-
ers, begins this issue of our Law Review with an overview of the diverse
and changing views of the western landscape. The event's other keynote
speaker, Professor Rebecca Tsosie, then introduces a central issue in the
Symposium: sacred sites protection. Specifically, Professor Tsosie sug-
gests the possibility of intercultural understanding with respect to sacred
sites. Next, Professor Kristen Carpenter describes the current legal
framework governing American Indian sacred sites claims on public
lands and suggests new directions for scholarship and advocacy. Profes-
sor Kevin Holdsworth addresses historical and constitutional issues re-
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lated to Martin's Cove, a location considered sacred by Mormon Church
members. William Perry Pendley, in contrast to Professors Carpenter
and Tsosie, argues against the protection of American Indian sacred sites
on Establishment Clause grounds.
The two articles that follow explore the intersection of conservation
and culture. Professor Federico Cheever describes how the West was
carved up by successive governmental policies, and holds out the land
trust community as a possible "agent of positive change" to "reorder the
jumble of property rights" that currently exists in the western landscape.
Lawrence Kueter and Christopher Jensen take a practical approach by
addressing the legal and tax consequences of utilizing conservation
easements to protect cultural resources.
Next, Curtis Berkey explores how the trust doctrine might function as
a needed source of substantive law for tribes in Indian environmental
cases. In the issue's final article, Keith Bauerle describes how the pri-
vate surface/federal subsurface split estate in the Powder River Basin of
northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana has led to an alliance
between the "old and new west interests."
The 2006 Symposium would not have happened without the inspira-
tion and assistance of Professors Carpenter and Cheever, who initially
suggested the conference theme. We acknowledge and appreciate their
support of our Law Review. Amy Bowers, NALSA president, was in-
strumental in contacting participants and organizing the event. Sarah
Benjes and Lynda Atkins, Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor, respec-
tively, of Volume 84 of the Law Review, provided invaluable assistance
in the preparation of this issue. We wish them and the entire staff of






LISTENING TO ALL THE VOICES, OLD AND NEW:




In the gray of a crisp desert dawn six years ago, I drove east out of
Furnace Creek, having completed my work in Death Valley. It had been
an intense two days. I was mediating negotiations between the Park Ser-
vice and the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe. The Shoshone settlement in Fur-
nace Creek, old adobes and battered trailers, signaled them as the squat-
ters that they were under the law. These residents, by 12,000 years the
oldest society in the valley, wanted parkland from a government that
never gave away parkland.
The tensions lifted during the two days of talks. John Reynolds, the
Park Service regional director, was a good man, open-minded. Pauline
Estevez, the tribal chair in her seventies, tough and traditional, held a
well-warranted suspicion but she listened and grew guardedly optimistic.
Maybe these federal people would be different. There was no resolu-
tion-that would take many more meetings-but it was a good start.
I had seen Death Valley during this trip, but only at a distance for
both negotiating sessions had gone late, and it was then a quick dinner
and off to bed. Over the years, I had gotten out on the land in the west
and south Mojave, but this was my first trip to this part of the desert. On
this day, I had time before getting on my plane in Las Vegas and set out
early so I could see some country.
During the talks, Pauline had made many statements about the land,
about how when she was a girl the people wintered on the valley floor
and moved into the high country during the summers. She was precise,
the way Indian people are, about the particulars of places, animals, and
vegetation. One place she mentioned was Ash Meadows. Her family
loved it there. The water, the rabbits, the mesquite beans.
So I decided to stop off at Ash Meadows. I knew of it through a
Supreme Court case that curtailed groundwater pumping in the area.
That interested me because I've come to think of lawsuits over public
lands as much in terms of place as law, and I like to visit those places.
t Distinguished University Professor and Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of
Colorado. This was originally presented as a keynote address on February 17, 2006 at the 2006
Denver University Law Review Symposium entitled "Borrowing the Land: Cultures of Ownership in
the Western Landscape." My thanks to Professor Rebecca Dobkins and my assistants, Josh Tenne-
son and Cynthia Carter.
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Even more basically, though, Pauline had moved me and I wanted to
know more about her life.
I turned left onto the Ash Meadows dirt road, then took a right to-
ward Jackrabbit Spring. I had no idea what to expect from this parched
landscape. Probably a burbling up of water and a slim outlet trickle. I
parked, walked over, and-like many before me, all the way back to
Pauline's oldest ancestors-I stood stunned, without words. Way out
here in the scrub desert, the spring rose into a pool ten to twenty feet
across, six to eight feet deep, pure, clear beyond the saying, the low mes-
quite, ash, and grass on the banks, the pupfish and dace finning down
below. No words.
I alluded to a Supreme Court case at Ash Meadows. This was Cap-
paert v. United States, handed down in 1976.1 Although it made history
for all of Ash Meadows, the opinion dealt only with Devil's Hole, a pool
lodged deep in a rock formation. In 1952, President Truman issued a
proclamation making Devil's Hole and the land surrounding it, just forty
acres, a separate part of Death Valley National Monument, twenty road
miles to the west. Truman did this in those pre-ESA days to protect the
rare desert pupfish living in Devil's Hole. The case arose because the
Cappaert farm, established in 1968, began pumping large amounts of
groundwater for irrigation. This lowered the level of Devil's Hole,
which was connected to the aquifer. The Supreme Court held that the
Truman proclamation impliedly reserved sufficient water to protect the
pupfish. Specifically, the Court ruled that the Cappaert operation could
continue to pump, but that it could not draw the pool down below a shelf
where the fish spawned.
The decision protected Jackrabbit Spring because all the thirty
pools, springs, and seeps in the ecologically rich Ash Meadows area are
hydrologically connected, all proof that Ash Meadows is the main dis-
charge point of a vast aquifer stretching some 100 miles to the northeast.
In time, if it had not been prevented, the high level of pumping would
have taken out all of these magical desert oases.
Major land management decisions followed. Congress made Ash
Meadows a 23,000-acre national wildlife refuge in 19842 and upgraded
Death Valley, including Devil's Hole, to national park status in 1994.3
The Cappaert operation could continue to pump, but at a reduced level.
The law gave protection to Ash Meadows because American values
evolved. For over a century, westerners saw water as a commodity, raw
1. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
2. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Ash Meadows National Wildlife Refuge,
http://www.fws.gov/desertcomplex/ashmeadows/index.htm (last visited April 3, 2006).
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 41Oaaa-1 (1994).
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material for agriculture, mining, industry, and power production. We
still want water to be used in those ways, but now we see other things in
water-recreation, fishing, beauty, and, in this case, desert magic. In-
creasingly, extractive water users have to account for those other values,
with the result that their property rights change.
To be sure, property rights in water retain plenty of vitality. Cap-
paert, for example, began pumping in 1968, after the Devil's Hole proc-
lamation, so the Court could employ the reserved rights doctrine to find,
effectively, that federal pupfish protection was a valid preexisting use.
My guess, though, is that legal protection would in time have come to
these pools even without the prior Truman proclamation, whether
through the Endangered Species Act, some form of nuisance action by
the park or the refuge, or a buyout. And so the law cramped Cappaert's
property rights due to new values personified by scientists, citizens such
as myself who simply love those pools, and, although Indian law was
never directly involved, Native people such as Pauline Estevez, whose
culture flourished at those pools.
It should not surprise us that these property rights changed because
of new societal values. James Ely, in his history of American property
rights, has written that "Americans, in J. Willard Hurst's phrase, pre-
ferred 'property in motion or at risk rather than property secure and at
rest.' As a consequence, legislators and courts often compelled existing
property arrangements to give way to new economic ventures and
changed circumstances. ' 4 Joseph Sax has written extensively on how
water and land rights are dynamic and often change over time.5 We cer-
tainly see it in modem times. Clean water and air legislation have de-
manded extraordinary retooling in industry. The Endangered Species
Act has altered development practices on rivers, private lands, and espe-
cially on public lands. Landlords must change their practices to comply
with laws protecting tenants and requiring that their buildings must be
handicapped accessible. More and more private facilities are coming
under no smoking laws. America's greatness is due in no small part to
the stability it guarantees to private property, but it is a measured stabil-
ity that must sometimes be calibrated to account for important societal
interests.
The context is even more dynamic on the public lands where, ex-
cept for the dwindling chance of a fee patent for a proved-up hardrock
4. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 6 (Oxford University Press 2d ed, 1998) (quoting JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 24
(1956)).
5. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1447-49 (1993); Joseph L. Sax,
The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473 (1989).
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mining claim, 6 land rights are grounded in leases and permits, not owner-
ship. When the national forest timber cut plummets, as it has since the
late 1980s, the companies have little or no legal recourse. If the Forest
Service or BLM reduces animal unit months, ranchers are bound by con-
tracts that allow stock reductions. As with alterations of private rights,
the individuals or companies may suffer real burdens. The community
impacts can be even greater. When a timber mill shuts down, the town
may be grievously wounded. In a related situation, whole communities
can suffer when commercial fishing is reduced to protect endangered
salmon or to fulfill Indian treaty rights.
It is true that throughout history time has made certain trades and
businesses obsolete, and they go into decline or extinction. We need,
however, to appreciate the inequities. Those jolting changes affect some
individuals disproportionately, and many loggers, ranchers, and commer-
cial fishers have been neither amused nor comforted by the fact that their
communities have rebounded in the recreation economy, for which they
have no interest or training.
Yet currents of change in the modem West, bottomed in powerful
cultural, scientific, emotional, and often economic forces, have caused
the public and the law to view the land in new ways. Take the western
deserts, where many extractive enterprises have been made to adjust or
give way entirely to new conceptions of what deserts are.
Jackrabbit Spring is just one of many miracles of the hot and dry
Mojave. Other springs. Pauline's Shoshone people. Other tribes. The
blue and gold carpet on Death Valley's floor in some spring seasons.
The Panamints. The tortoises, so ancient. The fallen-down cabins that
someone somehow survived in. The Joshua trees. The rises and sets of
the sun. The space. The hard work it takes to know the desert. The tart
taste of wildness. The time the Mojave gives you to think.7
The desert has always been that way. It has always been that way
for the Shoshone. But it has not always been that way for us.
For us, "desert" was long a pejorative term. In The Grapes of
Wrath, John Steinbeck conjured images of the Valley of the Shadow of
Death for the hapless Joads crossing the terrifying Mojave. Frank Norris
ended his novel, McTeague, to evoke ultimate despair, in Death Valley
with McTeague handcuffed to a dead man. Without a key. In the sum-
mer.
6. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
332, § 112, 108 Stat. 2499, 2519 (1995) (moratorium on patenting of mining claims).
7. For a comprehensive look at the Mohave Desert, see generally DAVID DARLINGTON, THE
MOJAVE: A PORTRAIT OF THE DEFINITIVE AMERICAN DESERT (1996).
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Non-Indians first came in numbers to the Mojave in the 1850s,
spillovers from the great rush in the Sierra. The miners picked over an
amazingly large part of the Mojave's vast and difficult terrain, taking out
everything from gold to borax to gravel. But they were there for busi-
ness, not living, and they moved on to more appealing locales when the
deposits played out.
World War II and the Big Buildup that followed changed every-
thing, just as it did all across the Southwest, which has boomed more
than four times over, from eight million people to more than thirty-two
million, since the war.8 Level, wide-open expanses of desert land for
military installations were big draws. But mark it down that our societal
disdain for deserts was also critical to our decision to locate so much
military might there. The Mojave was a useless place, a lifeless place, a
wasteland, the most logical ground to bomb, grind down with heavy ve-
hicles, and dump. That's what it was, a dump.
The Big Buildup after World War II brought large-scale permanent
population to the Mojave. At its far eastern edge, an urban behemoth
was born in Las Vegas. The citizens of Las Vegas and the other expand-
ing population centers liked the desert just fine-so long as it came fully
equipped with air conditioning, Kentucky bluegrass lawns, golf courses,
public water fountains, and opportunities for swimming-for which
Jackrabbit Spring over on Ash Meadows did not qualify. So our disdain
for the desert has been accompanied by a related attitude, our refusal to
acknowledge what a desert is-and first on the list is that a desert is a
place without much water.
To be sure, there have always been people, in addition to the Indi-
ans, who understood what the Mojave is and loved it with all their hearts
and souls. Mary Austin, wrote The Land of Little Rain, her book-song to
Owens Valley. Joseph Wood Krutch was another.9 Wallace Stegner
helped broaden us: "You have to get over the color green; you have to
quit associating beauty with gardens and lawns; you have to get used to
an inhuman scale."' And, at least as fundamentally, thousands of im-
passioned rockhounds, botanists, artists, hikers, and plain citizens knew
and respected this dry, white-hot, rocky, scratchy ground.
But it may be that a person irreverent, iconoclastic, and bombastic
in the extreme-wild-eyed and fire-breathing doesn't begin to describe
him-was the one who most caused us as a society to take a better and
8. See CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST xii (1999).
9. See generally JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH, THE DESERT YEAR (1952); JOSEPH WOOD
KRUTCH, THE VOICE OF THE DESERT, A NATURALIST'S INTERPRETATION (1955).
10. WALLACE STEGNER, WHERE THE BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS 45
(1992).
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longer look at the deserts, to open our minds and try to understand. And
that would be, of course, one Edward Paul Abbey. He dealt mostly with
the Colorado Plateau desert but he also knew and wrote about the Sono-
ran and Mojave deserts-and composed the final chapters of his master-
piece, Desert Solitaire, in Ash Meadows.
At its core, Desert Solitaire is about teaching. Abbey instructs us
about what the desert is and the profound impacts it can have on us. But
much of the desert is counterintuitive. You have to spend time at it,
work at it, get down on your hands and knees. He gave us particularity,
vivid descriptions of desert plants, animals, minerals, air, and land for-
mations. Consider this, one of his many descriptions of rocks:
The various forms of chalcedony, for example, are strewn liberally
over the dismal clay hills along Salt Creek. Here you will find tiny
crystals of garnet embedded in a matrix of mica schist-almandite or
'common garnet.' Fragments of quartzite are everywhere, some con-
taining pure quartz crystals. You might find a geode: a lump of sand-
stone the size and shape of an ostrich egg, or sometimes much larger;
slice it through with a diamond wheel and you may find inside a glit-
tering treasure trove of crystals. A treasure not in money but in
beauty.
t
And this about midday, after a long passage where Abbey explains
that everything-lizards, spiders, red ants, birds, flowers, coyotes, every-
thing-shuts down in the heat of noon.
Noontime here is like a drug. The light is psychedelic, the dry elec-
tric air narcotic. To me the desert is stimulating, exciting, exacting; I
feel no temptation to sleep or to relax into occult dreams but rather,
an opposite effect which sharpens and heightens vision, touch, hear-
ing, taste and smell. Each stone, each plant, each grain of sand exists
in and for itself with a clarity that is undimmed by any suggestion of
a different realm. Claritas, integritas, veritas. Only the sunlight
holds things together. Noon is the crucial hour: the desert reveals it-
self nakedly and cruelly, with no meaning but its own existence.
12
By the 1980s, Abbey, and the deserts that so inflamed his passions,
had literally millions of readers. But whatever the specific influence
Abbey or anyone else may have had, it is certain that by the 1980s the
public's affection for the natural qualities of the desert had risen noticea-
bly and it had grown intense.
Another desert resident had a story to tell in the 1980s and it too
gripped the public. An enormously successful animal, in substantially its
present form since the late Paleozoic, the desert tortoise found its stabil-
ity, its staying power-the work of 200 million years-thrown into crisis
11. EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDERNESS 61 (1968).
12. Id. at 135.
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in the click of a moment. Research scientists explained the reasons. Out
of affection, we had collected too many tortoises. Much worse, we had
debilitated their habitat: our ORV wheels, tank treads, and cattle hooves
crushed desert wildflowers, pads of the prickly pear, cactus flowers, and
grasses that these grazing animals need. Our garbage attracted ravens
that in turn fed on turtle eggs. Our civilization inadvertently introduced
upper respiratory infections that ravaged the tortoise population.'
3
This crisis-the tortoise is now a listed species, over the cries of
several industries, Las Vegas and other growing cities-had a powerful
impact on the public. These little animals, stolid and silent as the desert
itself, gave us a vivid and compelling reason to protect the Mojave. The
country was finally ready to take action on behalf of the desert.
The historic California Desert Protection Act of 1994 marked the
nation's first comprehensive national statement on the worth of deserts
and the necessity of preserving the naturalness, remoteness, and wildness
of these once-scorned lands. In it, over the objections of the mining in-
dustry, Congress elevated Joshua Tree and Death Valley to national park
status. It set aside more than seven million desert acres as wilderness,
most of it in the Mojave. The California Desert Protection Act is by any
standard one of our grandest national statements in favor of the land. We
had finally heeded Stegner's call to get over the color green.
We also heard another call. Under Pauline Estevez' leadership the
Department of the Interior extended federal recognition to the Timbisha
Shoshone Tribe. Congress granted the Park Service authority to grant
temporary closures of traditional Timbisha areas for tribal ceremonies,
14
and the national legislature created a Timbisha reservation consisting of
300 acres within Death Valley and several thousand acres of BLM land
adjacent to the park.
1 5
Sometimes, as in this desert, the law alters ownerships by respond-
ing to new voices, other times by hearing the oldest voices.
In the West, when land is at issue, culture can be every bit as real as
any timber sale, open-pit mine, or ski area. On the Colorado Plateau,
especially in southern Utah, rural Mormon communities hold a powerful
sense of ownership over the public as well as private lands. To them,
they settled a harsh and unforgiving land six or seven generations ago--
they farmed and ranched, kept the peace with the tribes, and made stable,
13. For a detailed study on the impacts human activities have on the desert tortoise, see gen-
erally WILLIAM I. BOARMAN, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THREATS
TO DESERT TORTOISE POPULATIONS: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2002),
http://www.werc.usgs.gov/sandiego/pdfs/tortoisethreats.pdf.
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-75(a) (1994).
15. See Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act, Pub. L. No. 106-423 114 Stat. 1875 (2000).
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close-knit communities-and that long possession makes it Mormon
country, their country. Theirs is a culture of tradition and they resist, and
often rail against, outsiders and their ideas about the land.
The Kane and Two Mile ranches encompass 830,000 acres-about
1300 square miles-on the remote North Rim of the Grand Canyon, geo-
graphically within Arizona but, because of the deep gorge, more easily
reached from Utah. The two ranches have base property, owned in fee,
for ranch houses, corrals, barns, and such, but most of the land is held in
BLM and Forest Service grazing leases. Local ranchers have grazed the
area with their cattle for generations. 
16
Conservationists see this landscape differently. The Paria Plateau,
which comprises most of the Vermilion Cliffs National Monument, and
the stately ponderosa pine stands of the lifted Kaibab Plateau lie within
the ranches. The terrain of canyons and rises makes for extremes: eleva-
tions range from 3,000 to 9,000 feet. Worked over though it has been,
the ground still holds native grasses and other plants. The Kaibab Pla-
teau is home to the largest goshawk population in the Southwest and one
of the greatest mule deer herds in the country. The ranch is the site of
the condor release and the big birds, once nearly extinct, now work the
thermals from the Vermilion Cliffs south to the Grand Canyon.17 There
may be another reintroduction before long: Remote and blessed with the
tasty and abundant supply of Kaibab mule deer, the ranches may soon
become wolf country.'
8
In September 2005, the Grand Canyon Trust (I am a board member)
in cooperation with the Conservation Fund completed the purchase of the
Kane and Two Mile ranches. The transaction was done at arms-length
with the previous owner. Even before the purchase was final, the Trust,
as the managing partner, was deep into a cutting-edge scientific assess-
ment that will lay the foundation for an ambitious wholesale land restora-
tion effort. 19
The Trust has its frustrations. The Taylor Grazing Act and other
federal laws make no allowance for true conservation use. As long as
land is classified for grazing, the permit-holder must run serious amounts
of cattle. So the Trust has no choice but to keep some cows on the land
until the agencies or Congress change the classification.
16. See Grand Canyon Trust, Kane and Two Mile Ranch Background,
http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/programs/kane/background.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
17. See Grand Canyon Trust, Vermillion Cliffs National Monument,
,http://grandcanyontrust.org/programs/landscapes/vermilion.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
18. See Robert M. Ferris et al., Places for Wolves: A Blueprint for Restoration and Long-
Term Recovery in the Lower 48 States (Dec. 1999), available at www.defenders.org/pubs (follow
"Wildlife Publications" hyperlink; then follow hyperlink to article title).
19. See Grand Canyon Trust, supra note 16.
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Local Mormons, forty miles away in Kanab, Utah, are fuming.
Mike Noel, a Republican representative in the Utah legislature, has
fought the Trust's grazing purchases on the Arizona Strip and in the
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument because, as he puts it, the
conservationists want it "locked up for the recreational pleasure of the
elite., 20 But he also argues on cultural grounds: that taking land out of
grazing will eventually leave communities without a critical mass of
ranchers-basically, that at some point John Deere and other businesses
will pull out. Then all will be lost. "Most of the herds are very small,"
Noel argues. "Those 25 to 30 cows are what make the difference be-
tween being able to really provide for the family that extra little thing.
They can buy a pickup truck or send a kid to college or on a Mormon
mission.,
21
It is hard to dispute Noel's point. Retirement of grazing leases mark
a change in ownership, from the ranching community to the conservation
community. It may be that in time a loss of culture will follow. None-
theless, the tipping point Noel and others fear is still far away. The BLM
ardently supports the Mormon ranching culture. The Trust's purchases
pose less of a threat than the difficult economic climate that affects the
profit margin of all ranches and is forcing some ranchers off the land.
Ultimately, it is unreasonable to expect that an ownership in public land
will last forever. Today there need to be places on the Colorado Plateau
for nonprofits to engage in progressive restoration programs. One would
guess that the future holds a diminished but still active Mormon grazing
culture will continue on, along with a gradually expanding conservation
ownership.
But what of cultures that have been dispossessed of their historical
land tenure, not by changed economic and legal circumstances, but by
raw force and fraud?
Hispanics first crossed what is now the international border to settle
in the Rio Grande watershed in the late 1500s and gradually moved
north. One of the last places to be settled was the valley of the Rio
Chama, a northern New Mexico tributary of the Rio Grande. The tight,
remote Chama valley is bounded by the soaring Sangre de Cristo Range
to the east, the wild San Juans to the north, and lower mountains on the
west. The valley is fiercely proud of its Hispanic heritage. Rio Arriba
County remains more than 70% Hispanic.22
20. Land for Them and No One Else, LIBERTY MATTERS NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://www.libertymatters.org/newsservice/2005/newsservice1l207 05.htm.
21. Felicity Barringer, A Strategy to Restore Western Grasslands Meets With Local Resis-
tance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A24, available at 2005 WLNR 19319817.
22. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, RECONNAISSANCE REPORT: Rio CHAMA -
ABIQUIU DAM TO ESPANOLA, NEW MEXICO 2-1 to 2-2 (1996).
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Some settlers came to Abiquiu in the 1750s. The population grew
slowly but sporadically. Spain and then Mexico promoted settlement of
the upper Rio Grande and issued land grants, small ones to prominent
individuals and much larger ones, up to one million acres, for communi-
ties, with large blocks of common land. When the United States ob-
tained New Mexico and most of the Southwest from Mexico in 1848, it
agreed in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo that the individual and com-
munity land grants would be "inviolably respected.,
23
Mexico issued the Tierra Amarilla community land grant in 1832.
This protected the rights of the people already settled there and assured
land to those others moving in. The Tierra Amarilla was central to their
way of life, providing hunting and gathering, grazing for their sheep,
water, wood for construction and heating, and the solace of full access to
the rising flanks and high country of the Sangres.24
The United States may have promised to "inviolably respect" the
land grants but the speculators loathed the treaty provision. This was the
era of Manifest Destiny; to them, the future lay with Americans not the
Hispanics, whom they looked down on, and far too much land was
locked up in the Mexican and Spanish grants, especially the community
grants. Disputes arose over the legality and interpretation of the grants.
Until 1891, when Congress established the Court of Private Land Claims,
Congress itself confirmed grants-and the sale of the grants. In 1860,
Congress approved the Tierra Amarilla as a private-not community-
grant and declared Manual Martinez as the original owner in spite of the
fact that Martinez plainly was the petitioner for a community, not a pri-
vate, grant. This just happened to suit the interests of Thomas Catron,
the head of the corrupt Santa Fe Ring, who had already been buying up
the interests of the Martinez family. By 1881, Catron was able to obtain
an Interior Department patent to the entire Tierra Amarilla grant. Nu-
merous other New Mexico land grants had similarly sordid histories.
The people of the Chama valley never forgot the treachery. This
was their land. The whole mix of history and culture boiled up in 1967.
The charismatic Reies Tijerina had researched the history and the law,
and formed the Alianza Federal de Mercedes (Federal Alliance of Land
Grants) to bring justice to the land. The effort culminated in a dramatic,
armed takeover of the country courthouse in Tierra Amarilla, a front-
page, top-of-the-broadcast conflict that drew 350 national guardsmen,
tanks, and helicopters. Two county lawmen were shot and others beaten
23. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.-
Mex., art. 8, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
24. See MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW MEXICO 121-
22 (1994).
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before the courthouse raid dissipated as the raiders disappeared into the
night. Tijerina was later tried but acquitted. 5
Some of the land fraudulently taken has gone into private hands but
much is now in national forest ownership. In the Chama valley, the For-
est Service seems to do reasonably well in responding to the needs of the
Hispanics, many of whom depend on a subsistence lifestyle. The agency
responds with flexibility in managing grazing and allows extensive fire-
wood gathering, which amounts to several million board feet a year.26
Not long ago, I was looking at a Forest Service historical exhibit in
the Chama valley. The ranger, an Hispanic, came up and we talked. I
told him that I liked the exhibit but wondered why it didn't include the
courthouse raid, such a prominent part of the valley's history. He paused
and then said, "We've talked about that. But it's just too emotional."
And, while history should be told right, one can see his point. The
courthouse raid hovers over the valley every bit as much as the high
peaks of the Sangres. There's a bulletin board along Highway 64 that
won't go away. Its bold letters proclaim, "TIERRA 0 MUERTE." Land
or death. Flyers announcing the same slogan sprout on bulletin boards
and trees around the county. In 1988, Bill Richardson, then Congress-
man for northern New Mexico, introduced a bill to create a presidential
commission to study the land grants and make recommendations. 7 The
people won't let the issue die, and similar proposals have been put forth
since, including a bill by Congressman Tom Udall in 2002. Those bills
have not passed, but something like them should. Right now the owner-
ship is not just and it ought to be addressed.28
Having mentioned the relationship of Pauline Estevez and the Tim-
bisha Shoshone to Jackrabbit Spring, I want to return to the tie between
Indian people and the land. The Indian tenure is the oldest and most
profound of the cultures of ownership on the western landscape. The
Indian world view is critical because of its centrality to Indian life and
also because it can be so useful to the majority society.
25. See Robert V. Urias, The Tierra Amarilla Grant, Reies Tierina, and the Courthouse Raid,
16 CHICANO-LATINo L. REv. 141, 149-50 (1995).
26. See Carol Raish, Historic Land Use and Grazing Patterns in Northern New Mexico, in
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT RM-GTR-272, DESIRED FUTURE
CONDITIONS FOR SOUTHWESTERN RIPARIAN ECOSYSTEMS: BRINGING INTERESTS AND CONCERNS
TOGETHER 189, 193-95 (1995).
27. Roberto Rodriguez and Patrisia Gonzales, 149 Years Later, Justice Still Elusive, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1 A.
28. See Phillip B. Gonzales, Struggle for Survival: The Hispanic Land Grants of New Mexico,
1848-2001, 77 AGRIC. HIST. 293, 323 (2003) ("Future work should seek to square the community
land grant with an expanded notion of the native reservation and group land rights .... The land-
grant issue is sure to grow to prominence in the political discourse of the Southwest.").
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Last September, I went out to Oregon to participate in the Tenth
Annual Run to the Rogue, 263 miles in all, from the town of Siletz, south
down the coast and then up the Rogue River to its junction with the Illi-
nois River.29 It's a relay, and I did two legs of three and five miles. It's
a great community event for the Siletz Tribe-hundreds of people take
part in various ways, running or walking, organizing, staffing the many
needs during the three days, or just spectating at various points along the
way. So it is fun.
At the same time, a solemn mission permeates the run. The Siletz is
a confederated tribe of twenty-six ethnological tribes from western Ore-
gon. In the mid-i 850s, the military marched or shipped by jam-packed
ocean vessels some 2000 Native people up to the town of Siletz, on the
central coast about twelve miles inland from Newport. The history of the
Siletz Tribe is-except for the thousands of years before Europeans and
the past two generations-mostly sad beyond the saying. It includes
disease, wars, unratified treaties, broken treaties, the forced marches,
forced assimilation, allotment, termination, and the loss of every last acre
of land of the magnificent 1.2 million-acre treaty reservation that encom-
passed nearly 100 miles of the Oregon coast.30
This annual run is held to return to the Rogue River country of
southern Oregon, from which most ancestors of the modem tribes were
forced out after the Rogue River wars that resulted in a casualty level
among the highest of all the United States-Indian conflicts. The destina-
tion point for the run is White Oak Flat, where the 1855 treaty, never
ratified and never honored, was signed. The Siletz people were very
precise about the mission of the Run to the Rogue: to commemorate, not
celebrate, the treaty. And to remember-and to remind themselves never
to forget-the treaty, the march, the ancestors, and the land.
The three days, with people making their ways down in motor vehi-
cles, were slow-moving and easy, with time for hikes and exploring and
talking. The coast country is rugged, mostly rocky beaches and cliffs
with the land all chopped up by creeks and rivers, with one or several
villages in virtually every valley. Their aboriginal life was prosperous.
They had the salmon, shellfish, seals, and sea lions. The thick, green,
moist forests gave deer meat, cedar for canoes, and spruce roots for ele-
gant baskets.
I heard many stories. Big Stump, the much-weathered redwood
stump, right out in the middle of the beach, the center of the world for
the Alsea, Siuslaw, Lower Umpqua, Coos, and Lower Coquille tribes.
The forty-mile-long beach, broad with sand dunes from Heceta Head to
29. For information regarding the Run to the Rogue, see Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indi-
ans, Run to the Rogue, http://ctsi.nsn.us/run-to the-rogue.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2006).
30. See generally STEPHEN Dow BECKHAM, THE INDIANS OF WESTERN OREGON: THIS LAND
WAS THEIRS (1977).
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Coos Bay and a national seashore today, that every bit as much as the
winter rivers and high cliffs, made the march north so brutal. Cape Per-
petua, rising straight up from the waves, where, one man told me, the
ancestors built amazing trails into the sheer sides. Battle Rock, near Port
Orford, the massive formation where a rogue captain fired his cannon
into a cluster of local Natives in 1851, killing seventeen. 31 The open,
inviting Sixes River valley. "I never lived in Sixes but my people came
from there and I've heard so many stories," one woman told me.
"Whenever I come over that rise, I just feel something in my whole
body. It's home to me."
The Illinois River empties into the Rogue about twenty-five miles
inland. On that last leg of the run, young male and female runners
chewed up the early-morning miles, proudly bearing the ceremonial
staff-myrtlewood from the Rogue country, embroidered with ribbons
and eagle feathers-as they headed up the Rogue, place of so many good
years and then the wars. A light rain came in and mist rose up from the
Rogue, the white playing off against the thick green that comes down to
the banks. Between one hundred fifty and two hundred people waited at
White Oak Flat, a level meadow up above the Illinois River.
When the last runner broke into view, he was greeted with smiles
and gestures of satisfaction rather than noise. After passing the staff to
an elder, he and the other tribespeople walked down a rocky jeep trail,
talking quietly, to a wide, rocky beach on the edge of the surging Illinois
River. A return to a place that once was theirs, a place to shake your
head in wonder at the beauty, a place to break your heart. A commemo-
ration, not a celebration.
The group formed a circle. There was no dancing. The formal
dances are done deep into the night in the traditional, cedar-slab dance
house back in Siletz and a social dance would be done later, after the
salmon dinner. After a prayer, the tribal chair welcomed everyone.
Some of the elders spoke briefly, honoring the ancestors and talking
about how this big-river, big-tree country would always be home. Then
the group lapsed into a long silence, awash in thoughts of the ancestors
and the land.
In a sense, The Run to the Rogue is notable for its ordinariness.
Yes, the run has an element of ceremony. It's an event to mark on the
calendar. Yet it also is commonplace, unremarkable in its simple logic.
The Rogue River country still holds a place in the daily lives of Siletz
people. That land, and all the stories about it, are part of the community.
31. See NATHAN DOUTHIT, UNCERTAIN ENCOUNTERS: INDIANS AND WHITES AT PEACE AND
WAR IN SOUTHERN OREGON 1820s to 1860s 116-17 (2002).
20061
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Going to White Oak Flat may be a lot farther away, but going there is as
normal and obvious as visiting grandmother across town.
Though much has been written and said about the connection be-
tween Native people and the land, it saddens me that that relationship is
not broadly accepted. For many Americans, the Indian world view is
romantic, past tense if it ever existed at all. Yet the land is and always
has been distinctively central to, and pervasive in, Native American spiri-
tuality and culture. That is not true of Christianity. I accept the view
that Mormonism, especially in the early time, includes an environmental
ethic. But it does not come close to the primacy of land in Indian relig-
ion. I accept the view that many Americans share the love of the land
that we find in Abbey's best and most tactile writing. But that attitude
does not play nearly the role in American culture that the land plays in
Native culture. True, the land relationship has been beaten out of some
Indian people, and traditional ways have been joined by Anglo attitudes
for most Indians, but the tie to the land remains strong. Just spend time
in Indian country. It is a difference of kind, not degree.
Eminent scholars, practical people driven by data and not remotely
apologists, while acknowledging that tribes and individual Native have
sometimes overharvested and otherwise erred, have dug down to the
undeniable core truth of the organic way that the land is interwoven with
the Native way of life. They emphasize the particularity of the relation-
ship and its ramifications. Eugene Hunn writes that
[T]he fact that Native Americans have occupied every cranny of the
continent for at least 10,000 years, and have maintained the rich di-
versity and high productivity of American landscapes throughout the
millennia, must be understood as a consequence of the sophisticated
systems of Traditional Environmental Knowledge developed and
passed down the generations by all Native American tribes.... Thus
we recognize in the knowledge systems of Native American people
an alert intelligence and an aesthetic sense for connection that we
admire in the scientists and poets of all cultures. We need not choose
sides in this debate, but marvel equally at the wealth of human diver-
sity and at our common humanity.
32
Vine Deloria, Jr., who has explored Native spirituality and the con-
nection to place to a depth perhaps greater than anyone, explained that
"Indian tribes combine history and geography so that they have a 'sacred
geography,' that is to say, every location within their original homeland
has a multitude of stories that recount the migrations, revelations, and
particular historical incidents that cumulatively produced the tribe in its
current condition."'33 Keith Basso, who has given us such penetrating
32. Eugene S. Hunn, Knowledge Systems, in A COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
AMERICAN INDIANS 148, 150 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004).
33. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 122 (1992).
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and compelling writing on Western Apache stories and place names
based on exhaustive field work, speaks to how the Apaches, the names,
and the places have become one. "[I]nsofar as this kind of incorporation
occurs-insofar as places and place names provide Apache people with
symbolic reference points for the moral imagination and its practical
bearing on the actualities of their lives-the landscape in which the peo-
ple dwell can be said to dwell in them.... Inhabitants of their landscape,
the Western Apache are thus inhabited by it as well, and in the timeless
depth of that abiding reciprocity, the people and their landscape are vir-
tually as one.
34
All tribes have suffered to some degree the trauma of being forcibly
severed from their land. The original treaties, and the even more confis-
catory ones that usually followed, began that progression. The discred-
ited allotment policy, which hit the Siletz and most other tribes, took 90
million acres, an area the size Colorado and Washington combined.35
Most people in Washington, DC in the 1880s could not foresee the costs
of allotment but one person-the person who knew more about Indian
people than any non-Indian in the country-did see what was coming
with complete clarity. That was the storied John Wesley Powell, much
admired by me and many westerners, who, in the darkest episode of his
career, wholeheartedly supported and pushed allotment precisely because
he knew about the particularity and about how only by forcing Indians
off the land could the radical reformers achieve "civilization," that is,
wholesale assimilation of Indians, including the elimination of their res-
ervations. Powell wrote this cynical, treacherous letter to Senator Henry
Teller that showed exactly how dear the land is to Indian people:
The Indian religion is localized. Every spring, creek and river, every
valley, hill and mountain as well as the trees that grow upon the soil
are made sacred by the inherited traditions of their religion. These
are all homes of their gods. When an Indian clan or tribe gives up its
land it not only surrenders its home as understood by civilized people
but its gods are abandoned and all its religion connected therewith,
and connected with the worship of ancestors buried in the soil; that
is, everything most sacred to Indian society is yielded up.
3 6
Powell then concluded: "Such a removal of the Indians is the first
step to be taken in their civilization.... When a powerful nation
34. KEITH H. BASSO, WESTERN APACHE LANGUAGE AND CULTURE: ESSAYS IN LINGUISTIC
ANTHROPOLOGY 171 (1990).
35. See ALVIN M JOSEPHY, JR., NOW THAT THE BUFFALO'S GONE: A STUDY OF TODAY'S
AMERICAN INDIANS 132 (1982).
36. DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE LIFE OF JOHN WESLEY POWELL 270
(2001) (quoting letter from John W. Powell to Senator Henry Teller (Feb., 1880) (File 3751) (Powell
Papers, National Anthropological Archives)).
37. Id.
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eliminates land ownership of an essentially defenseless minority and acts
with that kind of malice, it throws a long shadow across the future.
While an understanding of history and the Indian world view should
spur us to recognize greater tribal rights in the public lands, the majority
society can benefit from an understanding of the way Native people con-
ceive of the natural world. We in the West desperately need to rethink
our relationship to the natural world. The region's population has shot
from seventeen million people in 194538 to nearly sixty million since
World War II.39 We had towns or small cities then. Now, along the
Front Range, the Wasatch Front, the Valley of the Sun, Southern Ne-
vada, Southern California, the Bay Area, and Puget Sound, we have me-
tropolises or megalopolises. Now you can even feel it on the Western
Slope, northwest Wyoming, and the Last Best Place. You see it, in addi-
tion to the subdivisions, in species loss. The Endangered Species Act has
nearly become a western statute. How could we have allowed that here,
in this place?
The Indian world view holds the most sophisticated connection be-
tween our species and the natural world of any body of thought I know.
The particularity. The holism. The connectedness. The respect. The
love. The ceremonies.
The following are the words of Billy Frank, Jr., the celebrated Nis-
qually fisherman and statesman from Washington state, but he would be
the first to say that they are the words of all Indian people, of all the an-
cestors. Cannot these words tell us things, give us direction, suggest
ethical standards, even beyond the words of John Muir, Mary Austin,
Rachel Carson, Wallace Stegner, Terry Tempest Williams, and Edward
Abbey?
"When I was a boy," Billy told me once, "I used to go up in the na-
tional forest and lay down under those big fir trees and just watch the
ants work in those big ant piles under those fir trees. Some of those piles
were three or four feel tall. Now most of those trees have been logged
off. You don't see many of those ant piles any more. ''4 Months later, he
returned to the subject and how it fit his philosophy. Remember those
ant piles I told you about? "We talk about state sovereignty and tribal
38. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1957, at 10 tbl.7 (1958).
39. Compare U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1996, at 28 tbl.27
(1996) (estimating the population in the 11 western states at 55.8 million for the year 1995) with
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports: Population Projections of the United States by
Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin 1995-2050, at 6 (1996) (estimating the addition of more than
25 million people in the national population during the decade of the 1990s and reporting that the
West has the highest growth rates in the country).
40. Interview with Billy Frank, Jr., celebrated Nisqually fisherman and statesman from Wash-
ington state, in Olympia, Wash. (1998).
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sovereignty but those ant communities under the big fir trees are sover-
eign, too. We've got to find a way to protect their sovereignty.
'"A]
On another occasion, he took it a step further. "It used to be, when I
was a little boy, that we could see the stars at night. Now it's much
harder to see them, with all the lights from all the cities and towns.
Some nights you can't see the stars at all. That's wrong. Those stars are
sovereign. They have a right to be seen. 42
"I don't believe in magic. I believe in the sun and the stars, the wa-
ter, the tides, the floods, the owls, the hawks flying, the river running, the
wind talking. They're measurements. They tell us how healthy things
are. How healthy we are. Because we and they are the same. That's
what I believe in.
'A3
41. CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK'S LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON,





CHALLENGES TO SACRED SITE PROTECTION
REBECCA TSOSIEt
Editor's Note: The following is an edited transcript of Professor
Tsosie's presentation at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
on February 17, 2006.
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: Thanks to all of the wonderful people who
organized this symposium, the Denver University Law Review, the Na-
tive American Law Students Association, and the excellent professors,
Kristen Carpenter' and Fred Cheever.2 These people have been my col-
leagues for a long time. I have an enormous amount of respect for their
work. When I look into the audience, I see people that I have tremen-
dous respect for. People who are leaders in the field-Professor Wilkin-
son,3 all the folks from the Native American Rights Fund (NARF),4 and
my wonderful friends and students-I'm overwhelmed just to be here. I
feel very blessed.
What I'd like to do is talk about sacred sites protection-
highlighting some of the challenges that are quite apparent from the re-
cent opinion dealing with Arizona's San Francisco Peaks5 and the tribes
that have an affiliation with that site. Then, I want to do something ex-
perimental with you, because when I think about what would be an ap-
propriate way to manage lands that have sacred sites, I think that we need
to go beyond the standard approaches. There are some incredible people
in this room, and I hope that we can have a dialogue and share some per-
spectives.
I've been thinking about this issue, sacred sites, for a long time. I
first experienced the need for a different way of thinking about the issues
when I went to a summit in 2003 in Santa Fe, New Mexico. 6  Suzan
Harjo,7 a long-time activist and leader on this issue, hosted the summit.
t Professor of Law, Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar, Executive Direc-
tor, Indian Legal Program, Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology,
Affiliate Professor of American Indian Studies at the Arizona State University. The following is a
transcript of remarks made on February 17, 2006 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium,
"Borrowing the Land: Cultures of Ownership in the Western Landscape."
1. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
2. Professor of Law, University of Denver Strum College of Law.
3. Distinguished University Professor, Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of Colo-
rado School of Law.
4. See Native American Rights Fund, http://www.narf.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
5. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006).
6. Summit on Consultation Protocols to Protect Native American Sacred Places, Nov. 14-16,
2003.
7. Suzan Shown Hajo (Cheyenne & Hodulgee Muscogee), President, The Morning Star
Institute.
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She brought together all of these native leaders-traditional leaders and
political leaders-from just about every part of the country. There were
also government people there and, of course, attorneys and other people.
It was an amazing experience.
We started early in the morning. Every night we wouldn't stop talk-
ing until eleven or twelve. After the formal sessions were over, we
would just convene in groups and share experiences-and you could
talk. These were people from the northwest, from the southwest, from
the plains, and all of these different areas with different sites. We started
to talk about the connections-the stories and how those places were
connected and what they meant. I learned so much during that time. It
was just incredible.
The other thing I experienced listening to the stories was that people
were dealing with the same type of challenges. Any time there was a
native nation trying to protect a site on public lands, they had the same
experiences in terms of the consultation process. The agencies, unless
they had committed people within-and there are some very dedicated
people in particular agencies-went about things with a procedural
mechanism. Do we have some Indians at the table and are they talking
to us? If so, let's check the consultation box.
On the other side, native nations would agonize because who actu-
ally had the right to reveal some of the things that the agency people
wanted them to reveal?-the confidential things about your culture and
about your way of living. In other words, who had the authority to talk
for the tribe? How much could be said? Could you really identify these
places on the map and then have everybody know where your site was?
There were all of those challenges. At one point-and I actually
wrote this down because it was something that really stuck with me-
John Sunchild, Sr.,8 from the Chippewa Cree tribe, was speaking about a
particular Chippewa sacred site, and he was talking in the context of their
ways of knowing. He said
The sacred places are made by the Creator, and the people have a
duty to protect them, as you would protect altars. It's not only the
sites, not just the land, but also the natural resources, the oil and the
gas on them. The minerals help balance the earth. [They were fight-
ing a strip-mining project up there.] By stripping minerals from the
land, you're tinkering with the energy of the atmosphere, the fire and
the wind. It's all related, and it's all embodied in our stories. In
God's wisdom, this was meant for all of our survival.
9
8. The late John R. Sunchild, Sr., was CEO of the National Tribal Development Association
and chair of the Rocky Boy Tribal Council.
9. John Sunchild, Sr., Comments Presented at Summit on Construction Protocols for Protect-
ing Native American Sacred Places, Nov. 14-16, 2003, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
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That stuck with me. I thought about how right it was, but I also
thought, how do you convey this idea to people that don't live that ex-
perience? How do you explain to a court, or to people from an agency,
what we perceive as a truth about how human beings live in the world?
That's what I want to talk to you about today-what that process
looks like. What are those connections that need to be made among peo-
ple from different cultures so that respect can be carried out through the
law? My starting assumption is that this can be done. I want to explore
how we would do it.
I first want to discuss Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service °  a
district court opinion out of Arizona handed down on January 11, 2006.
Navajo Nation was the second part of a long series of litigation where the
Navajo, Hopi, and other affiliated tribes throughout Arizona's San Fran-
cisco Peaks have been fighting against the use of those mountains for a
ski resort, lodge, and associated enterprises." The ski lodge is operated
by a private company, and it's on U.S. Forest Service land.'
2
Navajo Nation involves environmental claims under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 13 forest preservation claims under the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 14 claims under the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 15 and claims under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).16 The biggest claim, and the only one
that the court actually held the bench trial on, came under RFRA. 17 So,
this was one of those cases that featured property claims, environmental
claims, and religious freedom claims. Those were the three boxes. I
guess you could put historic sites and cultural resources in a different
category-although they are integrated.
Of course, the Forest Service won on all three accounts. The envi-
ronmental and forest preservation claims were dismissed on summary
judgment in favor of the Forest Service, 8 and the claims that went to
trial were decided in favor of the Forest Service.19
Let me talk a little bit about what happened in the context of that
case, and then, move into the other aspects of the larger issue.
10. 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006).
11. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71.
12. Id.
13. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
14. National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat: 2949
(codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
15. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2000).
16. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). The
Navajo Nation opinion also considered and rejected claims under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470, and the Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act (GCEA), 16 U.S.C.
§ 228i. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 871.
17. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 882-907.
18. Id. at 908.
19. Id.
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The Arizona Snowbowl is a ski resort site. It is operated under a
special use permit-covering about 700 acres of land in the Coconino
National Forest, renewable on a forty-year basis.E° The site has been
used for skiing since the 1930s.2' The big expansion happened in 1979,
when there was a plan to expand the ski resort--cutting runs and doing
all of these other things on the mountain.22 The Navajo Medicine Men's
Association and the Hopi tribe challenged the expansion in Wilson v.
Block,23 a 1983 opinion of the D.C. Circuit.
The court in Wilson used the constitutional standard for Free Exer-
cise Clause claims and held that the tribes had not "shown an impermis-
sible burden on religion., 24 Therefore, the developers could continue as
planned. The Wilson decision validated the initial NEPA process of the
Forest Service-there were many expansions that were planned but per-
mitted back in 1979. So, since 1979, the ski operation has been success-
fully operating under Wilson.
What ended up happening, and this is in the recent Navajo Nation
opinion, is that the new owners wanted to construct the rest of the things
that were authorized under that 1979 action, but there was going to be a
change in the use.25 The ski resort said their operation couldn't be prof-
itable unless they could engage in artificial snowmaking.26 The only way
to make artificial snow, they said, was to actually pipe waste water in
from Flagstaff, requiring booster stations and a huge reservoir and all
sorts of things.27 Then, the waste water would actually be used in the
snowmaking.
Flagstaff does have a wastewater treatment process. The tribes
were horrified for a number of reasons, but the primary claim here,
which environmentalists joined, was that the quality of the water wasn't
sufficient to maintain the spiritual purity of the mountain.28 The water
was contaminated with a lot of human waste and by-products, including
things from mortuaries and hospitals, etc. That was very inconsistent
with the nature of the peak-a sacred site. 29 This was essentially the
religious claim.
I want to tell you a little bit about what the court did with the envi-
ronmental and historic preservation claims before moving into the reli-
gious claims. The environmental claims were all handled, of course,
20. Id. at 870.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
24. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
25. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870-7 1.
26. Id. at 873.
27. Id. at 871.
28. Id. at 888.
29. Id.
2006] CHALLENGES TO SACRED SITE PROTECTION 967
using a very deferential standard. The environmental claims fell under
the Administrative Procedures Act30 and utilized the "arbitrary and capri-
cious standard."'', The court said that NEPA is a procedural statute, so
the issue was whether or not the agency took the requisite hard look at
the environmental consequences.32
The plaintiffs-the tribes-argued that because the Forest Service
acted in response to the need for the ski resort to be a profitable commer-
cial enterprise, the Forest Service's purpose was not sufficient purpose to
outweigh the environmental impacts.33 The court disagreed, saying this
was a reasonable purpose.34 The primary purpose was to maintain the
economic viability of the ski lodge, and the secondary purpose was
safety-they had to renovate the ski runs.35 The court determined that
those purposes were fine. This is one ground that the tribes are consider-
ing as a basis for appeal-whether or not the court came out right regard-
ing purposes. But, the court said that procedurally, the agency had done
everything that it was supposed to do-because it considered the requi-
site three alternatives: the no action alternative, the snowmaking alterna-
tive, and allowing the changes to proceed without the snowmaking.36 So
the intermediate alternative involved cutting the runs without the artifi-
cial snowmaking.
In terms of the scientific analysis, there were competing expert
opinions on whether or not the use of this wastewater would have other
detrimental environmental effects.37 The agency, of course, discounted
the ones that said it would, and it accepted the ones that said it would-
n't.38 The court refused to second-guess the agency's assessment of the
competing claims.39 So, Navajo Nation was very much a procedural
holding.
On the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) claim, Arizona's
San Francisco Peaks are considered to be a Traditional Cultural Property
under Bulletin 38 of the National Register.40 They are also eligible to be
listed on the National Register of historic places.4' So the agency has to
go through the NHPA process and figure out whether there was an ad-
verse effect on this historic property.42  Essentially, if it materially
30. Administrative Procedures Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
31. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
32. Id. at 872.
33. Id. at 873.
34. Id. at 873.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id. at 876-77.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 878.
40. Id. at 883.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 878-80.
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changes the nature of that place in a way that's antagonistic to the reason
why it's considered a historic property, then that's sufficient to be an
adverse effect.43 The Forest Service concluded that there was going to be
an adverse effect.
Now, what's the remedy? Again, it's much more of a procedural
situation. You do need to engage in consultation with affected parties.
The Forest Service claimed they did that by entering into a memorandum
of agreement (MOA) under the requisite regulations of NHPA.44 Two of
the tribes-the Hualapai and Yavapai Apache nations signed onto that
MOA.45 The others did not. The Forest Service said that all of it's con-
sultation requirements under NEPA were in many ways duplicative of
the NHPA consultation requirements and, therefore, they didn't have to
be held to the time and notice provisions of NHPA.46
The court accepted that argument and said that as long as the
agency makes an extensive good-faith effort to seek out consultation, the
requisite standard was met.47 So, by complying with RFRA, they com-
plied with NEPA and the MOA was the requisite proof. The MOA did
have provisions in it for continued access to the peaks and things like
that, that were considered to be culturally beneficial.
Now, that in itself is probably unremarkable for people that practice
in this area of the law. I think the holdings on both Wilson and Navajo
Nation are unremarkable. The tribes had tried to go one step further,
arguing there was a separate trust responsibility to native people in terms
of the executive order on sacred sites.48 There's a consultation process,
there's the executive order on the government to government relation-
ship, and you can't just say that because we met our duties under NEPA
or NHPA-that we've actually served the trust responsibility. What
about the trust responsibility? The court did not buy that, at all.49 One of
the things that is most important to me about the court's opinion in Na-
vajo Nation is that it says the government's duties under it's trust respon-
sibility to Indian tribes are the same as it's duties under NEPA, NHPA,
and the other federal statutes. There is no additional duty that attaches.5°
What about the executive orders? The court said those were just
ways for the federal government to manage its affairs efficiently.
51
43. Id. at 879.
44. Id. at 879-80.
45. Id. at 880.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. ld. at 871.
49. Id. at 888.
50. Id. ("Because this case does not involve tribal property, the Forest Service's duty to the
tribes is to follow all applicable statutes.").
51. Id. at 888 n. 14.
[Vol. 83:4
2006] CHALLENGES TO SACRED SITE PROTECTION 969
They're not legally enforceable, and they cannot be maintained in terms
of this position of the trust.5"
So, that was the whole thing on that side of the fence. Now, the re-
ligious freedom claim was obviously the one that the court felt was more
problematic. And there was the predecessor case, Wilson, but that, of
course, was a case that pre-dated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),53 and so it was going to be very interesting to see what the court
did with the whole pre-RFRA line of cases, including Wilson and Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.54 How does RFRA
change that, if at all? What would the court do?
The way that the court approached the issue in Navajo Nation is to
say what the court is interested in is whether or not the agency action
placed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' exercise of religion.55
Therefore, the court said it needed to make findings of fact. 56 But, what
is the starting place? The starting place was Wilson.57 So, the court said
that it already considered this in the federal courts and found that the
1979 project was authorized-and it did not pose a substantial burden.
58
It answered the more general question of whether skiing was antithetical
to the religious interests, and obviously answered, no, it's not antitheti-
cal.59
Given the starting place, what the court was actually probing was-
is there anything more happening now that would place a substantial
burden on the plaintiffs' religion? I think this part of the opinion is very
problematic. The standard the court used was to say, under RFRA, since
that was the statutory fix to Employment Division Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,60 that a law of general applicability sub-
stantially burdens a person's exercise of religion is invalid unless the law
is the least restrictive means of serving a compelling interest. 6' So,
RFRA reinstates a compelling-interest test.
In addition, the court notes a Ninth Circuit case, Guam v. Guer-
rero,62 which actually says that the action burdens the free exercise of
religion if it puts pressure on the adherent to modify behavior and vio-
lates his belief, and results in the individual having to abandon his reli-
gious principle or face criminal prosecution.63 Those are pretty stringent
52. Id.
53. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000).
54. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
55. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 904-06.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61. Id. at 895-903.
62. 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
63. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 904-06 (quoting Guam, 290 F.2d at 1222).
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standards. However, in Navajo Nation, the court goes back to Lyng and
finds that unless the government is affirmatively coercing you to give up
your religion, then there isn't a cause of action under RFRA. So, RFRA
does not make any difference here.
The court then moves into findings of fact. What are the facts here
that are different than in Wilson? What has happened in the interim?
The court denotes what I would perceive as bad facts, right at the out-
set-and I'm just going to give you the list of them. These facts worked
against the native people.
First of all, the court says that it had no doubt that the plaintiffs are
sincere in their beliefs about the following: The peaks are a living en-
tity.64 The presence of the Snowbowl desecrates the mountain and
causes various problems for mankind.65 Snowmaking will exacerbate the
problems, and creates others, including drought.66 The quality of the
water, because it's contaminated with by-products, is inconsistent with
the use of that site as a sacred site.67
The court had no problem accepting the sincerity of the native peo-
ple's beliefs, 68 -however, the court asked whether they caused any tan-
gible harm---or whether they were purely subjective beliefs. 69 The court
moved on to examine whether or not there were shrines and trails and
cultural resources on the land and concluded that none of those tangible
things were affected.70 Furthermore, the court was very troubled that the
plaintiffs didn't want to specifically identify those aspects of their relig-
ion that they were saying would be harmed.7' The court ultimately con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' testimony was about their subjective beliefs.72
Because there was no tangible harm to the religion-like a shrine or
plant or something-the court had to consult the experts to see whether
or not there was a substantial burden on their belief.
73
Does anybody want to guess who the experts were? Anthropolo-
gists and archeologists.74 The court had these experts do studies about
native beliefs, and the experts concluded that the Snowbowl activities
didn't amount to a substantial burden. 75 How did the experts conclude
64. Id. at 887.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 887-88.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 904.
70. Id. at 888.
71. Id. at 905.
72. Id. at 904.
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that? Pretty much the same way the court did. If there wasn't a tangible
harm to some physical shrine, there really wasn't a substantial burden.76
In terms of the bad facts, the court also found from questioning the
Hopi people that they still believe the Kachina spirits inhabit the moun-
tains, even though there had been a big ski lodge there since 1979.77
Additionally, the Hopis believe the Kachina spirits would continue to
inhabit those sites, even if this use was permitted.78
The court also said they interviewed all of the tribes that were mak-
ing claims and found that collectively, if you look at all of the sacred
sites claims, they extend to Ohio and to the Mexican border. 79 In other
words, the court felt that the tribes were having a really hard time deter-
mining just what is the sacred land. There are millions and millions of
acres of land-including public land-that would be considered sacred
by these tribes.
Finally-this was the real killer fact-the court asks, what are other
tribes doing with their own land?80 And so, there's a part of the findings
of fact where the court says the White Mountain Apache tribe and other
claimants have a ski resort on the White Mountains-which the tribe
considers sacred-that relies on artificial snowmaking, and uses in part,
reclaimed water.8 1 Additionally, the Navajos and Hopis have strip min-
ing on Black Mesa, which they consider sacred. 82 There is also a pipe-
line that discharges water of ambiguous quality on lands that they con-
sider sacred. 3
The court was asking, in what sense are these claims credible? Not
surprisingly, by the time we actually get to the legal standard-this was
the opportunity for the court to use Lyng to find that the government's
land management decision on its own public lands does not impose a
substantial burden, absent some showing that it coerces activity that
would violate religious belief or penalize religious activity. 4
The court says that RFRA is not the constitutional version of free
exercise, it is the statutory version of free exercise.8 5 Therefore, the
RFRA standard is qualified because it has to be read in light of all of the
other statutes that Congress has passed. 6 Under that analysis, the court
concluded the National Forest Management Act has a mandate requiring
76. Id. at 888.
77. Id. at 895.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 897-98.




84. Id. at 904-06.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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that the agency serve multiple uses.87 This is at least equal to the RFRA
mandate.
Finally, in conclusion, the court says, the question was already an-
swered in Wilson.8 8 They didn't see anything beyond what the court did
there. 89 They do engage the compelling interest step, however, and they
say that there is a compelling interest in recreational uses such as skiing
on public land.90 Additionally, the court finds there is a compelling inter-
est in public safety on the ski run.91 There is also a compelling interest in
serving the Establishment Clause. 92 The government has lots of compel-
ling interests.
The court also considered the least restrictive means, and they said
that prong was met as long as the agency demonstrates that it actually
considered and rejected other alternatives before it went with the one that
it chose-and they did that here, through NEPA.
93
That's the holding. What are the areas that need to be explored?
The problems-and I see at least four-are quite immediate. The first
one is that obviously all of these statutes-NEPA, the NHPA, etc. in the
court's analysis here-consider Indian nations to be stakeholders in a
much larger discussion about public lands management. They're stake-
holders. The tribes have some voice as governments, but it's not the type
of standing that we would hope would emerge out of the history of this
nation in terms of the treaty relationships.
The second thing that's problematic is that these claims for sacred
sites are handled by balancing property claims-those largely being the
property of the United States and the interests of the public that it
serves-against the religious claims of tribal members. They're sort of
group-based religions. But when you look at the court's analysis, the
free exercise standard is one that goes to individual adherence. How are
individuals penalized? How are they coerced? The witnesses that are
interrogated are very much within the scope of that inquiry.
The third problem is that the courts are unable and unwilling to ac-
tually look beyond these categories-these narrow categories, property,
religion, etc.-to actually examine what's going on. What's going on in
these cases is a dynamic process that calls for accommodation of both
political and cultural pluralism-and it is unique to native nations. But
the courts seem reluctant to endorse any "special" rights. They want
these categories to basically serve everybody.
87. Id. at 904.
88. Id. at 905.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 896-00.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 899-00.
93. Id. at 900-03.
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Further-and finally-I think tribal rights to sacred sites are being
collapsed into a series of procedural requirements. You have the list. It
says, "Did you consult?" The court actually looks at this and says in
essence:
Well, the Forest Service has been consulting since 1979. They've
called several Indians on the phone, by mail, probably by email
now-maybe not, since their email is always shut down. But, they
tried. So, we're going to say consultation's met on testimony of
tribal members. Did we get a couple of people from White Moun-
tain, a couple of people from Navajo? If so, we have got the requisite
testimony from them. Now we can go to the real experts, i.e., the ar-
cheologists. We can see what they have to say.
Those are all problematic parts of the process.
I'm going to wrap up my discussion by mentioning what I think are
important inquiries in terms of building an alternative theory. I am
committed to building an alternative theory. I think we absolutely have
to do that. How to do that and what it looks like are going to be the sub-
jects of the dialogue.
When I look at these cases, I see that there are all of these inter-
ests-some are legal, some are moral, some are political, and some are
cultural-all convening in terms of the protection of sacred sites. I be-
lieve that the trust doctrine is essentially a political doctrine. The trust
doctrine says to Indian nations, "Look, if you form a political alliance
with us, the United States, we're going to protect your status as sover-
eigns under our protection against these claims of states and citizens of
the states, etc." Is that right? Am I right about that?
That's my understanding of the genesis of the trust doctrine, that it
is a political doctrine. That's why in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock94 they said
that congressional actions with respect to the tribes are a political ques-
tion.95 The trust responsibility wasn't co-extensive with some federal
statute. It was different. And it still is different-at least, that's my
claim.
So, what do we do? We could try to craft categories where the trust
responsibility serves to justify an agency in accommodating a cultural
use as opposed to the claim of some commercial enterprise. The closest
thing to that approach might have been Bear Lodge Multiple Use Associ-
ates v. Babbitt.96 The agency there-the National Park Service--called
for a voluntary agreement by hikers not to climb on Devil's Tower dur-
ing the month of June and to have an educational process to basically tell
non-Indians what's going on in terms of tribal ceremonial use and why
94. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
95. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 565.
96. 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
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it's important. 97 Because the climbers lacked standing, the court sus-
tained the NPS policy against an Establishment Cause claim. 98 I think
that part of the argument there was if the policy serves cultural purposes,
it's really not "religious." The agency is just doing a good job with edu-
cation. So, maybe, you could get there that way.
The second inquiry is whether we can develop a new theory. If so,
then what is that theory? I want to encourage everybody to read Profes-
sor Kristen Carpenter's article on property theories in terms of justifying
sacred site protection.99 Her article is actually the best treatment, overall,
of the tensions between the religious freedom cases-why are those fal-
ling short?-and she asks, what would property law have to add onto
that? The theoretical basis of American property law and American reli-
gious freedom jurisprudence, as discussed by Professor Carpenter, is
very integral to what we're talking about here. I loved the article, but it
obviously shows that neither of those approaches is sufficient to meet the
interests that we're talking about here.
How would we go about doing that? This is the experimental part
of my work. I am trying to build a moral theory, a political theory, and
finally, a legal theory, to justify a new and different approach to sacred
sites protection. The starting place for this work is that whole question
about what does cultural survival really entail? Why is it important and
how do we protect it-if at all-in this society?
The questions that I've asked in my preliminary work are: Is there a
right to culture? How do we account for cultural harm in the law? Do
we? How should we be thinking about that? I'll just highlight some of
the things that I've been thinking about.
Cultural survival is hard to understand for cultures that have not
been under a consistent attack. That strikes me as one of the starting
places for a dialogue-what are people talking about when they're talk-
ing about cultural survival? It's a response in many ways to coercive
assimilation over a very long time. The U.S. government looks back at
those laws that said native religions were criminalized, and you couldn't
have plural marriages. The government says those laws were designed to
serve beneficial purposes, and we don't do the most extreme penalties
any more.
Now, everybody is an equal citizen, right? So the way of thinking
is: look, we have a Constitution. Indians are citizens. They can bring a
Free Exercise Clause claim. They can bring a Takings Clause claim.
97. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819-20.
98. Id. at 820-22.
99. Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a
Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1061 (2005). Kristen Carpenter is an Assistant
Professor of Law at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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They have all of those Constitutional rights. That's why, when native
people go into the international forum, the United States usually just says
that human rights norms are for countries that don't respect basic civil
rights-but we're the United States, and we do-and Indians can go to
court, and they can bring their claim.
What is missing is the account of cultural harm. The United States
has not arrived at a place where it's willing to accept cultural rights as
being anything different than the panoply of constitutional rights. That's
what the United States thinks cultural rights are. We have things like the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 27, protect-
ing the rights of minority and ethnic groups and religious groups. 00 The-
federal courts have said that we already do that under the Constitution.'0
We don't need to go any further.
What happens to claims of cultural harm? Here, I'm going to
briefly talk about some cases. One of the things that's critically impor-
tant to realize about the nature of native peoples as cultural groups is that
religion and culture and environment are all intertwined. There is a huge
debate internationally on what defines indigenous people. They won't
even try to define it because they're not really sure what constitutes an
indigenous people. They know that it has something to do with a long
association with the land and traditional ways of interacting with the
environment, and a distinctive culture that's different than the people
who came later. All of those things are what justify the status of indige-
nous peoples. Arguably, that is going to be a category for rights, if the
UN draft declaration' °2 can ever reach consensus.
That's where a lot of the debate is. "Indigenous" must identify a
category for rights holders. Will the United States accept that? That
would be kind of scary. What if indigenous people are no longer "in-
digenous"? You look at the media, and they're out there saying that na-
tive people are all doing gaming casinos. They're really not indigenous
people because they don't have their traditional way of life anymore. So
it gets used in that way, in the media.
That's why cultural survival is important. I co-authored an article
103with Wallace Coffey about cultural sovereignty. One of the things we
were trying to say in that article is that we, Indian nations, have to be the
ones to define sovereignty within a cultural framework-and to assert
that that is the relevant framework. It's not what the exterior society says
about sovereignty-it's what we actually say about it.
100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27. Mar. 23, 1976.
101. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. n.85 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cit.
1983).
102. U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People art. 27, pt. IV (Aug. 26, 1994).
103. Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural
Sovereignty and the Collective Future ofIndian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191 (2001).
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In terms of the cases, cultural harm has not been a basis for a suc-
cessful legal action. Here I want to talk about a case that stemmed out of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill.""4 A native village was severely impacted by
that oil spill. 0 5 They sought to recover damages from the injury to their
lands, resources, and culture. 0 6 The environmental damage claims were
handled under the CERCLA (the superfund law).'0 7 But, the cultural
category-the damage to the subsistence life way and to their culture-
and they had put in a lot of evidence about the impact on them and their
health and mortality, etc.-and the court said that can't constitute a basis
for compensation.10 8
This is the language of the U.S. District Court in justifying that con-
clusion: "[O]ne's culture-a person's way of life-is deeply embedded
in the mind and heart. Even catastrophic cultural impacts cannot change
what is in the mind or in the heart unless we lose the will to pursue a
given way of life."' 09 So, put the blame on them, right? If they voluntar-
ily gave their culture up, then that would be their problem. But it's not
like anybody did that to them.
I think that the court in the San Francisco Peaks case (Navajo Na-
tion) shares that impression-that culture is an inner state-that religion
is an inner state. So, their subjective beliefs are not impaired. We can let
them have those subjective beliefs. It's not a substantial burden if we
authorize this other enterprise that offends them. That's not the same
thing.
What is that dialogue going to be about in terms of the inner state of
being and the outer state-the tangible aspect of what's happened? Have
we polluted your waters in a way that we can give you damages for that?
But the cultural-the inner state-is not a category that's protected.
Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v. Dalton"0 is another example of
cultural harm involving NAGPRA."' The cultural harm involved the
disclosure of photographs and documentation of native skeletons that
were analyzed pursuant to a NAGPRA inventory." 2 The claimants were
trying to prevent that from being disclosed under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA)' ' 3 and given out publicly because it was so detailed
104. In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997).
105. Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d at 1196.
106. Id
107. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) (Superfund Act), Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
108. Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d at 1197-98.
109. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), at *4 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) (granting
Exxon's motion for summary judgment on Native claims for non-economic injury).
110. 894 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Haw. 1995) (Na Iwi).
111. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), Pub. L. No. 101-
601, 104 Stat. 3048 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 & 18 U.S.C. 1170).
112. Na lwi, 894 F. Supp. at 1402.
113. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§552 (2000).
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and so invasive.1 4 The native claimants said that the people that were
harmed were not only the descendants, but the spirits of the remains that
were displayed and held out there for everybody to see. 15 The court in
that case said that there is no category of harm the court could respond
to. 116 There's no legal action that will protect the native people."17
I think that what we see is that the applicable moral theory needs to
respond to a harm principle. I think we do that in standard liberal juris-
prudence. We look at the harm principle as being the basis for rights, but
we haven't extended that far enough to protect unique native cultures.
Then, building the political theory involves responding to what's
going on in the international arena, in terms of indigenous rights, in
terms of self-determination, in terms of the original government-to-
government relationship between the United States and the nations
here-the treaty relationships. It's all coming together on a political
level that's really challenging this whole notion as Indians as equal citi-
zens with these Constitutional rights. That is not the framework that is
going to get us where we need to go.
Specifically, in terms of the sacred sites issue-building the legal
theory-people have started to try to do this with various kinds of pro-
posed legislation. The problem that we've experienced in those propos-
als is: How do you define sacred sites? That's always the big question.
The courts don't want the slippery slope problem-the easement over
millions and millions of acres. How do you respond to the need of native
practitioners to keep the confidentiality of the information? How do you
prove what is sacred? That's the big issue. If the conception of the sa-
cred doesn't even have an anchor in Anglo-American culture, then it's
always a losing battle.
I think we just need to get into that dialogue-and I actually did this
with a group that came to an event sponsored by Arizona State Univer-
sity. They didn't understand sacred sites at all. I did this experiment
with them where I actually took them through various aspects of what
they perceived of as sacred and different scenarios. That was really a
revealing process because there is a different metaphysics that underlies
many native epistemologies. Just by virtue of our identity as human be-
ings, however, I think all of us have a conception of what's sacred. If we
can just get beyond the talk of rights into what is significant about our
lives as human beings in this world.
114. Na lwi, 894 F. Supp. at 1410-14.
115. Id. at 1406.
116. Id. at 1407.
117. Id.
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So, what are the connectors? I was having that conversation with
my colleague, John LaVelle, 8 over lunch about how you connect inter-
culturally on those levels. I think that that's important. We do have
some models out there. A good example of the co-management model is
the Agua Caliente case in California. 119 The ultimate goal in many cases
is repatriation of sacred sites, which has occurred in some instances.
120
The stories that different tribes have about what the connections between
sites are, sometimes only come into a collective understanding around
these co-management models-where people are present and in that dia-
logue.
I'd like to save a few minutes to engage in that dialogue. Thank
you.
QUESTION: I'm really interested in what you were saying about
cultural rights because, as you said, it is difficult to incorporate cultural
rights or group rights in that framework. I understand that native rights
cannot be divorced from ones community and culture. Is that diametri-
cally opposed to liberalism?
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: I think that is one of the most important is-
sues right now. International law is where I see that happening. When,
for example, the right of self-determination is designated as a moral right
and also a group right. Even within the liberal framework, we have to
accept that there are some group rights.
Where things break down is when the discussion involves the idea
of an individual's right to autonomy and whether the state can endorse a
comprehensive notion of the good. Individuals have this interest in a
good life. Therefore, on the level of cultural rights, the right-holder
really is the individual member. So if the members of a group decided
that it no longer speaks its language, or no longer wanted to practice their
religion, this would not be actionable. The group could not coerce any-
body to maintain culture. That would have to be a voluntary thing.
Will Kymlicka is one of the most prolific scholars on this whole
area of group rights within moral theory. He's a liberal philosopher who
believes in group rights-but only to serve the individual's interest to the
extent that they decide that they want to retain their cultural life.
12 1
Therefore, the only thing that the nations state can't do, for example,
under Article 27, is they can't coerce them to give their culture up. They
118. Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
119. Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian Trust" Doc-
trines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REv. 271, 309-10 (2003).
120. Id. at 306-09. See also Susan Shown Harjo, Protecting Native Peoples' Sacred Places,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Apr. 1, 2002, http://www.indiancountry.com/
content.cfn?id=1017430958.
121. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 94 (1995); WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 196-98 (1989).
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can't penalize them for speaking their language, but they don't have to
do anything affirmative to help them sustain it. That's the account that
we have.
There's another scholar out there, Jeremy Waldron. He's a property
law scholar. He's been dabbling in native land rights recently. He has
this whole idea of the cosmopolitan citizen. 122 He says globally what
we're trying to do is create a society where you can be anything you
want to be. You can eat Italian food, you can be a Buddhist, you can-
whatever you want to do you can do-because the individual holds that
autonomy.
That intersects with cultural appropriation. A lot of what native
people are trying to do is to preserve a cultural context for themselves,
but also to prevent cultural appropriation. I think you can look at what is
happening with sacred sites as cultural appropriation. Look at the Black
Hills. Look at where Mount Rushmore is. That's not an accident.
That's making a statement and that is the most insulting and defamatory
thing-but how do you relate that? I have long been arguing for a theory
of group rights. 123 But what I'm really looking at or what I'm interested
in looking at is native epistemologies. I think that the categories that
come out of Anglo-American jurisprudence fall so short of what we are
trying to argue. We have to do a better job of saying what it is that we're
doing in responding to those challenges.
QUESTION: What do you think the problems are with a statutory
solution to the sacred sites problem?
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: I think that's an excellent question. As my
colleagues at NARF experienced, this was the subject of a vehement
discussion in the context of what legislation could you propose that could
fix some of the problems that were occurring. I think that one of the
biggest obstacles was: Could you develop a standard that they would use
fairly--or would they then turn the standard against you?
I am stumped on that one, because I think that the right thing to do
would be a political agreement that would allow the tribes to have auton-
omy over management under a flexible framework that would not force
tribes to prove the particulars about a sacred site. This would be a
framework based on equal respect.
I'm still on the fence, and I'm open to suggestions. There are dan-
gers with a legislative "fix." On the other hand, the default is what we
have now, and that is not a good situation. So the executive order, for
example, I'd love to be able to make an argument triggering the protec-
122. Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural Accomodation, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 3, 16 (2002).
123. See Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural Appropriation and
Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ, ST. L. J. 299 (2002).
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tions of an executive order on sacred sites-but the court just says I
can't. The executive order is just something that the agency uses to
make its own life happier. It doesn't have any substance to it. So we at
least have to try, but we have to be mindful of that challenges.
QUESTION: I have two questions. The first is on the cases that
you briefly mentioned. Are those happening outside of government and
federal agencies and bureaucracies or are people doing it on more of an
autonomous level? The second one has to do with a book, Who Owns
Native Culture?, by Michael Brown. 124 If you're familiar with that, what
do you think about his work?
PROFESSOR TSOSIE: In response to the first question, Agua
Caliente was a case where Congress actually passed a statute that en-
abled this co-management plan between a federal land manager and the
tribe. There, the tribe's land-it's traditional land encompassed by the
public lands-and that is the case with virtually ever set of public lands
that we're talking about. But the tribe's own lands were contiguous to
the public lands. It made a lot of sense in terms of the uniform manage-
ment. But what was great about that process is that the federal agency
people said that they learned so much about what they ought to be pro-
tecting. That wouldn't have happened without the co-management
scheme.
I do have a great deal of respect for Michael Brown's book and his
work. A lot of voices are making suggestions out there. What I really
see of value there is the inception of a dialogue that is more diffuse. Of-
tentimes it's just a native person who gets up and testifies. The more
voices you get from scholars in different disciplines making these argu-
ments within those disciplines is a powerful and positive thing.
124. MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CuLTURE? (2004).
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The federal public lands contain places with both religious and secular
value for American people. American Indians, in particular, hold cer-
tain natural features to be sacred, and visit them for ceremonies and
worship. Simultaneously, non-Indians use the same places for economic,
recreation, and many other purposes - and conflicts arise between these
groups. In the past twenty years, a body of constitutional jurisprudence
has developed to address questions of religious freedoms and public ac-
cess rights on these lands that are owned and managed by the federal
government. This article outlines the relevant First Amendment frame-
work as well as recent statutes that apply in sacred sites cases. Ac-
knowledging that the law fails to satisfy parties on all sides of the dis-
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Our sacred ceremonies teach us to stand in a defined sacred place to
pray, that the laws we set for ourselves as humans are only as good
as the way we observe them .... Every one of those places in the
Black Hills has a specific relationship to us and to our origin legend
going back to the beginning ....
The unfortunate thing for us in the Black Hills is that they are also
one of the richest resource areas of the Earth. The world's largest
producing gold mine is there .... [A]ost of the Black Hills are un-
der private and federal ownership, and when we go back to these
places we have to get permission from the government, or we have to
sneak in as tourists to pray.1
- Charlotte Black Elk
INTRODUCTION
The western landscape is beautiful and complex.2 One factor that
contributes both to its beauty and complexity is the fact that, for some
people, certain locations within this landscape have spiritual meaning.
They are religious or sacred sites. For American Indians, some sacred
sites mark the place of creation for a particular tribe, while others have
more recent historical significance. Today, Indians continue to visit sa-
cred sites to hold ceremonies, to pray, gather medicine, and engage in
other activities that perpetuate tribal cultures.4
These sites maintain their sacred quality to Indians even if other
Americans do not ascribe religious significance to them.5 At Indian sa-
cred sites, non-Indians conduct many activities such as tourism and natu-
ral resource extraction.6 For example, at Mt. Graham in Arizona, various
1. HUSTON SMITH, A SEAT AT THE TABLE: HUSTON SMITH IN CONVERSATION WITH NATIVE
AMERICANS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 64-65 (Phil Cousineau ed., 2006).
2. See generally Charles Wilkinson, Listening to All the Voices, Old and New: The Evolution
of Land Ownership in the Modern West, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 945 (2006); Federico Cheever, Con-
fronting Our Shared Legacy of Incongruous Land Ownership: Notes for a Research Agenda, 83
DENV. U. L. REV. 1039 (2006).
3. See generally ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING
TRIBAL TRADITIONS (2000); CHARLES LITTLE ET AL., SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN AMERICA (2001).
4. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 1999).
[T]raditional religious uses of the tower are: 'vital to the health of our nation and to our
self-determination as a tribe. Those who use the butte to pray become stronger. They gain
sacred knowledge from the spirits that helps us to preserve our Lakota culture and way of
life. They become leaders. Without their knowledge and leadership, we cannot continue
to determine our destiny.
Id. (quoting Intervenors Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe).
5. See Laurie Anne Whitt et al., Belonging to Land: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and the
Natural World, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 701, 722 (2001) (Even if a place has been desecrated, "a
people's custodial responsibilities remain. No matter how damaged, the land retains its power and
significance.").
6. See Shawna Lee, Government Managed Shrines: Protection of Native American Sacred
Site Worship, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 265 (2000).
People come to Devils Tower and think, 'We're on vacation, we're going to go see Indi-
ans and take videos of them doing their ceremonies while we drink beer and wear short
shorts.' Cremated human remains, a .38 caliber bullet, and beef jerky have all been left as
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universities and the Vatican have teamed up to install a giant astronomy
project in an area where Apache people worship and prepare for ceremo-
nies.7 Reflecting a real plethora of uses, Devils Tower, Wyoming, has
been the star of a major motion picture, a summer home to RV-driving
tourists on vacation, and a rock climbing mecca-all while Lakotas try to
conduct sundances, sweat lodges, and other quiet spiritual activities
there.8 There are, of course, other sacred sites whose location remains
confidential among tribal members and whose ambience may be more
conducive to religious ceremony.
The fact that an Indian sacred site is also a regular stop on a national
motorcycle rally9 is, of course, a contemporary ramification of the his-
torical process by which non-Indians acquired Indian lands.10 In early
negotiations with European nations and the United States, Indian nations
sometimes reserved title or rights to use their sacred sites through trea-
ties." But many such treaties were broken--others failed to protect
sacred places in the first place. Moreover, Indian lands have been taken
through generations of federal policies such as removal, allotment, and
termination; illegal acquisitions by state and individual citizens; and out-
right physical conquest.
1 2
The upshot is that, through varied means of acquisition, non-Indian
governments, entities, and individuals have come to own Indian sacred
sites.' 3 These current owners sometimes want to use their property in a
offerings at Native American religious shrines by visiting sightseers. Tourists trample
over Indian graves, Steven Spielberg lands a spaceship on a sacred shrine, and families
traipse poodles through sacred ceremonies.
Id. (citation omitted).
7. See WINONA LADUKE, RECOVERING THE SACRED: THE POWER OF NAMING AND
CLAIMING, 19-32 (2005) (on a joint project of the University of Arizona, the Vatican, and other
parties to install a Large Binocular Telescope at Mt. Graham International Observatory, on the
mountain known to Apache people as Dzil nchaa si an, a sacred place).
8. See PETER NABOKOV, WHERE THE LIGHTNING STRIKES: THE LIVES OF AMERICAN INDIAN
SACRED PLACES 215-18 (2006) (on the use of Devils Tower, called Mato Tipila or Bear Lodge by
Lakota religious practitioners, in Steven Spielberg's movie Close Encounters of the Third Kind, as a
rock climbing destination, and tourist attraction).
9. See SturgisZone.com, http://sturgiszone.com/sturgis-bike-rally.html ("At the Sturgis bike
rally the best big thing has to do with nature-Devils Tower National Monument.") (last visited Apr.
5,2006).
10. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property
Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REv. 453, 458-61 (1994) (on the dispossession of Indian
lands).
11. See, e.g., Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian
Trust" Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 303
(2003) (on the Lakota people's treaty claim to ownership of the Black Hills).
12. See Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on
Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REv. 51, 59-67 (2005) (on federal policies to dispossess Indian land);
Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Power, Authority and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L.
REv. 21, 23-36 (2005) (surveying several means of dispossessing tribal property including the use of
"pure, brute physical power").
13. See Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites: Asserting a Place
for Indians as Non-Owners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1069-85 (2005) (describing federal ownership
of sacred sites).
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way that will harm the physical integrity of the site or limit Indian access
to it. On the federal public lands, the government promotes activities
like tourism, recreation, and natural resource extraction that may disrupt
Indian ceremonies or harm the physical integrity of sacred sites. Such
conflicts prompt various parties, Indian and non-Indian, to turn to the
legal system seeking vindication of their perceived entitlement to use the
public lands in a certain way.
Of course, American Indians are not the only people who hold cer-
tain places sacred and seek to use them for religions purposes. Our fed-
eral public lands contain thousands of Catholic missions, historic Mor-
mon sites, bible camps, and other places used for religion.14 In one nota-
ble case, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Interior Department's decision to
allow the Pope to perform Catholic Mass on the National Mall, holding
that even the exclusion of the public through construction of a fence
around the Mass area did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
15
Here in the West, however, many sacred site disputes have con-
cerned Indian tribes, and a distinct body of law now governs these cases.
Accordingly, this article first articulates the current legal framework gov-
erning American Indian sacred sites claims on public lands.' 6  It then
recognizes, however, that the parties affected most directly by this legal
framework have not been altogether satisfied with it, and suggests sev-
eral new directions for scholarship and advocacy.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Sacred sites litigation is cabined by two major cases: Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,7 a 1988 decision of
the United States Supreme Court, and Bear Lodge Multiple Use Associa-
tion v. Babbitt, 18 decided eleven years later by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals here in Denver.
14. A recent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request initiated by Steven Moore, Native
American Rights Fund, for example, reveals that dating back to the 1950s the Forest Service has
granted over 350 special use permits to religious groups, primarily Christian churches and camps.
Letter from the U.S. Forest Service to Steven Moore, Native American Rights Fund (2003) (on file
with author). See also FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, SPECIAL USES, NON
COMMERCIAL GROUP USES REGULATIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7 Nos. 22-24 (2002),
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/permits/documents/ncgu-q-a-2002.doc (describing that
the Forest Service allows the Rainbow Family, "a loosely knit association of persons who organize
gatherings in the national forests for their stated purpose to celebrate life, worship, express ideas and
values, and associate with others who share their beliefs" to use the national forests and BLM lands
for gatherings attracting "as many as 20,000 people from across the nation"); Earl C. Leatherberry,
An Overview of African Americans' Historical, Religious, and Spiritual Ties to Forests, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS 1999 NATIONAL CONVENTION 452 (2000),
available at http://ncrs.fs.fed.us/pubs/viewpub.asp?key=2570.
15. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
16. This article focuses on federal public lands but also makes several references to state
public lands and privately owned property.
17. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
18. 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
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A. Limiting Indian Free Exercise: Lyng
The Lyng case involved several Northern California Indian tribes
who challenged the federal government's decision to build a road
through a site where tribal religious practitioners gathered medicine and
prepared for dances and ceremonies.' 9 The sacred area in Lyng, known
as the High Country or Medicine Rocks, was within the tribes' traditional
territory. In the mid-nineteenth century however, California tribes ex-
perienced white conquest at its worst. In one decade, white settlers mas-
sacred thousands of Indians20 and the federal government wiped out In-
dian land title to the entire state. 21 Though California reservations were
later created by executive order, the tribes lost ownership of many sacred
sites.
By the 1970s, when the Lyng litigation commenced, the sacred
lands at issue were located in the Six Rivers National Forest, owned by
government and managed by the Forest Service. While preparing an
Environmental Impact Statement for the proposed road and logging pro-
ject, the Forest Service commissioned a study of Indian religious uses.
The study found that the area was "significant as an integral and indis-
pensible [sic] part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice. 22
Such religious activities were "dependent upon and facilitated by certain
qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are
,,23privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting. Because the road
construction "would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and
lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples," the study authors
recommended against road and logging activities.
2 4
The Forest Service decided to pursue the project anyway, and at-
tempted to mitigate Indian and environmental concerns by choosing a
road location that was "removed as far as possible" from archaeological
sites and contemporary Indian activities.2 5 A location that would have
19. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 443.
20. See RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN INDIAN HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A
POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1942 107-09 (1987) (on the Gold Rush-era "genocide" of California
Indians in which "primarily because of the killings, the California Indian population ... decreased
almost by two-thirds in little more than a single decade: from 100,000 in 1849 to 35,000 in 1860").
21. See Newton, supra note 10, at 460 n.26; see also Amy C. Brann, Karuk Tribe of Califor-
nia v. United States: The Courts Need a History Lesson, 37 NEw ENG. L. REV. 743, 753-54 (2003)
(although eighteen treaties were negotiated with California tribes, the Senate refused to ratify them,
instead passing the California Land Claims Act of 1851, which effectively transferred Indian abo-
riginal title into the public domain, except for lands occupied by certain bands of Mission Indians,
and the Act of April 8, 1864, authorizing the President to create four reservations by executive
order).
22. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 443.
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avoided some sacred sites altogether was rejected because of soil stabil-
ity problems and the need to acquire private land. 6
Because of the grave ramificiations for their religious and cultural
practices, the Indians continued to challenge the project through the ad-
ministrative process. When those efforts failed, they sued in federal
court, bringing claims under the First Amendment, several statutes, and
common law doctrines.27 Applying the Free Exercise Clause, the District
Court enjoined the six-mile road and timber project on grounds that it
would substantially infringe on the Indians religion and that the govern-
ment had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest. 28 The Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed. 9
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the road would
"virtually destroy" the Indians' ability to practice their religion, the gov-
ernment's action would not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it
would not "coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious be-
liefs."30  And secondly, Justice O'Connor held that "[W]hatever rights
the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not
divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all its land."
3'
The first prong of Lyng has been criticized as narrowing Free Exer-
cise Clause analysis 32 and the second as expanding government owner-
ship rights.33 But, in any event, that's our leading Supreme Court hold-
ing: by virtue of its ownership, the federal government can destroy a
sacred site located on public lands so long as it is not coercing belief.
34
Justice O'Connor said one more thing in Lyng that laid the ground-
work for contemporary sacred sites practice: "[N]othing in our opinion
should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious
26. Id.
27. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 590-91 (N.D. Cal.
1983).
28. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595-96.
29. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 585-87 (9th Cir. 1985),
afft'd in part, vacated in part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986). By the time the Ninth Circuit heard the
case, Congress had enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984, restricting commercial activities
such as logging in much, but not all, of the contested area. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 444.
30. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
31. Id. at 453.
32. See, e.g., S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n:
Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,490-510
(1989); see also Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944-46 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Histori-
cal Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1485-86 (1990); Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 125-26 (1992); Peggy
Healy, Casenote, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n: A Form-Over-Effect Stan-
dard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 171, 171-72 (1988); J. Brett Pritchard, Note,
Conduct and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause: Developments and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 268, 269 (1990); Kathryn C. Wyatt, Note,
The Supreme Court, Lyng, and the Lone Wolf Principle, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 623,624 (1989).
33. See generally Carpenter, supra note 13, at 1082-87, 1092-93.
34. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 447-53.
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needs of any citizen., 35  And more specifically "The Government's
rights to the use of its own land.., need not and should not discourage it
from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by the
Indian respondents." 36  Though those words sounded rather empty to
many tribal advocates at the time, federal law and policy has actually
evolved toward accommodating sacred site usage, as described below.37
B. Towards Accommodation: Bear Lodge
Of course the federal government has long managed various uses of
the public lands. The Constitution's Property Clause gives Congress
power to regulate the property of the United States.38 Congress, in turn,
delegates this power by statute to agencies such as the Forest Service,
Park Service, and Bureau of Land Management.39
In the 1980s and 1990s, these federal agencies were increasingly
confronted with challenges of multiple uses on the public lands. For
example, recreational visitorship was exploding, at the same time that
many development activities continued. 0 Whether it was heightened
tourism causing environmental degradation; local citizens protesting
energy extraction; or rock climbers clashing with Indian sun dancers,
agencies found themselves needing to fashion, or re-fashion, manage-
ment plans for the lands under their authority.41
Though administrative law had long required public participation in
agency management decisions, the 1990s also saw a growing body of
federal law pertaining to sacred sites. These included amendments and
guidelines to the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),42 rendering
"traditional cultural properties" (TCPs) eligible for the Act's consultation
provisions.43 The Act now provides that "properties of traditional reli-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Marcia Yablon, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to
American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L. J. 1632, 1653-54 (2004).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535
(1976) (holding Congress has the power to dispose of and regulate property under the Property
Clause); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523 (1897) (finding the federal government's
power over its own property is analogous to states' police power).
39. See generally Martin Nie, Statutory Detail and Administrative Discretion in Public Lands
Governance: Arguments and Alternatives, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223 (2004).
40. See Hooker, infra note 41. Compare Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transforma-
tion on Public Lands, 26 ECoLOGY L.Q. 140, 143-46 (1999) (arguing that since the 1970's, tourism
and conservation have increased on public lands, while commodity uses like timber harvesting and
mining have declined).
41. See, e.g., Ann M. Hooker, American Indian Sacred Sites on Federal Public Lands: Re-
solving Conflicts Between Religious Use and Multiple Use at El Malpais National Monument, 19
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 134-52 (1994) (on the challenges faced by the National Park Service in
accommodating multiple uses at a national monument).
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2005); see also Dean Suagee, Historical Storytelling and the Growth
of Tribal Historic Preservation Programs, 17-FALL NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 86, 86-87 (2002)
(describing 1992 amendments to the NHPA and implementing regulations).
43. Peter J. Gardner, The First Amendment's Unfulfilled Promise in Protecting Native Ameri-
can Sacred Sites: Is the National Historic Preservation Act a Better Alternative?, 47 S.D. L. REV.
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gious and cultural importance to an Indian tribe" may be determined
eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places.44 Fed-
eral agencies are directed to consult "with any tribe. . . that attaches reli-
gious and cultural significance to [such] properties" regarding federal
"undertakings" on these TCPs.4 5 Additionally, President Clinton issued
an executive order directing agencies both to accommodate ceremonial
uses and avoid "adversely affecting" sacred sites.46
These circumstances and laws coalesced in a number of places.
Devils Tower, Wyoming, was one of them. The Tower, known to some
Plains Indians as Bear Lodge, is a place of historical significance and
contemporary ceremony.47 As part of the Black Hills, the Tower was
originally reserved to the Great Sioux Nation with the Black Hills in the
Treaty of Ft. Laramie of 1868, which was soon thereafter violated by the
United States. 48 Devils Tower became a National Monument in 1906,
and is now managed by the Park Service.49 By the 1990s, conflicting use
patterns of rock climbers, local citizens, tourists, environmental groups,
and Indian religious practitioners were creating management challenges
for the Park Service. °
The Park Service was obligated to manage these conflicting uses at
Devils Tower, not only by the NHPA,5" but also by the Park Service Or-
ganic Act and Presidential Proclamation establishing Devils Tower as a
National Monument. 2 After a planning process, including public meet-
ings, circulation of drafts, and a formal notice and comment period, the
Devils Tower Superintendent announced a management plan banning
commercial rock climbing during the month of June when most religious
ceremonies were conducted. 53 The Plan also called for educational pro-
grams on Indian religious and cultural uses and mitigation of climbing's
68, 79-82 (2002); see Dean Suagee, Tribal Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes,
Cross-Cultural Bridges, and Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REv. 145, 160 (1996).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B); 16 U.S.C. § 470f
46. Exec. Order No. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 24,1996).
47. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 815-16.
48. See National Park Service, Devil's Tower History: Our First Fifty Years,
http://www.nps.gov/deto/first50.htm ("The Treaty of 1868 guaranteed this region to the Indians. In
1874, in violation of this treaty, General George A. Custer led a reconnaissance expedition into the
Black Hills.").
49. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 817-18.
52. See id. at 819 & n.7
Under its governing statute, NPS must protect the values for which Devils Tower Na-
tional Monument was established .... [O]ne of the primary bases for the Tower's desig-
nation as a National Monument is the prominent role it has played in the cultures of sev-
eral American Indian tribes of the North Plains .... President Roosevelt declared the
Tower is 'a natural wonder and an object of historic and great scientific interest... [and]
warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, or destroy
any feature of the natural tower.'
Id. (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 819-20.
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effects on the environment through reduced use of pitons and closure of
routes near raptor nests.54
The Bear Lodge Multiple Use Association and several rock climb-
ers filed suit, challenging the plan primarily on Establishment Clause
grounds, and the Park Service changed the climbing ban to a voluntary
closure. 55  The federal district court in Wyoming then upheld the plan,
ruling it did not violate the Establishment Clause because it advanced
secular purposes, did not have the primary effect of advancing religion,
and did not entangle the government with religion.5 6  On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed, but not on the merits. It held that because the
plan made the climbing restrictions "voluntary" and the plaintiff climbers
had continued climbing, they suffered no injury and therefore lacked
standing to sue.57 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
These two cases give us a legal framework applicable in many sa-
cred sites disputes. Lyng generally forecloses First Amendment relief to
Indians in cases where government activity on federal lands threatens
religious uses of sacred sites,59 but it leaves the door open for agency
accommodations of religious practices. 60 Bear Lodge tells agencies how
to craft those accommodations. So long as they are "voluntary" in nature
54. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998).
55. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450-51.
56. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court established a three-part test for
delineating between proper and improper government actions. According to this test a governmental
action does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) does not have the
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. In a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984), Justice O'Connor sought to clarify the Lemon analysis by focus-
ing on whether the government action endorsed religion. "Applying Justice O'Connor's refined
analysis, the government impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or
(2) the effect of conveying a message 'that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred."' Bauchman v. W. High School, 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997). Recent jurispru-
dence has admittedly created some uncertainty about the content of the Establishment Clause test.
See, e.g., Jessica Gavrich, Constitutional Law: Judicial Oversights-Inconsistency in Supreme Court
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 58 FLA. L. REv. 437 (2006).
57. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The three essential elements
necessary to establish standing are:
(1) plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected in-
terest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent,' not 'conjec-
tural' or 'hypothetical;' (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of - the injury has to be 'fairly... trace[able] to the challenged ac-
tion of the defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court;' (3) it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that
the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citation omitted).
58. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
59. See Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge and The Uphill Battle Facing
Native American Religion On Public Lands, 20 LAw & INEQ. 157, 165 (2002) ("The decision in Lyng
effectively marked the end of Native American attempts to employ the Free Exercise clause to
protect Native American religious sites on public lands .... ").
60. See Marcia Yablon, Note, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Re-
sponses to American Indian Religious Claims On Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1629 (2004)
("[I]n foreclosing judicial protection, the Lyng court shut off one method of protecting sacred sites,
but suggested another, more feasible method in its place-agency accommodation.").
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and do not "prohibit" other citizens from using the public lands, sacred




A. Between Lyng and Bear Lodge
Recent cases have faithfully applied both Lyng
62 and Bear Lodge.63
And, as one might expect, parties on all sides are unsatisfied. Many In-
dians feel that the First Amendment should protect them just as meaning-
fully as it protects Christian church-goers and that accommodations like
the one in Bear Lodge are extremely modest considering the centuries of
religious oppression they have suffered. 64 Moreover, they argue that
relegating their religious freedom to the discretionary powers of agencies
leaves them vulnerable to shifting political winds. The differing priori-
ties of the Clinton and Bush administrations would support these con-
cerns.
65
On the other side, some of the multiple use groups, tourists, local
citizens, and energy developers feel that the federal government is too
solicitous of Indian nations, that each citizen should be entitled to an
equal right of access to the public lands no matter what his or her religion
or race, and that Indians are getting special treatment.66  Indian nations
respond that this analysis ignores their status as sovereign governments,
some with ongoing treaty claims and all with an expectation that the fed-
eral government will meet its trust duties to tribes.67
Responding to these concerns, scholars and advocates offer various
legal theories and practices. Some articulate sacred sites claims in terms
61. See, e.g., Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 F. App'x 711, 713-16 (10th Cir.
2004) (upholding, on standing grounds, NPS' management plan accommodating sacred site usage).
For a similar decision by a state, versus federal, agency, see Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382
F.3d 969, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2004) (state Department of Transportation policy against using materials
mined from Indian sacred site in state construction projects did not violate the Establishment
Clause), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1828 (2005).
62. See Navajo Nation v. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006); see also United
States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir. 1988) (Forest Service did not violate the First Amend-
ment when it denied a group of Sioux Indians a special use permit that would have allowed them to
occupy National Forest land that they believed was sacred).
63. See supra note 61 (discussing Cholla and Natural Arch); see also Wyoming Sawmills Inc.
v. U.S. Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241, 1252 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Forest Service's historic
preservation plan for management of Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark against Estab-
lishment Clause and National Forest Management Act challenges).
64. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 65-66 (quoting Charlotte Black Elk on the challenge of trying
to access Black Elk Wilderness, named after her own grandfather, by obtaining a "special use per-
mit").
65. See Carpenter, supra note 13, at 1145 n.489.
66. See William Perry Pendley, The Establishment Clause and the Closure of "Sacred"
Public andPrivate Lands, 83 DENv. U. L. REv. 1023, 1037-38 (2006).
67. See Tsosie, supra note 11, at 292, 300.
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of environmental and cultural preservation statutes, 68 others appeal to a
human rights framework, 69 and still others turn to the to the common law
as a basis for sacred sites access arguments.7° Many scholars focus on
process, exhorting tribes to avoid rights-based lawsuits and instead work
with agencies for negotiated solutions.7' Indian leaders may consider
alternatives to litigation,72 such as legislation,73 joint management pro-
grams,74 land re-acquisition and trust programs, 7 state-level advocacy,76
the development of tribal law, 77 coalition building and activism. 78  One
non-Indian religious entity, the LDS Church, has negotiated a lease ar-
rangement of a sacred site on BLM land.79 Looking at the bigger picture,
68. See, e.g., Sarah Palmer, Cherie Shanteau & Deborah Osborne, Strategies For Addressing
Native Traditional Cultural Properties, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 45 (2005) (discussing the
National Environmental Protection Act, National Historic Preservation Act, and other statutes);
Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 413, 439-54 (2002) (discussing the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act, and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act).
69. See, e.g., S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peo-
ples' Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 82 (2001); see also SMITH, supra note 1, at 37-38 (interviewing Walter
Echo-hawk on the legal challenges of protecting Indian religions, human remains, and sacred places
in an international human rights context).
70. See Kevin J. Worthen, Protecting the Sacred Sites of Indigenous People in U.S. Courts:
Reconciling Native American Religion and the Right to Exclude, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 239 (2000)
(advancing torts and property arguments).
71. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? xi, 144-72 (2003) (calling for
"pragmatic compromise" in indigenous cultural property disputes, including sacred sites cases).
72. See generally R.C. GORDON-MCCUTCHAN, THE TAOS INDIANS AND THE BATTLE FOR
BLUE LAKE (1991) (Taos Pueblo's experiences with Blue Lake provides a multi-facted, successful
approach to sacred site recovery that did not include litigation).
73. See, e.g., Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191,
205 (2001) (describing the legislative restoration of Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo and Kaho'olawe to the
Native Hawaiian people).
74. See Lee, supra note 6, at 303 (proposing legislation that would include legal basis for joint
management programs). For discussion of an innovative tribal-federal management program in the
wildlife habitat context, see Erin Patrick Lyons, Note, "'Give Me a Home Where the Buffalo Roam ":
The Case in Favor of the Management-Function Transfer of the National Bison Range to the Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 711
(2005).
75. See, e.g., Charmaine White Face, Bear Butte Land Trust Fund Started, Jan. 2, 2006,
http://www.defendblackhills.org/article.php?id=108 (discussing the Bear Butte land trust initiative);
see generally Lawrence R. Kueter & Christopher S. Jensen, Conservation Easements: An Underde-
veloped Tool to Protect Cultural Resources, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1057 (2006).
76. Lucus Ritchie, The Failure of the National Historic Preservation Act in the Missouri
River Basin and a Proposed Solution, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 11-12 (2005) (demon-
strating the concern of South Dakota politicians regarding the disturbance of human remains appar-
ently caused by federal management of the Missouri River Basin).
77. See generally Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of
Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69 (2005).
78. See Hillary Rosner, Saving a Sacred Lake: Zuni Activist Pablo Padilla, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.hcn.org/ (follow "Archives" hyperlink; then follow "Native Ameri-
cans" hyperlink; then follow "Environmental Laws" hyperlink) (describing the success of Indian and
environmental coalition that pursued an activist strategy to stop coal strip mining and its destructive
impact on the sacred Zuni Salt Lake).
79. Sherry Hutt, If Geronimo Was Jewish: Equal Protection and the Cultural Property Rights
of Native Americans, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 544 n. 101 (2004).
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a potentially groundbreaking new approach seeks to articulate and apply
a theory of "cultural harm" to federal management of sacred sites.
80
B. Statutory Reform
All of the above strategies are integral to meaningful legal solutions
of sacred sites disputes, but several federal statutory developments merit
particular attention here. Enacted in response to Supreme Court cases
that Congress perceived to diminish religious freedoms, both the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 199381 and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 200082 offer some promise for In-
dian religions. However, in my view, these statutes may have only lim-
ited utility in the specific context of sacred sites litigation. Both the
RFRA and the RLUIPA reflect a continuing legal privilege for property
rights over religious freedoms. To the extent that Indians often lack
ownership of their sacred sites, these statutes will only be useful where
tribes can make innovative property arguments.
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
83
Passed in response to the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Em-
ployment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,84 rejecting Indian Free Exercise clause claims in a peyote case,
RFRA aims to restore earlier First Amendment standards protecting reli-
gious freedom.85 RFRA provides that the "[g]overnment shall not sub-
stantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability," unless it can show the burden on
religion furthers a "compelling governmental interest" and is the "least
restrictive means" of furthering that interest.86  RFRA has been ruled
80. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Challenges to Sacred Site Protection, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
963 (2006).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
84. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
85. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1216-
1217 (2006).
In [deciding Smith], we rejected the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause announced
in Sherbert v. Verner, and, in accord with earlier cases, held that the Constitution does
not require judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens im-
posed by facially constitutional laws. Congress responded by enacting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which adopts a statutory rule comparable to
the constitutional rule rejected in Smith. Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not,
as a statutory matter, substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, 'even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability.' The only exception recognized by the
statute requires the Government to satisfy the compelling interest test-to 'demonstrate
that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernment interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.'
Id. (citations omitted).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)(b) (2006).
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unconstitutional as applied to state governments87 but still applies to the
federal government.
88
Several lower courts have rejected Indian claims based on RFRA in
sacred sites cases. In a very recent case, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Service,89 several tribes claimed that the Forest Service had violated
RFRA in its decision to permit the use of wastewater in snowmaking on
the sacred San Francisco Peaks.90 While the district court recognized
that RFRA was enacted to restore the compelling interest test to its pre-
Smith vigor, it also noted that plaintiffs still must show a "substantial
burden" to their religious freedom and that test has not evolved since
Lyng.91 Therefore, "the government's land management decision will not
be a 'substantial burden' absent a showing that it coerces someone into
violating his or her religious beliefs or penalizes his or her religious ac-
tivity.
' 92
Citing Lyng, the court held the plaintiffs "failed to present any ob-
jective evidence that their exercise of religion will be impacted by the
Snowbowl upgrades." 93 According to the court, the plaintiffs had been
unwilling or unable to show how the snowmaking plan would harm spe-
cific shrines or deny physical access to the mountain. 94 The court would
not entertain "subjective" claims of "perceived religious impact" for sev-
eral reasons. 95 First, previous caselaw on the same sacred site had al-
ready rejected a similar argument that "development of the Peaks would
be a profane act, and an affront to the deities, and that, in consequence,
the Peaks would lose their healing power and otherwise cease to benefit
the tribes. 96 Moreover, if Indian religious practitioners could claim a
substantial burden on facts such as these "the Forest Service would be
left in a precarious situation as it attempted to manage the millions of
acres of public lands in Arizona, and elsewhere, that are considered sa-
cred to Native American tribes. 97
In short, the district court sounded like Lyng all over again when it
concluded that the Forest Service's action "does not coerce individuals
into acting contrary to their religious beliefs nor does it penalize anyone
for practicing his or her religion." 98 Navajo Nation thus bears out the
87. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
88. See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 1216-17.
89. 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006).
90. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870-7 1.
91. See id. at 903-04.
92. Id. at 904.
93. Id. at 905.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
97. Id.
98. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 905. The district court found that the government had
met the "compelling interest" and "least restrict means" tests. Id. at 906-07.
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predictions of commentators who had earlier pointed out that, by failing
to overrule Lyng, RFRA did little for Indians in cases where the federal
government chooses not to accommodate religious uses on property that
it owns and manages.
99
Yet, there remains a (faint) glimmer of hope for RFRA. In Febru-
ary of this year, the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 00 applying RFRA to prevent the
federal government from enforcing a ban on a church's use of a hallu-
cinogen.10 1 Members of the church ("UDV") ingest as a sacrament the
tea known as hoasca brewed from plants that contain DMT, a drug regu-
lated by the Controlled Substances Act.'0 2  When customs inspectors
seized a shipment of hoasca to the church, UDV sought declaratory and
injunctive relief on grounds that the government action violated
RFRA.103 The government conceded burdening UDV's religious free-
dom, but contended that the seizure was the least restrictive means of
furthering its compelling interests in enforcing the Controlled Substance
Act and complying with the United Nations Convention on Psychotropic
Substances. 04
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the government failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest under either the Controlled Substances
Act or U.N. Convention. 0 5 Though the Court recognized the govern-
ment's interest in uniform administration of drug laws, promoting public
safety and welfare, and complying with international law, it also empha-
sized that Congress expressly restored the compelling interest test to
situations like that experienced by UDV.10 6 In this case, application of a
federal law of general applicability would substantially burden a sincere
religious exercise. The government did not provide enough evidence to
justify its burden on the sacramental use of hoasca, particularly in light
of the fact that the government makes exceptions for religious use of
peyote which is also regulated under the Controlled Substance Act (and
which inspired passage of RFRA in the first place).
99. Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring The Establishment Clause In Protect-
ing Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 1291, 1315 & n. 198-99 (1996)
[lI]n the Senate report leading to RFRA, Native American Free-Exercise claims were sin-
gled out for special treatment. Through the report, Congress was assured that RFRA
would not create a cause of action on behalf of Native Americans seeking to protect sa-
cred sites. The Senate report stated that RFRA would not overrule Lyng and that, under
Lyng, 'strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving only management
of internal government affairs or the use of the government's own property or resources.'
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892,
1898 n.19)).
100. 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
101. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 1216.
102. See id at 1217.
103. See id.
104. See id at 1217-18.
105. See id. at 1218, 1221-22.
106. See id at 1224.
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Some commentators believe the unanimous decision in Gonzales
may signal a new willingness of the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice
Roberts, to consider seriously Congress' intent in restoring religious lib-
erty in the post-Smith era. For example, Anthony Picarello, president
and general counsel for the Washington, D.C.-based Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, expressed the view that the decision represents a
"thumping victory for religious accommodation laws [and] [i]t's espe-
cially good news for religious minorities. 10 7
The Gonzales case, and other Supreme Court interpretations of re-
cent religious freedoms statutes, 0 8 may indeed signal a new era for mi-
nority religious practitioners. At the very least, tribal advocates can cite
Gonzales for the unremarkable point that RFRA mandates a compelling
interest analysis when federal programs of general applicability burden
religious freedoms, and argue that this principle should apply to Indians
too. To the extent that the Court has expressly called for "case-by-case
consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules,"
rather than blanket statements of government interests,109 Indian religious
practitioners may have reason to hope that such scrutiny will apply to
federal management of sacred sites on public lands.
On the other hand, it is not clear if such decisions will have any im-
pact on sacred sites litigation. Congress" 0 and the courts"' seem to view
RFRA as a direct response to Smith and its restrictions on individual reli-
gious practitioners' ability to undertake sacraments or other religious
practices required by their religion. By contrast, RFRA says nothing
about Lyng or land-based religious practices, and legislative history
would seem to confirm that it left Lyng in place. 12  Perhaps in some
cases Indian practitioners could still argue that the destruction of a sacred
place prohibits them from conducting a ritual or ceremony mandated by
their religion, thereby appealing to the cases finding RFRA violations
107. David L. Hudson, Jr., Tea and Sympathy: High Court Backs Religion Law: This Time,
Ruling In Religious Drug-Use Case Favors Sacramental Rites, 5 NO. 8 A.B.A. J. E-Report 1 (Feb.
24, 2006).
108. For example, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA) allows federal and state prisoners to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same
standard as set forth in RFRA and limits governments' ability to use land use regulation to interfere
with religious institutions that have a property interest in their religious facility. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc (2006). RLUIPA was recently upheld against a constitutional challenge. See Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005).
109. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 1223-24.
110. RFRA sponsor Senator Orrin Hatch explained: "The elimination of the compelling inter-
est standard has led to a string of lower court decisions eroding freedom of religion in a wide variety
of areas .... The Smith case was wrongly decided and the only way to change it is with this legisla-
tion." 139 Cong. Rec. S14, 353 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
111. See supra notes 85 & 89 (citing Gonzales and Navajo Nation for this point).
112. See Winslow, supra note 99 and accompanying text. In addition to the recent San Fran-
cisco Peaks case, Navajo Nation, RFRA relief has been denied to a Native American couple chal-
lenging the construction of a road through the gravesite of their infant. See Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d
1491, 1493 (10th Cir. 1996).
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where non-Indian religious practitioners have been "prevent[ed] from
engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the faith
mandates."
13
But Indian advocates should note that in the Gonzales case, the par-
ties agreed that the government activity "burdened" the minority religion
by limiting access to the sacramental tea. In sacred sites litigation, from
Lyng to the post-RFRA Navajo Nation case, the courts regularly deny
that the government's neutral regulation of its own property ever consti-
tutes a "burden" on Indian religion. If the courts adhere to this approach,
the Gonzales court's RFRA standard will probably not advance jurispru-
dence in many sacred sites cases, because the courts will rarely reach the
compelling interest/least restrictive means step of the analysis.
2. Property Law Interlude
Of course it is no accident that federal activities on federally-owned
lands are the ones that never give rise to a governmental "burden" on
religion, even as free exercise law otherwise evolves. Rather, I believe
the law reflects an ongoing preference for the rights of property owners
in religious freedoms matters, and that this preference applies whether
the owner is the federal government or private party.'"
4
An example is RFRA's silence on federally-owned sacred sites.
Though it generally restores the compelling interest test to government
activities, RFRA allows the Lyng standard to remain in place when it
comes to lands that the government owns. 115 RFRA seems thereby to
immunize the government from most, if not all, claims that its regulation
of the public lands burdens Indian religious practices. As discussed
below, a privilege for property rights also appear in the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000.116 RLUIPA
limits the government's ability to impose a burden on religion through
land use regulations, but only in cases where the plaintiffs have a prop-
erty interest in the religious institution or place.
17
113. Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2000) (articulating the standard, though rejecting the RFRA claim). For cases finding RFRA
violations, see, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming preliminary
injunction on RFRA claim where school weapons' ban prevented Khalsa Sikh schoolchildren from
carrying kirpans, or ceremonial knives as mandated by their religion), overruled on other grounds by
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). But see United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 920,
924 (9th Cir. 2002) (no RFRA violation where Indian religious practitioner who took eagle feathers
for use in potlatch ceremony was convicted of violating Golden Eagle Protection Act).
114. Indian practitioners and activists seem well-aware of this dynamic. See, e.g., SMITH,
supra note 1, at 66 (quoting Charlotte Black Elk) ("[T]here is a notion in Western socity that if you
own something you have property rights, and those rights are greater than the right of native people
to exercise their religious and cultural uses of that place.").
115. See Winslow, supra note 99, at 1315.
116. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2006).
117. Id.; § 2000cc-5(5).
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Thus, one lesson from the recent cases and statutes is that property
law remains a major factor in the sacred sites framework. While Con-
gress has recognized a need to balance federal power with citizens' reli-
gious interests, it still defers to the rights of property holders. My own
work has focused on this property law dimension of sacred sites dis-
putes.118 1 have first attempted to deconstruct the notion that property law
allows any owner limitless rights over its land." 9 All owners, including
the federal government, have obligations to non-owners, and in some
cases these obligations might include accommodating religious interests
of non-owners. Second, I have attempted to conceptualize ways that
Indians might assert their own property interests in sacred sites, even
when they do not hold title to the property.
20
I realize the relationship between Indian nations and sacred places is
much more expansive, spiritually, culturally, and historically, than An-
glo-American "property" concepts typically capture. As a long-term
goal, I want to push the envelope on those limitations of property law.
121
But more immediately, tribes may be able to bring well-established
property claims growing out of the common law, federal Indian law, and
even international human rights. 122 In the public lands context, there is a
recurring set of events where the federal government claims rights stem-
ming from its "ownership"-and non-Indian users claim competing
rights stemming from things like "mining patents," "grazing permits," or
"public highway easements."' 123 All of these claims have a property law
dimension.
In this climate, it is at least worth considering that Indian nations,
too, might have property use rights at sacred sites. Indians have the
longest and deepest relationship with sacred sites of any of the peoples in
North American, and in some instances, some of those relationships may
be cognizable under property law. Whether in the form of an express
easement reserved through a treaty, a prescriptive easement accrued over
time, or newly acquired right-of-way, Indian nations may be able to es-
tablish a limited right to "use" sacred sites.12 4 In other instances, they
may maintain a land claim including a sacred site. z5 Cases like Navajo
Nation suggest that without such an interest, tribes will not be able to
overcome the courts' perception that ownership gives the government
118. See generally Carpenter, supra note 13.
119. Id. at 1088-91.
120. Id. at 1092-1138.
121. Id. at 1138-42.
122. Id. at 1092-1138.
123. Id. at 1119-31.
124. Id. at 1092-1138.
125. See generally John P. La Velle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by
Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 40 (2001) (on ongoing claims to the Black Hills); Alexandra
New Holy, The Heart of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties, and Lakota Identity, 23 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 317 (1998) (same).
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near absolute rights to trample on Indian religious freedoms, even under
RFRA. On the other hand, litigation under RLUIPA suggests that Indi-
ans may in some cases be able to use property claims to their advantage
in sacred sites cases.
3. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act'
26
RLUIPA creates a cause of action for plaintiffs who can demon-
strate that a government regulation burdens their religious freedom by
"limit[ing] or restrict[ing] a claimant's use or development of land."'
127
Like RFRA, RLUIPA restores the strict scrutiny test by then requiring
the government to show that its burden on religion is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling state interest. 28  Enacted in part to
respond to zoning laws perceived as unfavorable to religious institu-
tions, 129 RLUIPA is explicit about the relationship between religious
freedoms and property rights. The claimant must demonstrate "an own-
ership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the
regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.
'' 30
That is, parties only qualify for RLUIPA protection if they can assert a
property interest in their religious site.
In one recent case, Northern Cheyenne v. Martinez, 131 an Indian na-
tion successfully asserted a property interest sufficient to trigger applica-
tion of RLUIPA. 132 Northern Cheyenne and Lakota religious practitio-
ners challenged the construction of a federally-funded shooting range
near Bear Butte, a spiritually significant mountain. Bear Butte is within
the tribes' traditional territory and was originally reserved to them by
two treaties that were violated, leading to white settlement of the Black
Hills. 133 Bear Butte was purchased in 1961 from private landowners by
the State of South Dakota and placed on the National Historic Register of
Places in 1973.
Despite the change in ownership, Indians continued to visit Bear
Butte for ceremonial purposes. In 2002 and 2003, federal, state, and city
officials joined forces with private developers to propose using public
126. 42. U.S.C. § 2000cc.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(2).
129. See Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9
GEO. MASON L. REv. 929,931 (2001).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).
131. Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction, N.
Cheyenne Tribe v. Martinez, No. Civ. 03-5019 (D.S.D.W.D. May 23, 2003).
132. Id. See also James D. Leach, A Shooting Range at Bear Butte: Reconciliation or Racism?,
50 S.D. L. REV. 244, n.306 (2005).
133. See Steve Young, A Broken Treaty Haunts the Black Hills, ARGUS LEADER, June 27,
2001, available at http://www.argusleader.com/specialsections/2001/bighom/Wednesdayfeature.
shtnrd. For a map illustrating the location of Bear Butte and other sacred sites relative to the Treaty
of Ft. Laramie of 1851, see http://www.sacredland.org/historicalsites_pages/black-hills.html.
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funds for a large shooting range in the western part of the state. They
picked a site several miles from Bear Butte, where religious practitioners
engaged in "prayer, fasting, and Vision Quest" would undoubtedly hear
"the piercing sound of gunfire--perhaps thousands of rounds a day".
1 34
The tribal plaintiffs complained that "by placing the shooting range
within earshot of Bear Butte, defendants' land use regulation limited and
restricted the tribes' use of their land" as prohibited by RLUIPA.
135
Advocates for the tribes in Northern Cheyenne argued that, notwith-
standing the land's status as a state-owned park, the tribal plaintiffs met
RLUIPA's property requirement." 136 They alleged three types of prop-
erty interests at Bear Butte State Park: small tracts of parcels owned in
fee by two tribes, land held by the federal government in trust for two
tribes, and a right of way.
137
Relying on RLUIPA and RFRA, the federal district court granted a
preliminary injunction preventing the federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development from disbursing funds for the shooting range.'
38
State lawmakers then withdrew their support and funding, prompting the
city and private developers to abandon the project. 139 Thus the underly-
ing dispute became moot and neither the district court nor the Eighth
Circuit issued a final decision on the merits of RLUIPA or the other reli-
gious freedoms claims. 140 Nevertheless, Northern Cheyenne is one of the
rare, pathbreaking cases where tribes have effectively asserted property
interests as part of a successful strategy to protect religious freedoms at
sacred sites. In the long run, of course, tribes may seek outright return of
their sacred sites through litigation, legislation, or trust programs. But a
more feasible, short-term approach could be for tribes to emulate the
Northern Cheyenne example by acquiring small property interests, such
as title to modest amounts of acreage or express easements, that are eli-
gible for RLUIPA protection.
C. The Claims of Non-Indians
As the above discussion suggests, many scholars and advocates fo-
cus on securing for Indians a baseline of religious freedoms protection at
federally-owned sacred sites, as against threats by the federal govern-
134. Leach, supra note 132, at 245.
135. Leach, supra note 132, at 279.
136. See Leach, supra note 132, at 279 & nn.308-09.
137. See Leach, supra note 132, at 246 & on.18-19.
The Northern Cheyenne Tribe and Rosebud Sioux Tribe own land at Bear Butte. The
United States owns land there in trust for the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma
and for the Northern Cheyenne Tribe with a reserved right of access for other Indians for
whom the area has a traditional religious significance.
Id. (citing evidence including warranty deed, maps, and depositions describing property rights).
138. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1084 (8th Cir. 2006).
139. See Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 433 F. 3d at 1084.
140. See id. at 1085 (district court grant of preliminary injunction for tribes did not make them
"prevailing parties" for the purposes of eligibility for attorneys fees under RFRA and RLUIPA).
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ment and other non-Indian parties. 41 Given the overwhelming historical
and contemporary oppression of Indian religion and culture,1 42 I believe
this is an appropriate focus. Yet, any meaningful long-term solution to
disputes over sacred places on federal public lands must also take into
account non-Indian concerns. Non-Indians have strong interests in the
public lands, and power with which to assert them. Indians and non-
Indians will be encountering each other on the public lands for quite
some time to come. Thus, it is important to think seriously about non-
Indian claims on federal public lands that are sacred to Indians.
Non-Indians (and many Indians too) are interested in using feder-
ally-owned lands for specific economic, recreational, and other activi-
ties.1 43 Non-Indians may also have spiritual or symbolic attachments to
the public lands. 144 We might consider the American people's attach-
ment to concepts of wilderness 145 and national pride 146 embodied in the
national parks. Less easy to understand in 2006 is some non-Indians'
desire to maintain the federal public lands as a symbol of American con-
quest over the west and its original indigenous inhabitants-yet such
sentiments are deeply felt and underlie sacred sites disputes. 147  Other
examples include the Church of Latter Day Saints and its desire to pre-
141. See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, Accommodating Native American Cultural Activities On Fed-
eral Public Lands, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 475, 562 (2005) (analyzing "the management of public lands
from the perspective of an Native American activist seeking to enforce through judicial means what
she sees is her right").
142. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nine-
teenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases,
49 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1997).
143. See generally Ray Rasker, Wilderness for Its Own Sake or as Economic Asset?, 25 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15 (2005).
144. See Jon K. Abdoney, Comment, Environmental Ethics: The Geography of the Soul, 27
CuMB. L. REV. 1217, 1236 (1996-1997) ("[O]ur freedom as a community lies in what externally
gives us definition, sentimental or not, America's communal attachment to Mount Rushmore, to the
California Redwoods, or to Ellis Island reflects a need for an iconography that then defines Ameri-
cans before themselves and to themselves.").
145. See RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS & THE AMERICAN MIND, 350-51 (4th ed.
2001); MAX OELSCHLAEGER, THE IDEA OF WILDERNESS 3 (1991).
146. See National Park Service, Mount Rushmore National Monument, South Dakota,
http://www.nps.gov/moru/park history/carvinghist/carving history.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006)
("Carved into the southeast face of a mountain in South Dakota are the faces of four presidents, a
memorial to American history. The faces of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore
Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln look down from their stoney heights and remind everyone that even
the impossible is possible.").
147. See also MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS 55-70 (1999) (on the
use of military force and other tactics to remove Indians from Yellowstone National Park, making
room for white uses, values, and occupation); Derek De Bakker, The Court of Last Resort: American
Indians in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 1 I CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 939, 970 &
n.242 (2004) (describing the carving of Mount Rushmore as a "final act of humiliation" against the
Sioux to make clear that the United States has no intention of returning the Black Hills). Compare
SMITH, supra note I, at 67.
I love Mt. Rushmore, because every time I look at that monstrosity I know that I will
never back down on being Lakota. Everyone of those gentlemen up there represents in-
stitutionalized genocide against the American Indian people . . .So long as that thing,
Mount Rushmore, sits in our sacred lands, I have a responsibility to live my culture.
Id. (quoting Charlotte Black Elk).
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serve places associated with the Mormon migration to Utah;148 rural
communities of white ranchers, loggers, or miners, with a shared need
and desire to maintain a certain way of life; 149 and the intergenerational
claims of Hispanic families who maintain subsistence uses dating back to
the Spanish land grants of their ancestors.
50
Even with this short list, we can see non-Indian interests manifest-
ing in numerous public lands settings, some of which may be sacred to
American Indians. This reality presents complex questions. How do we
choose between people's livelihoods and religious freedoms? Between
national and cultural identities? Among competing religions? Advo-
cates and scholars have considered how to negotiate Indian and non-
Indian interests at sacred sites, 51 but additional work is still needed to
develop frameworks for prioritizing claims, facilitating accommodations
where possible, and making difficult choices where necessary. In a sub-
sequent article, I will discuss these questions in the context of federal
agencies' ability to address the competing claims of groups at sacred
sites on public lands.
CONCLUSION
Sacred sites jurisprudence is sufficiently developed so that we have
a legal framework to guide advocacy in this area. Lyng teaches that Indi-
ans will not often be successful in Free Exercise Clause claims challeng-
ing the federal government's use of its own property, even if it interferes
with Indian religious freedom. But Bear Lodge suggests that courts will
uphold agency accommodations of Indian religious practices, particularly
if such measures only request that non-Indian voluntarily refrain from
activities that threaten Indian ceremonies and observances. Recent stat-
utes and innovative approaches by scholars shape Indian claims at feder-
ally-owned sacred sites, but do not significantly alter the Lyng/Bear
Lodge framework. At this point, lawyers need to work toward securing
more meaningful, permanent religious freedoms for Indian practitioners,
while also coming to terms with the interests of non-Indians. Hopefully
in the next generation of sacred sites advocacy, we can restore harmony
148. See generally Kevin Holdsworth, Why Martin's Cove Matters, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1003
(2006).
149. Compare Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and
Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 721 (2005) (critiquing federal policy promoting grazing on public
lands as founded on "beliefs ... that public-land ranching is a culture worth preserving, supports
small communities, and is vital to maintaining open space").
150. See Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (2003).
151. See, e.g., Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach
to Cultural Conflict Over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
757 (2001); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public
Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413 (2002).
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at various places, and among various peoples, on the western land-
scape. 
52
152. See SWITH, supra note 1, at 185 (on "the numerous creative efforts at healing the great
divide between the indigenous peoples and colonizing powers whose influence is still felt").
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This paper will focus on a lease agreement, signed in October,
2004, between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS Church) that allows the LDS
Church control over a historical site known as Martin's Cove, located in
Natrona County, Wyoming.' Martin's Cove is located adjacent to the
Oregon, California, Pony Express, and Mormon Pioneer Trails, and it
was, according to the LDS Church, the site of the deaths of a number of
Utah-bound emigrants who perished as a result of fall blizzards in 1856.2
In addition to the historical claim, the LDS Church has claimed that Mar-
tin's Cove is sacred to its followers, and the leased land is presently used
for a number of religious observances as well as historical reenactments.3
The LDS Church has also claimed that since the BLM is under-funded
and under-staffed, it is in essence doing the BLM a favor in running the
site and helping to accommodate and manage the large number of Mar-
tin's Cove and historic trail pilgrims.4
As we will see, the entire process of H.R. 27545 has been marked by
misinformation (if not deception), unprecedented collaboration between
the BLM and a private group, in this case a religious organization, and
the lease raises a number of troubling questions for historical preserva-
tion groups, civil libertarians, descendents of pioneers, and ordinary citi-
zens.
A few years ago, the LDS Church began to show a new interest in
using and acquiring land along the historic trails to be used by church
members for pilgrimages and faith-enhancing experiences. In 1996, the
LDS Church purchased the Tom Sun Ranch, located near an imposing
granite formation known as Devil's Gate, which was an important land-
t Kevin Holdsworth, associate professor of English and co-director of western American
studies at Western Wyoming Community College in Rock Springs, Wyoming. He is the author of a
book to be published by University Press, Boulder, Colorado: KEVIN HOLDSWORTH, BIG
WONDERFUL (forthcoming Oct. 2006).
1. H.R. 2754, 108th Cong., Pub. L. No. 108-137, 117 Stat. 1827, 1863-64 (2003), authorized
the Martin's Cove lease agreement. Previously, H.R. 4103 had been proposed to sell the land to the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.
2. Becky Bohrer, Casper Hearing (May 5, 2002), http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/
EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/sale/casper-hearing.htm.
3. Id.
4. Wyoming Church Leaders Call for Passage of Martin's Cove Land Conveyance Legisla-
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mark along the historic trails. The LDS Church made a number of im-
provements to the Sun Ranch and changed its name to the Mormon
Handcart Ranch. A visitor's center was constructed in an old ranch
house, several outbuildings were turned into museums, and other visitor
facilities were built.
Since 1996, increasing numbers of church members have made
summertime reenactments of the handcart treks of the 1850s, featuring
period costumes, assumed identities, and roughing it on the trailside
(though most treks have been supported by automobiles-"sag wagons"
that carried supplies). By 2005, it was estimated that 70,000 people an-
nually were visiting the Mormon Handcart Ranch, with about 12,500
trekkers using nearby public land.6 The BLM had to implement a reser-
vation and fee system to try to control the impacts on the landscape, and
the agency instituted a system that limited the number of trekkers to
7,500 annually, with the maximum group size of 200, and a fee of $4 per
7person.
Today, the Mormon Handcart Ranch serves as a staging area for re-
enactment treks, a place for religious gatherings, seminars for church
members, and as a site for curious tourists. The visitor center and other
museums seek to interpret and explain history in a style similar to Na-
tional Park Service visitor centers. The interpretive staff, however, are
all LDS missionaries, often retired church members who are called by
church authorities to serve as missionaries for a set period of time.
The history of H.R. 2754 requires some background information.
Martin's Cove is an area of approximately 1000 acres, managed by the
BLM, and located just to the west and north of the Mormon Handcart
Ranch. Former Representative James V. Hansen of Utah first proposed
the sale of Martin's Cove to the LDS Church in 2001 .8 Hansen's pro-
posal was met with a great deal of opposition within Wyoming.9 Opin-
ion polls showed that a majority of Wyomingites did not favor a sale.1 °
Wyoming's two senators, Craig Thomas and Mike Enzi, publicly an-
nounced their opposition to the sale. l l Wyoming's sole Representative,
6. Letter from Barbara Dobos, Alliance for Historic Wyoming to Editor, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (undated), http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/EmigrantTmils/MartinsCove (follow
"Attempts to Buy Cove" hyperlink; then follow "LDS Environmental Ethic" hyperlink) (last visited
Apr. 6, 2006).
7. BLM Signs Decision Record for Group Trekking on the Oregon-Mormon Pioneer Na-
tional Historic Trails in Lander, http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/EmigrantTrails/
RockyRidge/Decision Record Issued.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
8. Bohrer, supra note 2.
9. See Public Testimony, http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/EmigrantTrails/
MartinsCove/sale/public testimonyHR4103.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
10. Martin's Cove Scoping Statement Released, http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/
EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/lease/scopinglindex.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
11. Press Release, Senator Craig Thomas, Martin's Cove Statement (June 17, 2002), available
at http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/Sale/
thomasstatementpassage_4103.htm [hereinafter Thomas, June 2002 Release] (discussing Senator
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Barbara Cubin, was officially undecided. 12 Senator Thomas released the
following statement:
I firmly believe the sale of federal land to cultural or religious or-
ganizations would set a bad precedent, and I have seen no evidence
that suggests the current management situation between the Mormon
Church and the Bureau of Land Management is not working. Be-
cause of this, I would prefer to see this current relationship continue.
I will continue to oppose the Martin's Cove legislation when it
moves to the Senate and the Energy and Natural Resources Commit-
tee. I have made my position on the sale quite clear to my colleagues
here in the Senate, and will continue to stress that the arrangement is
working for both the church and the public. The Martin's Cove area
is public land in Wyoming, and I feel that decisions regarding our
public lands ought to reflect the will of our people.
13
The sale proposal reached an impasse.
The BLM then proposed to lease the land to the church. Initially
the LDS Church rejected the lease option for a variety of reasons. The
BLM continued to press forward with the lease option. The Executive
Director of the BLM, Kathleen Clark, was a former Utahan who once
worked for Representative Hansen. Clark showed interest in assisting
the church in its attempts to purchase or lease the land.
Pressure and a visit to the Cove seemed to alter Senator Tho-
mas's opposition:
While I led the fight to prevent an outright land transfer of Martin's
Cove, I have said all along that the BLM and the church should work
together to reach a reasonable agreement and I am pleased that this
proposal has come forward. Having visited the site, I am impressed
with the facilities that have been developed on the adjacent private
lands. The facilities help inform and educate the public to the impor-
tant events that happened there, and it blends well with maintaining
access to this public resource.
14
In the spring of 2003, closed-door meetings were held in Cheyenne
with representatives of the BLM and the LDS Church in attendance.
Church representatives included a Riverton, Wyoming church leader,
Lloyd Larsen, a Cheyenne lawyer, Brent Kunz, as well as Clint Ensign,
the Vice President for Government Relations of Sinclair Oil, a company
Thomas' opposition). The author deduces Senator Enzi's often-stated position from the author's
own observation of various news stories on the matter.
12. Bohrer, supra note 2.
13. Thomas, June 2002 Release, supra note 11.
14. Press Release, Senator Craig Thomas, BLM Offers Lease Agreement for Martin's Cove,
Thomas Says (Jan. 16, 2003), available at, http://www.sufpw.org/historicwyoming/EmigrantTrails/
MartinsCove/lease/LeaseOffered.htm [hereinafter, Thomas, Jan. 2003 Release].
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with significant Wyoming holdings, owned by billionaire Earl Holding.' 5
Earl Holding's other Wyoming businesses included the Little America
resorts located west of Green River and in Cheyenne. 16 The result of the
closed-door meetings was a proposal to lease 933 acres of Martin's Cove
to the LDS Church for a period of twenty-five years for an annual fee of
$17,000.17 Scoping documents were prepared, and following continued
public pressure, the relevant Congressional Subcommittee held one pub-
lic meeting in Casper, Wyoming. The BLM prepared an Environmental
Assessment in near-record time, complete with the required (and nowa-
days virtually obligatory) Finding of No Significant Impact.18 H.R. 2754
was attached to an omnibus spending bill and passed Congress in De-
cember, 2003. It was signed into law in October, 2004.19
The Martin's Cove lease surely demonstrates a new spirit of coop-
eration between the federal government, in this case the BLM, and the
LDS Church. (In the past, particularly in the nineteenth century, the
LDS Church did not have peaceful relations with the federal govern-
ment.) The lease agreement may have set a precedent of national signifi-
cance: the leasing of public land of historical significance to a private
entity, in this case a religious organization. The lease agreement also
begs the following questions: Who should interpret publicly-held or
publicly-important historic sites? How accurate does historical informa-
tion about a disaster have to be? What constitutes hallowed ground or a
sacred place? Does the Martin's Cove lease violate the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause? Did the BLM grant the lease to the LDS
Church based on the uniqueness of the LDS claim: that the emigrant
deaths that may have occurred there warranted such an extraordinary
measure? Are the BLM and the federal government setting a new prece-
dent by which other groups may make claims for sacred ground?
Before we can examine these questions, it's important to have some
historical background.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The year in question was 1856. Because of the success of overseas
missionary work, as well as the promise of a new start in the New World,
large numbers of European Mormon converts wanted to make the jour-
ney to the Territory of Deseret (Utah), to join in building Salt Lake City




17. John Morgan, Church Attempts Religious Balance at Martin's Cove, CASPER STAR-TRIB.,
May 31, 2005, available at http://www.historicwyoming.org/EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/
seekingbalance.htm.
18. Press Release, Alliance for Historic Wyoming, AHW Reacts to FONSI (Oct. 1, 2004),
http://www.historicwyoming.org/EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/press-release-toFONSI.htm.
19. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137.
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and settling outlying areas. Brigham Young, territorial governor and
church president, came up with a system to move Saints cheaply and
quickly across the plains.20 The first part of the plan was to use church
money to set up the Perpetual Emigration Fund to be used to pay for ship
passage across the Atlantic, train fare from the Eastern seaboard or New
Orleans to Iowa City, and then overland travel across the Great Plains to
Utah.21 Young was duly installed as president of the Perpetual Emigra-
tion Fund.22 The second part of the system came in the form of hand-
carts, which were easier to make and move, as well as cheaper, than
wagons with ox teams.23
Church agents made all the arrangements for the Atlantic crossing,
including chartering ships.24 For a variety of reasons, during the winter
of 1855-56 it was difficult to obtain shipping for the converts, and the
ships were delayed in embarking from Liverpool.25 Passengers in the
ship Thornton didn't leave Liverpool until May 4, and passengers on the
Horizon didn't leave until May 25.26 These emigrants didn't reach Iowa
City until July, where further delays ensued.27 (Normally, west-bound
emigrants would leave in March or April.) The two groups of emigrants
from these two ships would be known by their captain's names: the Wil-
lie Company, which left Iowa City on July 15, and the Martin Company,
which left on July 26.28 Such a late start ensured that these emigrants
would probably not reach the Salt Lake Valley before November-a very
risky proposition given the weather of the high steppes and Rocky
Mountains they would have to cross, as well as the likelihood of slow
progress because of the presence of a number of very young and very old
emigrants.
II. DIFFERENCES IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
There have arisen several distinct versions of the subsequent events
of 1856: (1) The official LDS Church version exists in church-sponsored
displays at the Mormon Handcart Ranch visitor's center (adjacent to
Martin's Cove and on private land.) This information is generally accu-
rate and well-illustrated. It does leave out the idea of responsibility, that
is, who made the decisions in question, but it does present selected in-
formation in an accurate way. In other words, it explains what happens
but not necessarily why. It sticks to bald facts and tries not to embellish
20. LEROY R. HAFEN & ANN W. HAFEN, HANDCARTS TO ZION 23 (Bison Books 1992)
(1960).
21. Id. at 23-24.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 29-30.
24. Id. at 38.
25. Id. at 47-48.
26. Id. at 46.
27. Id. at 91-92.
28. See WALLACE STEGNER, THE GATHERING OF ZION 239 (1964).
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or explain; (2) The traditional version is the more informal or colloquial
version of events taught to young Mormons and mythologized in the
culture. This version relies primarily on faith and faith-enhancement.
This version tends to ground such abstractions as sacrifice, faith, and
obedience in the story of the handcart pioneers. This is the version that
is often presented by the LDS missionaries who work as tour guides at
Martin's Cove; and (3) The other version is more scholarly and based on
research with primary (mainly personal journal) sources, as well as Per-
petual Emigration Fund records, in LDS Church possession. The two
most useful books about the handcart pioneers are now quite old, Hand-
carts to Zion by LeRoy and Ann Hafen (1960), and The Gathering of
Zion by Wallace Stegner (1964). A new book about the disasters is ex-
pected soon from the University of Utah Press written by an independent
historian Lyndia Carter.
Interestingly, the importance and focus of the tale of the handcart
emigrants has changed over the years. 29 According to historian Lyndia
Carter, "At the time it happened, these handcart company deaths made
the church look bad, they made Brigham Young look bad and, as a result,
a shroud of silence came down for many years and the event was never
discussed.,
30
At the Sun Ranch visitor's center and elsewhere, for example on the
official LDS website,31 interpretive material attempts to put a positive
spin on historical events. Another example is, "Presiding Bishop David
H. Burton told a house subcommittee last month [May, 2002] that church
ownership [of Martin's Cove] would preserve the site and educate visi-
tors about what he called 'the most heroic single event in the Mormon
pioneer experience of the nineteenth century."'' 32 The heroism in ques-
tion is probably the heroism of the rescuers, who came from Salt Lake
City and met the then-stranded emigrants in late October, 1856.
Two areas of potential embarrassment are the Perpetual Emigration
Fund, a church-sponsored system to pay for the emigrants' trans-Atlantic
and Great Plains crossing, as well as the ultimate responsibility for the
delays of the Willie and Martin Companies-and who actually made the
decisions to allow them to leave so late in the year.
In the official LDS church version, the Perpetual Emigration Fund
is presented as a benevolent method by which poor converts could make
the crossing to Utah. The fact is that the Perpetual Emigration Fund was
29. Christopher Smith, Tragic Handcart Account Evolved over the Years, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
June 30, 2002, at BI.
30. Id
31. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Martin's Cove,
http://www.lds.org/gospellibrary/pioneer/28_MartinsCove.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2006) [herein-
after LDS Web].
32. Smith, supra note 29.
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by no means free, and it resembled a system of partial indenturement.
According to the official LDS church European publication, The Mil-
lenial Star, in order to repay the cost of the Atlantic and Great Plains
crossing, emigrants understood, agreed to, and would be subject to this
clause: "and that on our arrival in Utah, we will hold ourselves, our time,
and our labour subject to the appropriation of the Perpetual Emigrating
Fund Company, until the full cost of our emigration is paid, with interest
if required.
33
In the traditional version of these events, delays are explained away
as unfortunate matters for which no one had actual responsibility, and in
the official version Brigham Young points the finger at someone else,
when in fact the distant leaders should have known better and probably
did.34 Mormons had been living in the Rocky Mountain West for nearly
ten years and would have known how quickly the weather could turn at
seven or eight thousand feet in elevation. To put the blame simply on the
weather leaves out half the story and absolves some of their responsibil-
ity. Wallace Stegner suggests at the very least the delays were "crimi-
nally careless., 35 The finger should be pointed directly at those who
oversaw the emigrant's progress and the Perpetual Emigration Fund, as
well as church agents in Liverpool and in the States. The emigrants were
under the control of the church authorities; their decisions were not their
own. According to Lyndia Carter, "I believe that if you're going to tell
the history objectively, tell the complete history, not just the traditional
version. And the side of the story that people never hear is that some
guys really goofed up."
36
October and early November 1856 featured dreadful weather: in-
tense cold, constant wind, and near-daily storms. Members of the Willie
and Martin companies suffered greatly. Any Wyomingite knows how
savage fall blizzards can be, and this was a worst case scenario come to
life. Imagine pulling handcarts through days of blizzards without proper
rations, gear, or clothing. Rations, which had already been reduced,
were reduced further still. The emigrants had been told to take no more
than seventeen total pounds of clothing and bedding and had received
insufficient provisions in the first place.37 Truly faithful, they hoped that
a miracle would provide them with more. The miracle did not come and
the emigrants began to die. They died from exposure, frostbite, malnutri-
tion, starvation, disease, injuries, and exhaustion.
Actually, all along the trail the old, the infirm, the young, and the
weak died. John Chislett, a member of the Willie Company, remarked
33. HAFEN & HAFEN, supra note 20, at 39-40.
34. STEGNER, supra note 28, at 238.
35. Id.
36. Smith, supra note 29, at B 1.
37. HAFEN & HAFEN, supra note 20, at 102.
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that it would seem odd to leave a campground without having to bury
one or more persons.38 These October blizzards, however, certainly in-
creased the number of deaths. How many of these pitiful emigrants died
is not subject to documentary rigor at the LDS Church-operated facili-
ties. The missionaries at Martin's Cove routinely claim that 200 emi-
grants died there. This is patently and demonstrably false.
The handcart companies kept good records. Between 135 and 150
members of Martin's Company died between Iowa City and Great Salt
Lake City.39 Some died when still in the States, some died between
modem-day Casper and a place called Greasebrush Creek, some died
along the endless run of the Sweetwater River, some died while holed up
near Martin's Cove, and still others died after the Martin's Company was
rescued and was on its way to Great Salt Lake City.
The Willie Company lost sixty-seven of its members along the
trail,40 but none of them died at Martin's Cove. The Willie Company
was about two weeks ahead of the Martin Company and had already
passed by the Cove when they were overtaken by the snowstorms in
question. To reiterate: these tragic deaths may have been avoided had the
emigrants left Iowa City earlier. They did not leave earlier because of
delays caused by mismanagement, lack of funds, bad luck, ignorance,
and hubris. When they left was by no means the individual responsibil-
ity of poor emigrants. But rather than accepting what should be official
responsibility, modem church spokesmen equivocate, seeking to praise
and celebrate the emigrants' courage-which was formidable and which
no one questions-and also praise the fortitude and heroism of the rescu-
ers, rather than telling the entire story of the disaster. Brigham Young is
let off the hook because he, having been informed of the plight of the
handcart companies by Franklin D. Richards, organized the rescue at-
tempts in October. 4' The most we ever hear is "mistakes were made."
This brings us to the exact location of Martin's Cove and its alleged
historical significance. Kit Kimball is an Idaho native who serves as
Director of the Office of External and Intergovernmental Affairs within
the Department of the Interior. In her prepared remarks before the House
Resources Committee, Subcommittee on National Parks, Recreation and
Public Lands, public hearing held in Casper, Wyoming on May 4, 2002,
she stated:
Martin's Cove was listed on the National Register of Historic Sites in
1977. It is significant because in 1856, Mormon pioneers traveling
west pushing handcarts were trapped by a severe early winter snow-
storm at Martin's Cove and it is estimated that between 135 and 150
38. STEGNER, supra note 28, at 245.
39. HAFEN & HAFEN, supra note 20, at 193.
40. Id.
41. See id. at ll9-21.
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of the pioneers perished .... The Department [of Interior] recog-
nizes the unique significance of Martin's Cove to the [LDS] Church
and understands and supports the intent of this proposed legislation
[H.R. 4103] to enable the Church to manage the site's historic re-
sources through educational and recreational opportunities for all
members of the public.
42
Notice that Ms. Kimball is making the claim that between 135 and 150
pioneers perished at Martin's Cove.
Officially, the LDS Church is not able to go this far. The LDS
Church website explains the significance of Martin's Cove this way:
Having started late from Iowa and suffered innumerable mishaps and
miscalculations along the way, two handcart companies under the
leadership of Captains Edward Martin and James G. Willie were
caught in early snows near the Continental Divide in 1856. In one of
the greatest tragedies in overland trail history, hundreds died of expo-
sure and starvation before rescuers from the Salt Lake Valley brought
them to this location a few miles west of Devil's Gate in early No-
vember.4
3
Note here the carefully parsed language. The Martin and Willie
Companies were separated and, again, the Willie Company had already
passed the Cove. It is true that several dozen members of the Martin
Company had died of exposure and starvation before rescuers brought
them to this location (Martin's Cove-if they in fact did) a few (four)
miles west of Devil's Gate in early November.
The only problem with both the traditional version of events, as re-
lated by Ms. Kimball, and the more official and careful version repre-
sented by lds.org, as well as the statement by Senator Thomas regarding
"important events that happened here" is that all of the claims are erro-
neous.
Hafen and Hafen cite documentary evidence of eyewitnesses and
rescue-party members. S.F. Kimball relates that the Martin Company
lost over fifty-six people in the nine days since crossing the North Platte
and their meeting with rescuers, sixteen miles east of Devil's Gate (nine-
teen miles east of Martin's Cove) at a place called Greasebrush Creek."4
Rescuer Joseph A. Young agrees that the Martin Company was found
42. Martin's Cove Land Transfer Act: Hearing on H.R. 4103 before the Subcomm. on Nat'l
Parks, Rec. and Pub. Lands of the H. Resource Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Kit Kim-
ball, Dir. of External and Intergovernmental Affairs, Dep't of the Interior), available at
http://www.blm.gov//nhp/news/legislative/pages/2002/teO20504.htm.
43. See LDS Web, supra note 31.
44. HAFEN & HAFEN, supra note 20, at 114-16.
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sixteen miles east of Devil's Gate. 45 Rescuer George D. Grant also con-
firms these facts.46
Apparently, the Martin Company members were brought by the res-
cuers to Devil's Gate, where there was a fort (now called Fort Seminoe)
and some sheltering buildings. They waited out the worst of the storms
there.
Barbara Dobos, a former Wyoming state legislator and co-founder
of Alliance for Historic Wyoming, has repeatedly stated that there is no
evidence that the Martin Company was ever even at Martin's Cove. She
stated, "Archeological surveys done by the BLM at the time the trails
were put in found no archeological evidence related to the Martin Com-
pany having been in the area. Nothing. There is evidence of Amerindian
use of the site-mainly lithic indications of hunting."47 Dobos goes on to
cite Lyndia Carter "who can account for 20-25 deaths at the time the
party camped at Devil's Gate-from her journal research" but none at
the spot the Church claims as sacred.48
A visit to the site confirms these facts. Devil's Gate is a natural
rock formation that would have provided some shelter from the prevail-
ing westerly winds. Moreover, there was a fort and some buildings at
Devil's Gate in 1856. (Though it is clear that there would not have been
enough room for all the emigrants and rescuers at the tiny fort.) The site
the Church claims as hallowed and where 135-150 allegedly died would
be the last place a person would pick to seek shelter. It is several hun-
dred feet above the river and away from the trail on an open slope that
faces directly west, into the prevailing winds, and about two and one-half
miles from the fort. A person would pick such a place in a blizzard only
in order to die quickly.
The late historian Aubrey Haines spent many years studying the
Mormon Trail. Haines believed that the actual site of the Martin en-
campment was located east of the Church's sacred place, much closer to
the river, closer to the fort, and more sheltered from the wind. As Bar-
bara Dubos states, "The unlikely exposure/altitude factors led [Haines] to
believe that the Martin Company huddled nearer the river and on the
eastern face of the basin. '49 Again, a visit to the site supports Haines'
hypothesis.
45. Id. at 230-31.
46. Id. at 227-29.
47. E-mail from Barbara Dobos, Board of Directors, Alliance for Historic Wyoming, to Kevin
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III. INTERPRETING MARTIN'S COVE
To review the salient facts: Deaths occurred all along the trail. The
Martin and Willie companies were separated, with the Willie Company
being several miles west of Martin's Cove when the worst snowstorms
hit. Members of the Martin Company report fifty-six deaths between the
crossing of the North Platte (modem-day Casper) and where the rescuers
first reached the Martin Company, at a place now called Greasebrush
Creek, nineteen miles east of Martin's Cove. There is no archaeological
evidence that the Martin Company camped at the spot the LDS Church
claims as sacred. What is probable is that the Martin Company holed up
at the Devil's Gate fort and also another location less than a half mile
away on the eastern side of the Cove. It is likely, then, that no one actu-
ally died in the location the LDS Church claims as sacred, although some
members of the Martin Company perished on the eastern (rather than the
western, "sacred") side of Martin's Cove, close to the Sweetwater River.
If the historical basis for the sacred claim is discounted or elimi-
nated, and it should be, then we move into a more subjective area. It is
clear that the LDS Church-sponsored interpretation would proffer Mar-
tin's Cove to represent the suffering of the emigrants in aggregate, to
provide one single place to celebrate, as it were, and re-enact the horrors.
This is fine, but the question remains: should public land be leased and
used by a private group to form a kind of memorial for sacrifice and suf-
fering that did not occur at that exact place?
When we go to Gettysburg, we want to believe that Pickett's
Charge took place exactly where it is presented. We are able to see ac-
tual landmarks such as the Cornfield, Cemetery Ridge, Spangler's Wood,
the Peach Orchard and so on. There is a general understanding that in
cases where public land is used, there needs to a certain measure of his-
torical accuracy.
Imagine if at Yellowstone Park there were no Park Service interpre-
tive rangers or Park Service official publications. What if interpretation
at the park were done by concessionaries-that a visitor might get
slanted historical information along with a grilled cheese and Diet Pepsi
at Old Faithful? More directly analogous, of course, would be interpreta-
tion done by a religious group, whether Catholic, Protestant or Jewish.
Some people would be uncomfortable with this.
On site, some visitors to the Mormon Handcart Ranch and Martin's
Cove might be highly uncomfortable with the proselytizing that goes on
there. Under the present lease arrangement, LDS missionaries act as
guides and interpreters on public land.
ElDean Holiday, caretaker for Martin's Cove and a LDS mission-
ary, is quoted in an article in the May 31, 2005 Casper Star Tribune,
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"We are the only LDS site in the world that doesn't proselytize."50 Nev-
ertheless, the same article mentions that forty-three missionary couples
currently work at the Mormon Handcart Ranch and Martin's Cove.
Given the emphasis the LDS Church places on proselytizing, the pres-
ence of these forty-three couples, and it seems unlikely that these eighty-
six people are merely there to answer questions and would have nothing
to say about their belief in the teachings of the LDS Church.
It may well be that Martin's Cove does have some extra-historical
significance to members of the LDS Church. It may be that some type
of revelatory event has occurred. This is supported by a plaque installed
at the Mormon Handcart Ranch in 1997 wherein current Church presi-
dent Gordon B. Hinckley makes the claim that this place [Martin's Cove]
is hallowed ground. Martin's Cove has a number of special sites that are
used as places of pilgrimage and devotion. It's not really possible to
argue one way or the other on this. If something is claimed to be sacred,
and if that claim is based on revelation, then that's fine, but it is abso-
lutely not something the government ought to endorse. For the BLM to
endorse this extra-historical version of events, and to promote it by
agreeing to a lease and giving all control over the area to the LDS
Church and its representatives, is deeply troubling.
Mormon authority Jan Shipps has pointed out that this looseness
with the facts may be an example of "holy history," that is, a not-exactly-
accurate version of events designed to enhance faith.51 Others point to
examples of the many dozens of hand bones of individual saints found in
European cathedrals to various stories of miracles, healings, and the
like.52 Given that possibility, government agencies should perhaps not
be in the business of promoting "holy history."
IV. MARTIN'S COVE TODAY
If you wish to visit Martin's Cove today, as I did most recently on
September 10, 2005, you will have some choices. There is an area des-
ignated for public parking, as well as signs which will allow a member of
the general public to walk two and one-half miles to the Cove. Chances
are a Mormon missionary will greet you, but the missionaries-probably
as the result of the pending ACLU lawsuit53-have been instructed not to
50. John Morgan, Church Attempts Religious Balance at Martin's Cove, CASPER STAR
TRIBUNE, May 31, 2005, available at http://www.historicwyoming.org/EmigrantTrails/
MartinsCove/seekingbalance.htm.
51. Michael Riley, Mormons, ACLU at Odds Over Future of Sacred Site, DENVER POST, July
24, 2005, available at http://www.rickross.com/reference/mormon/mormon249.html.
52. Id.
53. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Wyoming Residents, Including Decedents
of Mormon Pioneers, Sue to Block LDS Church Control of National Historic Site, Mar. 9, 2005,
http://www.aclu.org/ (search for "Holdsworth"; then follow "Wyoming Residents .... Sue to Block"
hyperlink) (discussing complaint, W. Land Exch. Project v. Norton, No. 05 CV 076 2005 WL
731986 (D. Wyo. Mar. 9, 2005)).
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proselytize.54 If you are a member of the LDS Church or would like to
tour the LDS-owned facilities at the Mormon Handcart Ranch, you will
encounter a number of friendly and helpful LDS missionaries. Most of
the missionaries, who live in a trailer village a few miles away, will be
dressed in period costumes. All will be wearing name tags.
Because of unclear signage, as a member of the public, you may
wander into the Mormon Handcart Ranch without knowing what to ex-
pect. You may be confused what is LDS-owned and what is LDS-leased.
A large sign in the parking lot will proclaim that the LDS Church owns
Martin's Cove, which it does not. You may see a large number of cars in
the parking lots and see a large number of people having some type of
closed religious meetings at buildings on Church property (the former
Sun Ranch). If you don't want to, or are unable to, walk the two and
one-half miles to the actual sacred site, you can get a ride from one of the
missionaries in a Kawasaki six-wheeler, via a back way that is not adver-
tised to the public, and not made available to the public except by one of
the missionary-led tours. This option, however, will include stops at
mission stations where you will hear much "holy history." At Martin's
Cove there are a number of various stations of pilgrimage-places where
people meet, pray, reflect and celebrate, and because it is a site of pil-
grimage, you may meet with hostile stares and secretive whispers from
the faithful.
Around 70,000 LDS Church Members visit Martin's Cove annu-
ally.55 My own experience is that outsiders, non-Mormons or perceived
non-Mormons, are treated as second-class citizens at the site-glared at
by pilgrims, greeted with indifference by missionary guides on the leased
land, and unable to penetrate the secrecy and coding that seems to per-
vade the place.
Nevertheless, my recent visit was markedly different from the first
time I visited the Martin's Cove area in July, 1997. My wife (who is also
descended from Mormon pioneers) and I visited the Mormon Handcart
Ranch Visitor's Center. Following our tour, our guide asked our reli-
gious affiliation and whether we were interested in learning more about
the LDS Church. We declined to discuss this personal issue. When my
wife wanted to walk over to the Cove, our guide barred her access, pre-
sumably because we had refused to answer his "golden" question. We
have since learned that the LDS Church may have been making im-
54. Morgan, supra note 50.
55. See Michael Riley, A Difficult Showdown Between Faith and History, DENVER POST, July
17, 2005, at Al.
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provements at the site at that time. 56 Other visitors have had similar ex-
periences and encountered active proselytizing until the ACLU lawsuit.57
It is also worth noting that unlike other historical sites, the Mormon
Handcart Ranch does not maintain a bookstore where one might buy
books of general or scholarly interest related to the topic. It also does not
feature a pamphlet specifically about Martin's Cove.
V. CRITICISM OF BLM's LEASE TO THE LDS CHURCH
Although an LDS Church spokesman claims 50,000 church mem-
bers in Wyoming,58 the lease has not been without critics. One group
that has continually opposed the lease is the Alliance for Historic Wyo-
ming (AHW), a non-profit citizen's advocacy group that maintains a
useful website. 59 Objections include: the close union of church and state,
widespread proselytizing, legal and political precedent, the extra-
historical justification for the site, and the argument of utility-that the
church is doing the chronically understaffed BLM a favor in handling the
visitor pressure.
In March, 2005 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a
lawsuit against the BLM,6° claiming that by agreeing to lease land to the
LDS Church and cooperating in interpretive endeavors, the BLM, a pub-
lic agency, has endorsed a particular and private entity, in this case a
religious organization. 61 In doing so, the BLM has collapsed the wall ofseparation between church and state envisioned by the Framers and con-
62 A*' h
templated in the First Amendment. In addition, the ACLU complaint
alleges that visitors to Martin's Cove are subject to pervasive proselytiz-
ing.
63
One example of the cooperation between the BLM and the LDS
Church was found on the actual interpretive signs located at the Handcart
Ranch and at the Cove. All these signs boasted the twin logos of the
56. Martin's Cove Tough to Resolve, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNENET, Oct. 27, 2002, available at
http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2002/ 0/27/news/casper/067322 le9dO2Oa4f87256c5e006a
569b.txt.
57. Alliance for Historic Wyoming, Aug '05 Update, http://historicwyoming.org/
EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/august 2005_update.htm.
58. Letter from Lloyd Larsen, President of Riverton Wyoming Stake, Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints, to Senator Thomas, Senator Enzi, and Representative Cubin (Sept. 8, 2002),
http://www.historicwyoming.org/EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/ (follow "LDS Seeks to Buy Martin's
Cove" hyperlink; then follow "LDS Lobbies for Sale" hyperlink).
59. See Alliance for Historic Wyoming, http://www.HistoricWyoming.org.
60. See Complaint, W. Land Exch. Project v. Norton, No. 05 CV 076, 2005 WL 731986 (D.
Wyo. Mar. 9, 2005).
61. ld.at60-61.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id.at6,17,21.
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BLM and the LDS Church until small metal plaques appeared in the
summer of 2005, covering the logo of the LDS Church.6a
We have already discussed the issue of proselytizing. The ACLU
suit alleges that it was widespread.65 Although proselytizing seems to
have been curtailed at the Cove for the time being, most likely because of
the lawsuit, there are concerns that once the case is adjudicated, particu-
larly if the judgment is in the defendants' favor, there would be little
incentive for a further cessation of missionary work. If past history is
any indication, and given the importance of missionary work in LDS
culture, proselytizing might resume as soon as the case is decided.
Senator Craig Thomas spoke of the issue of precedent in his 2002
press release in opposition to the first plan for the sale of Martin's
Cove.66 The question of precedent has been part of this controversy from
the beginning. Originally the question had to do with the possibility that
other groups with ancestral claims, in particular Native Americans, might
claim-based on documentary evidence-that a certain place was sacred
by virtue of it being the site of the deaths of ancestors of the current tribe
or band.6 7 The sites of various atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. military
against native peoples, then, might be considered sacred. Insofar as they
might have taken place on public land, the tribe or band or group might
make a legitimate claim to try to lease or buy the land. In fact, the Na-
tive American claim, in this instance, may be stronger, since in many
cases there is no doubt whatsoever that there was a battle, slaughter,
skirmish, or atrocity at a given site and at a given time. In such cases
there often exists copious documentary evidence, and there may be fo-
rensic as well as archaeological evidence as well.
If, on the other hand, the LDS Church believes Martin's Cove to be
sacred ground for extra-historical-that is, revelatory- reasons, then it
may well be impossible to adjudicate differences in future claims, and
this could create a multitude of problems for the government. The BLM
in particular may have a difficult time explaining why it is that they pro-
moted this lease, for it does appear that special favors may have been
done.
Opponents of the Martin's Cove lease point out a certain inconsis-
tency regarding land acquisition which can only be described as political.
Imagine if an Indian tribe or band wanted to acquire land that it consid-
ered sacred, or was the site of a battle or massacre where many dozens of
64. Alliance for Historic Wyoming, August '05 Update, http://www.historicwyoming.org/
EmigrantTrails/MartinsCove/august_2005_update.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
65. Complaint, supra note 60, at 6, 40.
66. Thomas, June 2002 release, supra note 11.
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its members had died or been killed. Does it seem likely that Native
Americans would be successful in such an endeavor? Probably not; his-
tory does not suggest success. If such a "private" group did turn out to
be successful, would the general public object if the tribe or band gave its
own interpretation of events, which might include a slanted interpretation
or inflammatory language, and one which might also be at odds with
historical fact or generally accepted belief? It does seem likely that it
would create a stir. Take the analogy further, however, and one differ-
ence emerges: Native Americans seem to lack the political influence and
representatives in Congress as well as the government agencies that the
LDS Church enjoys.
Other emigrant groups may well feel slighted by the special treat-
ment the LDS Church has received at Martin's Cove. Keep in mind that
Devil's Gate was a major landmark on the Oregon, California, Mormon
Pioneer, and Pony Express historical trails.68 The purchase of the Sun
Ranch and the lease of Martin's Cove have resulted in a marked increase
in the use of all the trails in the area. 69 As they pass through this part of
Wyoming, the four historic trails generally share a common corridor. As
a result, the registration and permit system which the BLM had to im-
plement because of vastly increased numbers may well shut out other
users. Certainly descendents of other emigrants would probably not feel
welcomed, and perhaps even slighted at Martin's Cove, by the emphasis
on one group and one story.
VI. POLITICS AND MARTIN'S CovE
Politics is also enmeshed in another interesting sidelight of the Mar-
tin's Cove controversy: the about-face of Wyoming's congressional
delegation regarding the sponsoring legislation. As we've seen, in the
early days of the proposal to sell the site to the LDS Church, Wyoming's
Senators Mike Enzi, Craig Thomas, and Representative Barbara Cubin
were opposed to any land sale.70 Elected officials and citizens publicly
opposed the sale. 71 In the give and take typical of a real estate transac-
tion, elected officials seemed to undergo a conversion. Or if they did not
undergo a conversion, at least they can be said to have seen the light.
It may be that some members of the LDS Church with significant
political clout, including Senators Harry Reid, Bob Bennett, and Orrin
Hatch may have worked behind the scenes.
68. Michael Riley, A Difficult Showdown Between Faith and History, DENVER POST, July 17,
2005, at A-01.
69. See Associated Press, Thousands to Re-enact Trek on Mormon Trail, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, Feb. 15, 1997, at C-07.
70. See supra notes 11, 13-14, and accompanying text.
71. Brodie Farquhar, LDS Faces Leasing Hurdle, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE.NET, May 17, 2003,
available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/05/1 7/news/lc6d57blbO8dac3 lal32575
cb7lf5fe5.txt.
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It may well be that some of that light was shone by Kathleen Clark,
Executive Director of the BLM. Clark has close ties to Representative
James V. Hansen of Utah, the original sponsor of H.R. 2754, having
served as the Executive Director of his Ogden office.72 Clark's career
was further enhanced when she was named by then-Utah Governor Mi-
chael 0. Leavitt (currently Secretary of Health and Human Services) to
head the state Division of Natural Resources. Clark was unanimously
confirmed in 2001 to head the BLM, 73 although she had no experience
with the BLM, and no experience with national appointed office.
Not much has been revealed regarding possible reasons for the con-
version. What is known is that Clint Ensign, Vice President for Govern-
ment Relations of Sinclair Oil, assisted with closed-door negotiations
between the BLM and the LDS Church. Ensign is an employee of busi-
nessman Robert Earl Holding, who owns Sinclair Oil, Sun Valley Corpo-
ration, and Little America.74 The result of these negotiations was the
proposal to lease the land for a period of twenty-five years.75
Ensign had experience with federal land transfers, having worked
out a beneficial land exchange deal for Holding's Sun Valley Corpora-
tion's operation at the Utah ski resort of Snowbasin to expand the resort
in order to host events for the 2002 Winter Olympics and create a ski
resort legacy 76 It is well known that Holding also worked closely with
Representative Jim Hansen, Senator Bob Bennett, and Senator Orrin
Hatch in connection with transportation and environmental issues at
Snowbasin.77
Holding's own interest in Martin's Cove may well be religiously-
motivated. It may also be owing to the convenient location of the Little
America motel, gas station, restaurants, curio shop and convenience store
to pilgrims traveling 1-80 east from Salt Lake City toward Martin's Cove.
(Little America also operates two well-known hotels in Salt Lake City.)
The southwestern Wyoming Little America resort is about two hours'
travel time from Salt Lake City.
Representative Barbara Cubin underwent perhaps the most notice-
able conversion.
Cubin, who publicly opposed the sale, was conveniently absent on
the day of a crucial vote on H.R. 2754. Cubin later told her constituents
72. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Biography: Kathleen Clark, Director,
BLM (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/info/director-bio.htm.
73. Id.
74. See Farquhar, supra note 71.
75. Riley, supra note 68.
76. Brodie Farquhar, Martin's Cove Negotiations: Setting the Stage for a Giveaway?, CASPER
STAR-TRIBUNE.NET, May 14, 2003, available at http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/
2003/05/14/news/d5l79c3bf4b7d3df5dbcc8e2dcb5fa24.txt.
77. Telephone Interview with Andy Howell, Managing Editor, Ogden Standard Examiner, in
Ogden, Utah (Apr. 19, 2006).
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she was "stuck in traffic"'7 8 -allowing the bill to pass in the House with-
out having her fingerprints on the action.
CONCLUSION
My own interest in Martin's Cove and in the Mormon handcart emi-
gration is more than passing. My maternal great great great grandpar-
ents, Thomas, 62, and Mary, 59, Girdlestone, emigrants from the English
Midlands, perished in the snows of the early-wintered fall of 1856. They
were members of the Willie Company. They were survived by a daugh-
ter, Emma, 21, who was left orphaned and penniless in a foreign land.
If fate decreed that Emma Girdlestone, my great great grandmother,
would have to undergo this unimaginable trauma of the crossing, so too
was the rest of her life shaped by her experience. In Salt Lake City she
became the first plural wife of a musician Thomas Ridges, who was em-
ployed building the pipe organ in the Salt Lake Tabernacle. The mar-
riage was not a happy one, though it did produce a daughter, Mary Ann.
Emma was granted a church-sanctioned divorce. She then supported
herself and daughter by working as a seamstress. A few years later she
became the first plural wife of Ralph Smith, who had been a founder of
Logan, Utah, and moved into his household there. Ralph and Emma's
first child was Frederick Girdlestone Smith, my great grandfather.
Because I have an ancestral connection to the handcart disasters of
1856, I am troubled by both the lack of historical accuracy in the por-
trayal of those events, as well as an appropriation of the events-and
particularly the emigrant deaths-for narrow purposes. Contemporary
reenactors are given names-identities--of actual historical personages
in their summertime treks.7 9 Obviously it's impossible to ask whether
those long-dead individuals if they would like their identities borrowed
in this way.
The pervasive proselytizing at the Cove also ignores the tremendous
irony that the emigrant-converts who perished were under the auspices of
the church authorities. Five generations later other church authorities
would use their deaths to attract more converts. While it is perhaps laud-
able that young Mormons wish to discover history through this reenact-
ing process, it should be pointed out that a summertime march across the
hot, buggy high steppes of Wyoming teaches very little about what oc-
curred in late October and early November 1856. If historical accuracy
is the goal, then dressing in period costumes in summer is not enough,
78. Press Release, U.S. Congresswoman Barbara Cubin, Cubin Opposes Martin's Cove Sale
(May 13, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/cubin/news/2002/Mayl3.html; Associated Press,
Cubin: Hansen Unbeatable on Martin's Cove, BILLINGS GAZZETrE, Jun. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.billingsgazette.com/ (search "Archives" for "June 20, 2002"; follow "Cubin: Hansen
Unbeatable on Martin's Cove" hyperlink under "Wyoming").
79. Anthony Petterson, LDS Recapture Pioneer Spirit, THE GREEN RIVER STAR, Aug. 3,
2005, at CI.
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nor were sag wagons any part of the actual-historical landscape, nor were
trailside portable toilets. Only a trek in the storms of winter would give
an accurate inkling of the horrors.
It is impossible to guess what the courts will decide, or whether any
court would enter into a dispute over historical fact and legend. At the
very least, it would seem that a reasonable person would conclude that
the Martin's Cove lease violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Using public land for active proselytizing is not what the
Framers had in mind. It is worth noting how opposed many of the Fram-
ers were to any attempt to marry church and state. If there's one thing
that Thomas Jefferson-to name one-remained consistent on, it is this
principle: that the state should establish no official religion, and that the
business of government and church should be separated by a stout wall.
80
At the very least, if LDS missionaries are going to be the official in-
terpreters and explainers at Martin's Cove, then they need to get the facts
straight, they need to discuss what really happened, and they need to be
prohibited from active proselytizing on public land. My own hope is that
the story of all emigrants can be told truthfully and accurately, and that
whatever interpretation is given would be based on a respect for their
suffering rather than a desire for new converts. This hope seems impos-
sible under the present arrangement.
80. See Robert L. Tsai, Democracy's Handmaid, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1, 39 (2006).
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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE CLOSURE OF
"SACRED" PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LANDS
WILLIAM PERRY PENDLEY
t
1. WYOMING SAWMILLS AND THE BIGHORN NATIONAL FOREST
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc., is the largest non-governmental employer
in Sheridan County, which lies in north-central Wyoming next to the
Montana border. The lumber mill itself is in downtown Sheridan, north-
east of the historic Sheridan Inn 1 and between the Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railroad yards and Interstate 90, which runs north and
south along the Big Horn Mountains to the west. In business since 1964,
Wyoming Sawmills's philosophy is "to use every bit of every log we
process and find outlets for all of our byproducts. Wood shavings, dry
sawdust, bark, chips: all are sold to become useful products.",
2
The prime source for its raw materials is the vast Bighorn National
Forest and its abundant lodgepole pines. Created in 1897, the Bighorn
National Forest is eighty miles long, thirty miles wide, and covers 1.1
million acres, including portions of four Wyoming counties (Sheridan,
Big Horn, Washakie, and Johnson). It is nearly as large as the State of
Delaware.3 Under federal law, the Bighorn is managed in accordance
with multiple use principles-that is, the land is to be available for use
by a variety of users, including ranchers, miners, energy developers, rec-
reationalists, and loggers, like Wyoming Sawmills.4 In fact, the National
Forest System was created by Congress in 1897 to serve two primary
purposes: to generate water and timber.5
For decades, the U.S. Forest Service recognized and fulfilled its
statutory obligations regarding its management of the Bighorn. Those
portions of the forest that were capable of being managed as a source of
t President and chief legal officer of Mountain States Legal Foundation, a nonprofit, public
interest law firm located in the Denver, Colorado, metropolitan area. This article is an excerpt from
WARRIORS FOR THE WEST: FIGHTING BUREAUCRATS, RADICAL GROUPS, AND LIBERAL JUDGES ON
AMERICA'S FRONTIER (2006).
1. The Sheridan Inn was built in 1893. From 1894 to 1901, Colonel William F. "Buffalo
Bill" Cody was a part owner of the hotel, which is today a National Historic Landmark. See Sheri-
dan Inn, http://www.sheridaninn.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
2. See Wyoming Sawmills, http://www.wyomingsawmills.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
3. See U.S. Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/r2/bighom/about/facts (last visited Mar. 26,
2006). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
1998 at 1-3 (1999), available at www.blm.gov/natacq/pls98/98PL1-3.PDF.
4. Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2000).
5. The Organic Act of June 4, 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000), provides: "No national forest
shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the pur-
pose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber
for the use and necessities of citizens of the United States .... (emphasis added).
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timber were made available for sale to timber companies like Wyoming
Sawmills. In the process, not only were fees paid to the Forest Service,
twenty-five percent of which were returned to the county where the tim-
ber was harvested, but also jobs and wealth were created and taxes paid
all while ensuring the health and viability of the forest itself.6 In 1996,
however, the Forest Service decided to manage nearly fifty thousand
acres, about seventy-eight square miles, of the Bighorn in accordance
with the demands of American Indian religious practitioners.
Various American Indian groups maintain that, notwithstanding its
prehistoric origins, the Medicine Wheel, a designated National Historic
Landmark on the western peak of Medicine Mountain in the northern
part of the Bighorn just off Alternate Highway 14, is sacred to them. 7 In
recognition of this belief system, the Forest Service granted free and
open access to the Medicine Wheel to permit American Indian religious
practitioners to engage in the free exercise of religion, even though that
exercise would occur on federal or public land. In fact, the Forest Ser-
vice granted the practitioners unlimited ceremonial use of Medicine
Wheel, agreed to close the feature during ceremonial usage to ensure
privacy, and authorized the presence of American Indian "interpreters"
during tourist season to proselytize about their faith.8  Even these ex-
traordinary allowances were not enough for the practitioners. They
maintained that any activity to which they objected that was audible or
visible from the Medicine Wheel would interfere with their religious
practices. Specifically, they objected to timber harvesting and demanded
the closure of huge portions of the Bighorn to that activity.
9
The process had begun in June 1993, when the Forest Service en-
tered into an agreement with a variety of governmental and non-
governmental groups, which did not include any members of the private
sector, such as Wyoming Sawmills, that established the Forest Service's
6. Although environmental groups vehemently deny the obvious, failure to manage forests to
preserve forest health results in dreadful forest fires, such as the 2002 Rodeo-Chediski fire, the worst
in Arizona history; more than 467,000 acres (an area two-thirds the size of Rhode Island) went up in
flames. See Wikipedia, Rodeo-Chediski Fire, http://en.wikipedia.org/wii/Rodeo-Chediski fire (last
visited Mar. 26, 2006). The White Mountain Apache Tribe, for example, prevented even greater
devastation of its forest by its aggressive forest thinning and fuel reduction program. See Dennis
Wall, The Rodeo-Chediski Fire: A Tribal Perspective, NATIVE VOICES, Summer 2002, at 1,
http://www4.nau.edu/itep/about/assets/docs/-NVSummer2002FINAL.pdf. Not surprisingly, an
environmental group sued to prevent the Forest Service from engaging in post-fire timber sales to
prevent future fires in the Rodeo-Chediski area. Ultimately, and perhaps for one of few times, that
attempt to delay harvesting failed. Forest Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 110 Fed.
App'x 26, 27 (9th Cir. 2004), en banc denied (Nov. 15, 2004).
7. See U.S. Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/r2/bighom/recreation/heritage/
nativeamericans (last visited Mar. 26, 2006). The Medicine Wheel is a "roughly circular alignment
of rocks and associated cairns enclosing 28 radial rows of rock extending out from a central cairn"
some 75 feet in diameter at an elevation of 9,642 feet. See Wyoming State Historic Preservation
Office, http://wyoshpo.state.wy.us/medwheel.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
8. See Sacred Land Film Project, http://www.sacredland.org/historicalsitespages/
medicine_wheel.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
9. Id.
1024 [Vol. 83:4
2006] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND "SACRED" LANDS 1025
management priority for Medicine Mountain and Medicine Wheel as
"continued traditional cultural use" of nearly twenty thousand acres as a
"sacred place and important ceremonial site."'10 In addition, the agree-
ment formed the groups into a permanent body called the "Consulting
Parties" to determine how the sacred areas of the Bighorn would be man-
aged. In April 1996, the Forest Service, responding to a "resurgence of
Native American spiritualism and new information that all of Medicine
Mountain [is] of religious importance to American Indians, not simply
the Medicine Wheel," published a draft management plan that affirmed
"the importance of the Medicine Wheel as a American Indian Shrine.""
'1
In September 1996, the Forest Service published its final plan in which it
announced that its "management priority" was to bar any activity that
might "detract from the spiritual and traditional values" associated with
"Medicine Mountain and the surrounding area."' 2  Then, in October
1996, as part of its statutorily mandated planning process, the Forest Ser-
vice adopted an amendment to its forest plan under which all of Medi-
cine Mountain, nearly twenty thousand acres, would be managed as a
"sacred site." 13
Previously, 15,840 acres of the sacred site area had been designed
by the Forest Service as available for timber management and more than
six thousand acres had been designated as available for timber harvest-
ing.' 4 In fact, the Forest Service regarded the timber there as especially
valuable because the trees were mainly "large and very large."' 5 Addi-
tionally, as a result of a pest infestation that has plagued the area since
1990, 1,135 acres had "a large amount of dead standing trees" and was
selected for thinning in order to achieve "the desired state of forest
10. Memorandum of Agreement Among the Bighorn National Forest, Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation, Wyoming State Historic Preservation Officer, Medicine Wheel Coalition For
Sacred Sites Of North America, Big Horn County Commissioners, and Federal Aviation Administra-
tion Regarding the Long-Term Management of the Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark and
Historic Properties on Medicine Mountain, I-I (June 21, 1993) (available from Forest Supervisor,
Bighorn National Forest, Sheridan, Wyoming).
11. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, DRAFT MEDICINE WHEEL/MEDICINE MOUNTAIN HISTORIC
PRESERVATION PLAN (Apr. 1996) (available from Forest Supervisor, Bighorn National Forest,
Sheridan, Wyoming).
12. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FINAL MEDICINE WHEEL/MEDICINE MOUNTAIN HISTORIC
PRESERVATION PLAN, Sec. 111-5 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter FINAL PLAN].
13. Id. at 1-2. The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14
(2006), requires each unit of the national forest system (forests and grasslands) to adopt plans pursu-
ant to which the unit will be managed. General plans are followed by specific plans authorizing the
previously approved management activity. Each plan must be adopted in accordance with the exten-
sive paperwork and public comment mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2000). These plans, often referred to as "environmental reviews,"
include Environmental Assessments (EAs) and Environmental Impact Statements (EISs).
14. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, ADDENDUM TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE
MANAGEMENT AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN FOR THE MEDICINE WHEEL NATIONAL
HISTORIC LANDMARK AND VICINITY, ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF PROPOSED FOREST PLAN
AMENDMENT NO. 12 (available from Forest Supervisor, Bighorn National Forest, Sheridan, Wyo-
ming).
15. Id.
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health" and to reduce "potential wildfire risk."1 6 As a result of the Forest
Service's agreement with American Indian religious practitioners, these
federal lands were now off-limits to timber harvesting.
7
Ten months later, the Forest Service completed its environmental
review of a timber sale plan that had been issued first in 1988 and deter-
mined that the sale could proceed.1 8 Almost immediately the Consulting
Parties objected.' 9 Although the sale area was several miles north and
outside of the twenty-thousand acre sacred site area, the sale would re-
quire timber hauling on a Forest Service road, a small portion of which
was within the far eastern boundary of the sacred site area. In deference
to the demands of the religious practitioners, the sale was cancelled.20
By putting that road off-limits to timber hauling, the Forest Service
added an additional thirty thousand acres to the lands being managed as
"sacred."
Wyoming Sawmills, which planned to bid on the sale and needed
the timber for its mill, filed a lawsuit against the Forest Service contend-
ing, among other things, that managing fifty thousand acres of federal
land as a sacred site violates the Constitution's Establishment Clause and
its mandate of government neutrality regarding religion.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment to the Constitution reads, in part, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ....,,21 The first phrase is referred to as the
Establishment Clause and the latter, the Free Exercise Clause. Since
1971, and its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,22 the U.S. Supreme Court
has defined expansively what governmental activities violate the Estab-
16. FINAL PLAN, supra note 12, Sec. IX-51 (available from Forest Supervisor, Bighorn Na-
tional Forest, Sheridan, Wyoming).
17. American Indian religious practitioners often assert that such demands are merely a re-
quest that the government "accommodate" their free exercise of religion. Government action re-
specting religion is not constitutional "accommodation," however, unless it removes a "discernible
burden" on the free exercise of religion, which was government-created. See Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 629 (1992); Corp. of Presiding Bishops of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987). The accommodation doctrine is "not a principle without limits,"
because, "[a]t some point, accommodation may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion." Bd.
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706 (1984), Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-
35.
18. U.S. Forest Service, Amendment to Horse Creek Timber Sale Environmental Assessment
(Aug. 8, 1997) (available from Forest Supervisor, Bighorn National Forest, Sheridan, Wyoming).
19. U.S. Forest Service, Bid Package for Horse Creek Timber Sale (Sept. 19, 1997); U.S.
Forest Service, Forest Supervisor's Notice of Cancellation of Horse Creek Timber Sale (Oct. 1,
1997) (available from Forest Supervisor, Bighorn National Forest, Sheridan, Wyoming).
20. U.S. Forest Service, Forest Supervisor's Notice of Cancellation of Horse Creek Timber
Sale (Oct. 1, 1997) (available from Forest Supervisor, Bighorn National Forest, Sheridan, Wyo-
ming).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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lishment Clause;23 the short answer, for the Supreme Court and the vari-
ous federal appellate courts, is that nearly any government involvement
with religion is unconstitutional.
Under Lemon, so as not to violate the Establishment Clause, gov-
ernmental action "respecting" religion: (1) "must have a secular... pur-
pose," (2) "must ... neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion" in "its prin-
cipal or primary effect," and (3) "must not foster an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion., 24  The Lemon test is supplemented
with the "endorsement test," which asks "whether, irrespective of gov-
ernment's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval., 25  What the Establishment
Clause requires, says the Supreme Court, is that government:
[N]ot coerce anyone to support or participate in a religion, or its ex-
ercise, or otherwise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion
or religious faith, or tends to do so." . . . [For] [w]hat to most believ-
ers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbe-
liever respect their religious practices ... may appear to the nonbe-
liever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the
State to enforce a religious orthodoxy.
26
Furthermore, a government may not send an "ancillary message to
members of the audience who are nonadherents 'that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. '"27
Applying these tests to the Forest Service's action in the Bighorn
National Forest seems to compel that a court issue a ruling that the Forest
Service had abandoned its constitutionally required neutrality. In fact, in
two earlier instances that is exactly how the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit and, eight years later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled. In
both cases, unlike the Forest Service in the Bighorn, the federal agencies
involved refused to accede to the demands of American Indian religious
practitioners.
23. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 (state-provided aid to church-related elementary and secondary
schools regarding secular instruction violates Establishment Clause).
24. Id. at 612-13 (quotation omitted) (citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
25. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 n.42 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (state-authorized daily period of silence in all public
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer violates Establishment Clause).
26. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 592 (1992) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678) (public
school requirement that students stand and remain silent during "nonsectarian" prayer at graduation
ceremony violates Establishment Clause).
27. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (elected student giving a prayer over public address system at each
varsity football game violates Establishment Clause).
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In 1980, the Tenth Circuit ruled regarding the demands by several
American Indian leaders and organizations that the National Park Service
(NPS) restrict tourist activity at Rainbow Bridge National Monument in
south-central Utah due to the needs of American Indian religious practi-
tioners. The Tenth Circuit held that restricting public access to the
Monument's lands would violate the Establishment Clause: "'The First
Amendment... gives no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of their
own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious
necessities.' . . . Were it otherwise, the Monument would become a gov-
ernment-managed religious shrine.,
28
In 1988, when members of three American Indian Tribes in north-
western California sought to prevent timber harvesting and road con-
struction in a portion of the national forest traditionally used for religious
purposes, the Supreme Court declared:
Nothing in the principle for which [American Indians] contend, how-
ever, would distinguish this case from another lawsuit in which they
(or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to exclude all
human activity but their own from sacred areas of the public
lands.... Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the
area, however, those rights do not divest the Govemment of its right
to use what is, after all, its land.29
III. JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED
By October 1999, Wyoming Sawmills's lawsuit, filed the previous
February, had been briefed fully and argued before the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming. Nonetheless, the district court did
not issue its decision until December 2001, ruling that Wyoming Saw-
mills did not have the legal right ("standing") to file its lawsuit. 30  Al-
though the district court agreed that Wyoming Sawmills had suffered an
injury, which was its lost opportunity to bid on the timber sale, the dis-
trict court held that it could not redress that injury because it "could not
eliminate the Medicine Wheel as it is a protected National Monument.",
3'
Either the court was being obtuse-because addressing the constitution-
28. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Judge Learned Hand's
decision in Otten v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 205 F.2d 58,61 (2d Cir. 1953)).
29. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,452-53 (1988).
30. Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (D. Wyo.
2001). Outrageously, these types of delays are not uncommon. One case litigated by MSLF was
briefed fully and ready for decision on July 5, 2001; the federal district court did not rule for more
than four years. See Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Norton, No. 99cv2728 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2005),
available at http://www.ifr-ors.com/mountain-states/legal-cases.cfm?legalcaseid-43.
31. Wyoming Sawmills, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1294. Standing is required by the Constitution's
case" or "controversy" requirement, U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, which the Supreme Court interprets
to require: (1) an "injury in fact," which is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is "(a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;" (2) a causal
relationship between the injury and the agency action; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
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ality of the Forest Service's closure of fifty thousand acres to timber har-
vesting would not affect the designation of the Medicine Wheel's 110
acres--or obstinate-because it did not want to apply the earlier holdings
of the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court.32 Perhaps it was a little of
both; Wyoming Sawmills appealed.
At last, in May 2003, Wyoming Sawmills appeared for oral argu-
ments before the Tenth Circuit, the matter having been briefed by Wyo-
ming Sawmills, the U.S. Forest Service, which under the Bush admini-
stration continued to support the constitutionality of the closure,33 and a
group of American Indian religious practitioners. 34 The good news for
Wyoming Sawmills was that the Tenth Circuit agreed that the district
court's redressability holding was in error. The bad news was that the
Tenth Circuit held that Wyoming Sawmills had suffered no injury what-
soever, neither the loss of its opportunity to bid on a timber sale nor its
having been "directly affected" by an Establishment Clause violation.
Even worse, the Tenth Circuit went so far as to accept the argument of
the Forest Service that a corporation is not capable of suffering an injury
under the Establishment Clause.35
The Tenth Circuit's ruling was particularly curious given that, for
more than thirty years, anyone "offended" by government action that
allegedly "respect[s] an establishment of religion," has been found to
have been "directly affected" by that purported violation and given
standing to sue. Famously, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that a
local citizen offended by seeing an image of the Mormon temple on the
seal of the City of St. George, Utah, had standing to challenge the seal's
constitutionality.36 In fact, according to the Tenth Circuit, all but one of
the other federal appellate courts, and the Supreme Court, anyone who
comes into direct contact with governmental action regarding religion
32. Interview with William Matthews, Forest Service Historian, U.S. Forest Service, in Lov-
ell, Wyo. (Nov. 10, 2005).
33. By the time the Bush administration filed its brief in December 2002, all of its high-level
and intermediary officials were in place. Moreover, the terrible 2002 fire season had energized the
Bush administration into addressing, at least legislatively, the forest health issue. Furthermore,
Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney had campaigned against Clinton's western policies. None of
these was a sufficient basis for Bush administration lawyers to change their litigating posture in
Wyoming Sawmills. In fact, to the writer's knowledge, on every lawsuit filed against the Clinton
administration that challenged Clinton's western, environmental, or natural resources policies, the
Bush administration aggressively defended its predecessor.
34. See Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 383 F.3d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.
2004). Friends of the court (amici curiae) briefs in support of the Forest Service were filed by the
National Congress of American Indians, National Trust for Historic Preservation, The Becket Fund
for Religious Liberty, Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, General Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists, Clifton Kirkpatrick, Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, and Council on American Islamic Relations. Id.
35. See Wyoming Sawmills, 383 F.3d at 1247. This is ludicrous. See, e.g., Two Guys From
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961) (holding that corporation has
standing to challenge whether law respected establishment of religion).
36. Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989).
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has standing to file an Establishment Clause lawsuit.37 Nonetheless, for
unspecified reasons, the Tenth Circuit did not apply that test to Wyoming
Sawmills. When the Tenth Circuit denied Wyoming Sawmills's petition
to have the Tenth Circuit panel's decision heard by all Tenth Circuit
judges, that is en banc, Wyoming Sawmills asked for Supreme Court
review. In October 2005, the Supreme Court denied Wyoming Saw-
mills's petition.38
The refusal of the Supreme Court to hear Wyoming Sawmills's
challenge, which was not surprising given that the Court grants only one
percent of the petitions filed, reveals an often overlooked aspect of fed-
eral litigation. For all intents and purposes, the three-judge panel of a
federal appellate court, whether the Tenth, the Ninth, or the District of
Columbia, is the court of last resort, the supreme court, for almost all
federal litigation. That is almost assuredly the result, regardless of the
importance of the issues raised-such as whether federal lands may be
managed to suit the demands of American Indian religious practitio-
ners-if the appellate court resolves the case on procedural or technical
grounds, such as "the plaintiff lacks standing." Almost as unlikely is that
a federal appellate court will hear the matter en banc, that is, before all
the judges of the circuit. If two members of a three-judge panel agree on
a decision, the third judge is encouraged to sign on as well, out of a spirit
of comity. In the rare instance of a 2-1 ruling, the dissenting judge, often
as not, declines to file an opinion. Finally, a circuit judge is disinclined
to vote for en banc review of the decisions of his colleagues just as he
would prefer that his colleagues withhold that vote on his rulings. Not
surprisingly, when the Supreme Court considers a petition for writ of
certiorari, a unanimous three-judge panel ruling, the absence of a written
dissent in a 2-1 ruling, or the denial of a petition for rehearing en banc
without dissent almost always dooms that petition.
If the law is so clear, one may ask in light of the Supreme Court's
1988 ruling regarding demands by American Indian religious practitio-
ners for exclusive use of public lands, how may an appellate court refuse
to follow it in addressing the issue of purportedly sacred federal lands.
The answer is that the appellate court will recognize the Supreme Court's
holding but will conclude that it lacks the jurisdiction to apply that hold-
ing in the case before it. The Supreme Court is highly unlikely to review
such a holding. Even if the appellate court rules on the merits and re-
fuses to apply, for example, that Supreme Court ruling or applies the
37. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 573-74 (1989) (holding that local
residents had standing to challenge the presence of a creche on city and county property). In fact, in
only one circuit must one who seeks to challenge an alleged Establishment Clause violation modify
his behavior in response to that offending religious symbol. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d
265, 269 (7th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court knows of this split and may yet resolve it. See City of
Edmond v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201, 1201 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
38. Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 126 S. Ct. 330, 330 (2005).
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ruling incorrectly, again the odds are that the Supreme Court will decline
to review the matter given that "misapplication" of the law is not a basis
for Supreme Court review.39
For more than a decade, that has been the fate of challenges to deci-
sions by Clinton administration federal land managers restricting public
use of purportedly sacred federal land either pursuant to Clinton's 1996
Executive Order40 on the subject or, with that order as cover, to prevent
activity that environmental groups or local land managers or both op-
pose. Thus:
* When commercial and recreational climbers challenged the Na-
tional Park Service's decision to restrict June climbing of Devils
Tower in northern Wyoming in deference to the demands of Ameri-
can Indian religious practitioners, the Tenth Circuit ruled that none
of them had standing to challenge the policy.
42
e When local members of a national trade association challenged the
U.S. Forest Service's decision to close nearly 1 million acres of fed-
eral land in north-central Montana to oil and gas exploration and de-
velopment,43 the Ninth Circuit ruled that they lacked standing and
that the Forest Service's action met the Lemon test.
44
e When visitors to Rainbow Bridge National Monument45 sued after
being told they could not approach Rainbow Bridge because it is god
39. SUP. CT. R. 10 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error
consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.").
40. Exec. Order No. 13,007,61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
41. Devils Tower, a vertical monolith that rises 1,267 feet above the Belle Fourche River in
Crook County, near Hulett, Wyoming, is the nation's first national monument and was created by
President Theodore Roosevelt on September 24, 1906. National Park Service, Devils Tower,
www.nps.gov/deto/index.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
42. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821-22 (10th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (ruling that the commercial climber had failed to show an economic
injury, the climbers who objected to the NPS's policy but climbed anyway had not suffered an injury
in fact, and climbers who refused to climb for fear that if they did climb the NPS would close Devils
Tower to all climbing year-round, had failed to show that their fears were anything more than "re-
mote and speculative.").
43. The Lewis and Clark National Forest covers portions of 13 counties in central and north-
central Montana. U.S. Forest Service, Lewis & Clark National Forest,
http://www.fs.fed.us/rl/lewisclark/about/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2006). Its Rocky Moun-
tain Division overlies the Overthrust Belt, a vast geological feature estimated to be the largest natural
gas deposit in the continental United States. DAVID ALBERSWERTH & PETER A. MORTON, THE
WILDERNESS SOCIETY, WILDERNESS SOCIETY'S SUBMISSION FOR THE SENATE ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE'S PANEL DISCUSSION ON NATURAL GAS POLICY 1-2 (2005),
http://www.wilderness.org/Library/Documents/upload/WildemessSociety-SENRC-NG-
PolicySubmittal20050107.pdf.
44. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Service, 12 F. App'x 498, 500 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. denied sub nom. Indep. Petrol. Ass'n of America v. U.S. Forest Service, 534 U.S. 1018
(2001). Despite the Bush administration's public commitment to finding new energy sources, its
lawyers opposed Supreme Court review of a decision closing one million acres of land thought to
contain an abundant amount of natural gas.
45. Rainbow Bridge National Monument is the world's largest natural bridge. National Park
Service, Rainbow Bridge, http://www.nps.gov/rabr/index.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006). It was
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incarnate to some American Indian religious practitioners,46 the
Tenth Circuit held that none of the visitors had standing to challenge
the NPS's policy.
47
IV. DALE MCKNNON AND WOODRUFF BUTTE
Designating federal or public land as sacred to a particular religious
group and thus off-limits to what the Supreme Court calls "nonadher-
ents' '48 is one thing; after all, as the Supreme Court declared in the oppo-
site context, it is "its land." 9 For the government to declare private land
sacred to American Indian religious practitioners and off-limits to the
owner's use is quite something else entirely! Or is it?
Woodruff Butte is private property located about ten miles southeast
of Holbrook, Arizona, which is ninety-three miles due east of Flagstaff.
Mr. Dale McKinnon and his family own Cholla Ready Mix, Inc., which
first leased and then purchased Woodruff Butte to mine the unique and
valuable aggregate found there for use in highway construction projects.
In 1990, the Hopi, Zuni, and Navajo Indian Tribes passed resolutions
against the mining of Woodruff Butte because they consider it a place of
religious significance or sacred. On that basis, in or around 1990, the
Arizona State Historic Preservation Officer declared Woodruff Butte
eligible for listing on the National Registry of Historic Places (NRHP)
over the objections of Mr. McKinnon. Woodruff Butte has yet to be
listed on the NRHP.
In June 1991, the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT)
granted Cholla a commercial source number allowing aggregate mined
from Woodruff Butte to be used on ADOT projects. Nonetheless, begin-
ning in 1992, ADOT took steps to bar the use of Woodruff Butte, which
culminated in new ADOT rules adopted in 1999. Under those new rules,
Cholla was required to apply for a new commercial source number. Its
application was denied solely as a result of the religious significance of
Woodruff Butte to the three Tribes.
In June 2002, Dale McKinnon's Cholla Ready Mix sued ADOT in
Arizona federal district court claiming that ADOT's actions violated the
Establishment Clause. In January 2003, the district court dismissed
Cholla's complaint holding that ADOT's regulation-Historical and
Cultural Resources Regulation--"[o]n its face... is aimed at protecting
sites of historical and cultural significance. That a protected site also has
designated by President Taft on May 30, 1910, and today is managed by the National Park Service.
Rainbow Bridge Home Page, http://www.nps.gov/rabr/home.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
46. Rainbow Bridge Home Page, supra note 45.
47. Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 98 Fed App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied
sub nom. DeWaal v. Alston, 543 U.S. 1145 (2005).
48. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
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religious significance does not make the regulation unconstitutional."50
After the district court denied Cholla's motion for reconsideration,
Cholla appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
In September 2004, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Cholla's
complaint holding that "[n]o evidence could bolster Cholla's Establish-
ment Clause claim because it is premised on flawed analysis of the gov-
erning law.",5' Although the Ninth Circuit upheld the Arizona federal
district court's dismissal of Cholla's complaint, it issued a published
ruling on the merits in which it declared: "[T]he Establishment Clause
does not bar the government from protecting an historically and cultur-
ally important site simply because the site's importance derives at least
in part from its sacredness to certain groups.' 52
After oral arguments in the case, but before the panel ruled, another
Ninth Circuit panel ruled on the constitutionality of a Latin cross erected
on federal land in the California desert to commemorate those who died
in World War I. In September 2004, in light of the clear conflict be-
tween two panels of the Ninth Circuit, Cholla petitioned for a rehearing
en banc. In October 2004, the petition was denied, as was Cholla's Su-
preme Court petition for writ of certiorari a few months later.
53
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit may yet have the opportunity to de-
cide which one of its opinions, Buono or Cholla, controls when consider-
ing American Indian religion, the use of public lands, and the Establish-
ment Clause. In January 2005, the Nevada federal district court upheld
the constitutionality of a decision by the Forest Service to close Cave
Rock near Lake Tahoe to climbing in response to the demands of Ameri-
can Indian religious practitioners. 4 Relying on the Ninth Circuit's ruling
in Cholla, the district court declared, "The Establishment Clause does not
require government to ignore the historical value of religious sites[;] pro-
tecting culturally important Native American sites has historic value for
the nations [sic] as a whole because of the unique status of Native
American Societies in North American history.,
55
50. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Mendez, No. 02 Civ. 1185 (D. Ariz. Jan. 21, 2003).
51. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub
nom. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Mendez, 125 S. Ct. 1828 (2005).
52. Id. at 977.
53. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, No. 03-15423 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 2004) (order denying
petition for rehearing en banc).
54. Transcript of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and the United State's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 54-55, Access Fund v. Veneman, No. CV-N-03-687-HDM (RAM) (D. Nev.
Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Veneman]. (The Access Fund, a climbing group, filed the lawsuit in
December 2003). Cave Rock is a basalt plug rising 300 feet above the shores of Lake Tahoe on
federal land along U.S. Highway 50. The U.S. Forest Service manages Cave Rock as part of the
Lake Tahoe Management Unit. Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit, http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/ltbmu/
(last visited Mar. 24, 2006)).
55. Veneman, No. CV-N-03-687-HDM (RAM) at 54-55 (quoting Cholla v. Civish, 382 F.3d
969, 976 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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The Forest Service, in barring climbers from Cave Rock, engaged in
a more blatant endorsement of American Indian religion than did the
National Park Service, ten years earlier, when it closed Devils Tower to
June climbing. Perhaps the federal government's string of procedural
victories had made agencies much bolder; if no one could challenge sa-
cred land closures to determine whether they violated the Constitution's
Establishment Clause, then the agencies had carte blanche to accede to
the demands of American Indian religious practitioners regarding public
land. Whatever the reason, the Forest Service documents that accompa-
nied its Cave Rock decision are breathtaking in their advocacy on behalf
of American Indian religious practitioners.
The Forest Service characterized the religious "power" of Cave
Rock as a "renewable" resource and concluded that the Forest Service
had to take action to ensure that "the short-term uses at Cave Rock...
will not compromise the area's long-term [religious] productivity."
56
That was not all. Wrote the Forest Service:
In the Washoe Tribe's view, effects of rock climbing, including
physical alterations of the rock associated with sport climbing, the
placement and presence of climbing equipment, and the presence of
visible and audible persons on the rock, are considered to be insensi-
tive, distracting, and incompatible with the traditional spiritual activi-
ties .... According to Washoe traditional belief, the intimate contact
between climbers and Cave Rock leads to an exchange of power be-
tween the rock and climbers .... Washoe believe the presence of
people at the rock can have ill effects on both the visitor and the
Washoe people.
57
One alternative considered by the Forest Service to preserve the re-
ligious power of Cave Rock would have "[v]oluntarily or mandatorily
prohibit[ed] all activities under Forest Service jurisdiction, other than
Washoe spiritual uses, during specific time periods. ' 58 The Forest Ser-
vice rejected that alternative because
[American Indian religious] practitioners cannot follow a predictable
schedule in knowing when the power that Cave Rock provides will
be needed ... this alternative would not meet the needs of the tradi-
tional tribal users .... [T]o implement it would unnecessarily restrict
public access without benefiting the group for which the regulation
was being established.
59
56. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, CAVE ROCK MGM'T DIV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT: LAKE TAHOE BASIN MANAGEMENT UNIT 3-72 (2002) [hereinafter CAVE ROCK].
57. Id. at 2-21.
58. Id. at 2-6.
59. Id.
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Thus, the Forest Service rejected this alternative, not because such a clo-
sure is patently and facially unconstitutional, 60 but because it would not
limit public access for as much of the year as American Indian religious
practitioners demanded.
Preserving the power of Cave Rock was not the Forest Service's
only concern. The Forest Service determined that recreational activities
by climbers and non-climbers would "disturb traditional users of the
property, [and] would affect the property's pre-European encroachment
feel and association.",61 Furthermore, conversations by those recreating
on Cave Rock "contribute to the generation of noise," which, although
the Forest Service recognized was "not the dominant noise source in the
area, current noise levels affect use by Washoe spiritualists, as rituals are
intended to occur during serene and tranquil periods; this would affect
the feel and association of the property., 62 Finally, the Forest Service,
noting the need to protect American Indian religion, stated, "If current
adverse impacts to [Cave Rock] continue, it is possible the Washoe Tribe
would abandon its... [religious] practices at Cave Rock.,
63
In the end, the Forest Service barred use of Cave Rock by climbers
and those on educational field trips, limiting access to American Indian
religious practitioners, hikers, and picnickers. 64 Because hikers "only
occasionally visit the cave, and more commonly walk up the backside of
Cave Rock up to its summit," American Indian religious practitioners
will be the primary users of the face of Cave Rock and the cave itself.
65
Effectively closing Cave Rock to all but American Indian religious prac-
titioners was not enough; the Forest Service also included in its man-
agement plan a "signage component and a brochure designed to inform
people of the cultural [that is, religious] significance of Cave Rock.
66
It is remarkable, given Establishment Clause jurisprudence by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
that the Nevada federal district court upheld the constitutionality of the
Forest Service's actions at Cave Rock. After all, in Buono, the Ninth
Circuit had ruled that the mere presence of a Latin cross on federal land
60. See, e.g., Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448-50.
61. CAVE ROCK, supra note 56, at 3-20.
62. Id. That the conversation of climbers at Cave Rock is not the "dominant noise source in
the area" is a bit of an understatement; the four lanes of Highway 50, which transect Cave Rock,
generate a continuous roar of speeding trucks, automobiles, and motorcycles.
63. Id. at 3-72.
64. See id. at 2-21.
65. See id. at 3-4, 3-5.
66. Id. at 2-7. A similar sign on federal land in California regarding a Latin cross erected to
honor those killed in World War I yielded this ruling: "[D]espite the sign-indeed, perhaps because
of it-'observers might (still have] reasonably perceive[d] the City's display of such a religious
symbol on public property as government endorsement of the Christian faith."' Buono v. Norton,
371 F.3d 543, 549 (quoting Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617,
626 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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in California constituted an Establishment Clause violation.67 As to Cave
Rock, not only did the Forest Service agree that Cave Rock is sacred, it
labeled the religious power of Cave Rock a "resource" to be protected by
the Forest Service and barred non-believing climbers from recreating on
Cave Rock.68
Furthermore, the Nevada court's holding with regard to the unique
status of American Indian religion and its blending of history, culture,
and religion ignores that other Americans celebrate faiths that have rich
histories and are part of their culture and the culture of this country.69
Judeo-Christian religion, for example, imbued every aspect of the early
American culture and history.70 Moreover, even if American Indian re-
ligion were unique, that uniqueness does not exempt it from application
of an Establishment Clause that has been applied to every other religious
faith. It would appear that the Ninth Circuit must reverse the Nevada
district court's decision and rule that the Forest Service's actions at Cave
Rock are unconstitutional. Whether the Ninth Circuit will do so remains
in doubt.
V. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGION
When the Ninth Circuit decides the Cave Rock case, its ruling will
be informed by two recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings regarding public
display of the Ten Commandments.
In June 2005, the Court ruled that display of the Ten Command-
ments in the McCreary County and Pulaski County courthouses was un-
constitutional. In a 5-4 ruling authored by Justice Souter and joined by
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court held that,
given the actions of the counties, "[t]he reasonable observer could only
think that the Counties meant to emphasize and celebrate the Com-
mandments' religious message.",71 In determining the counties' purpose,
the Court looked to "readily discoverable fact[s] set forth in a[n] ... offi-
cial act.",72  The Court demanded that the counties' purported secular
purpose "be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious
67. Buono, 371 F.3d at 550.
68. CAVE ROCK, supra note 56, at 2-4.
69. See McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2859 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100-03 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING 5-7 (2002). The author notes:
In one key respect, the way the story of the United States has been told for the past one
hundred years is wrong. It has cut off one of the two wings by which the American Eagle
flies, her compact with the God of the Jews-the God of Israel championed by the na-
tion's first Protestants .... Believe that there is such a God or not-the founding genera-
tion did, and relied upon this belief. Their faith is an 'indispensable' part of their story.
Id. at 5.
71. McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2726 (2005).
72. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2724.
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objective;" that is, the secular purpose must be "'preeminent' or 'pri-
mary.' '73 Finally, the Court had to "be familiar with the history of the
government's actions and competent to learn what [that] history has to
show.5
74
The same day, the Court ruled that a six- by three-and-one-half-foot
granite monolith containing the Ten Commandments set upon the Texas
State Capitol grounds was constitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist deliv-
ered an opinion in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
Justice Breyer, who expressly declined to join the Chief Justice's opinion
("I cannot agree with today's plurality analysis." 75), concurred in the
judgment. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented.
Justice Breyer called the case "borderline," given that "the Com-
mandments' text undeniably has a religious message. 76 Eschewing any
particular Establishment Clause test and embracing instead the Estab-
lishment Clause's purposes, Justice Breyer concluded, after an "exercise
of legal judgment," that the physical setting of the display "suggests little
or nothing of the sacred., 77 Most compelling to Justice Breyer, however,
was that "[t]his display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two
generations [which] ... helps us understand that as a practical matter of
degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive.
' 78
Therefore, the Supreme Court's two Ten Commandments cases
provide no support for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Cholla. If the Ninth
Circuit rules, in the Cave Rock case, that federal land may be closed to
public access because it is regarded by American Indian religious practi-
tioners as sacred, then the tests adopted by the majority in McCreary
County and espoused by the dissent in the Texas case compel reversal.
Moreover, Justice Breyer's test in the Texas case does not apply in the
Cave Rock case given that the Forest Service's access decision was chal-
lenged immediately. However, this does not mean that the Ninth Circuit
will adhere to the Supreme Court's commands regarding the Establish-
ment Clause and invalidate the Forest Service's closure of Cave Rock to
climbing. Nor does it mean that, if the Ninth Circuit, as is its wont, ig-
nores the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the Supreme Court will hear
the case. Finally, it does not mean that, even if the Supreme Court hears
the Cave Rock case, that it will apply to American Indian religion the
same principles that it has applied to Judeo-Christian religion.
73. Id. at 2735-36 (quoting Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)).
74. Id. at 2737.
75. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2871 (2005).
76. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869.
77. Id. at 2869, 2870.
78. Id. at 2871.
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Until the Supreme Court does just that, the law of the land regarding
government activity "respecting an establishment of religion" is Judeo-
Christian, "no," and pantheism, "yes." As long as that is the law, mil-
lions of acres of federal land and goodness knows how much private land
could be declared sacred and off-limits to the public and the people who
own it. The people who use those public lands, for recreation and for
economic purposes, will continue to challenge these unconstitutional
closures until the Supreme Court issues a ruling on the issue.
CONFRONTING OUR SHARED LEGACY OF INCONGRUOUS
LAND OWNERSHIP: NOTES FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA
FEDERICO CHEEVER
t
What we're saying today is that you're either part of the solution or
you're part of the problem.'
INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
Concepts of ownership in the American west have, quite literally, a
checkered past.
In a broad band across southwestern Wyoming, northern Utah, cen-
tral Nevada and the mountains of eastern California, 640-acre sections of
federal government land are still arranged in a checkerboard pattern with
alternating 640-acre sections of private land. This strange ownership
pattern has nothing to do with the contours of the landscape and nothing
to do with the traditions or aspirations of the human communities, native
and non-native, who have bound themselves to that hard country. The
Union Pacific/Central Pacific railroad "checkerboard" is a relic of a po-
litical deal designed to finance a transcontinental railroad, which was
once the technological marvel of the world and now a curiosity of inter-
est to no one but historians, railroad buffs, and the corporations who
transport coal and other large-volume, low-priced goods.2
Although the largest, the Union Pacific/Central Pacific checker-
board is only one of the West's railroad checkerboards. During the nine-
teenth century, the federal government granted more than 94 million
acres of land to railroads.
t Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thak the
editors and staff of the Denver University Law Review, particularly, Christian Aggeler and Paul
Kyed, who helped put on a fantastic symposium and put out a wonderful symposium issue. I would
also like to thank the officers and members of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law Na-
tive American Students Association, particularly Amy Bowers, who joined with the Denver Univer-
sity Law Review to put this symposium together and without whom it would not have been the
wonder it was. I would also like to thank my research assistants Anna Cavaleri and Naomi Perera
for their assistance with this essay. I also wish to thank Kristen Carpenter, Nancy McLaughlin,
Lawrence Kueter, and John Lavelle.
1. Robert Sheer, Introduction to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER: POST-PRISON WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES xxxii (Robert Sheer ed. 1969) (quoting speech by Eldridge Cleaver to the San Francisco
Barristers' Club).
2. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE WORLD: THE MEN WHO BUILT THE
TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 1863-69, 77-81 (2000).
3. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 385 (1968).
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Western New Mexico contains another kind of checkerboard, less
regular and more complicated than the railroad checkerboard. The Na-
vajo "checkerboard reservation" contains unequal chunks of Bureau of
Land Management, state, private and Navajo tribal land.4 Like the rail-
road checkerboard, the boxy section-by-section ownership configuration
of the checkerboard reservation has little to do with the contours of the
landscape or the aspirations of the residents. The Navajo checkerboard
is not the only checkerboard reservation. Most western states contain
Indian reservations whittled down or hollowed out by the allotment acts
of the late nineteenth century. As Justice Scalia recently put it:
In the late 19th century, the prevailing national policy of segregating
lands for the exclusive use and control of the Indian tribes gave way
to a policy of allotting those lands to tribe members individually.
The objectives of allotment were simple and clear cut: to extinguish
tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimi-
lation of Indians into the society at large.
6
Between 1887 and 1934, Indian title dwindled from 138 million
acres (an area larger than California and New York combined) to 48 mil-
lion acres (an area about the size of Oklahoma). 7 With the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934,8 the federal government abandoned the policy,
but the property rights remained. Indian tribes lost roughly 90 million
acres of land between 1887 and 1934, roughly the same amount of land
granted to railroads. 9
The railroad checkerboards and the checkerboard reservations are
not aberrations on the landscape of the American West. Rather, they are
extreme but emblematic examples of our "history of ownership." In the
"West,"' 0 land ownership has regularly been employed as a tool of gov-
ernment policy. To further goals articulated in the halls of Congress, and
to a much lesser degree in statehouses, our governments have been will-
ing to buy land, sell land, sell land cheaply and give land away. At the
same time, in furtherance of the same goals or related ones, our govern-
ments have been willing to deprive long time possessors and recognized
4. See BLM Surface Management Responsibility Map, New Mexico (1994) 1:5000,000.
5. See Sarah Krakoff, Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109, 1185-88 (2004).
6. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253 (1992).
7. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.07[1][a], at 1009 (Nell J. Newton et
al. eds., 2005).
8. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS, Table 1-2 (2004), http://www.blm.gov/natacq/plsO4/plsl-2 04.pdf (hereinafter PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS).
10. See Clyde A. Milner, Introduction to THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 1-7
(Clyde A. Milner et al. eds. 1994).
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legal owners of some or all of their rights to land with compensation,
with limited compensation, or without any compensation at all."
B. Ownership as a Tool of Policy
Property maps of the American West are littered with the detritus of
policies once thought essential for the expansion, survival or honor of the
nation, but are now largely forgotten.
Every western state contains thousands of acres once transferred
into private ownership for nothing under the Homestead Act and Stock-
Raising Homestead Act (287,500,000 acres) 12, and the Desert Lands Act
(10,700,000 acres), 13 or for almost nothing under the Timber Culture Act
(10,900,000 acres) 14 and Timber and Stone Act (13,900,000 acres).' 5
From 1862, a heady mixture of state donation act tradition, an egalitarian
National Land Reform Movement, and a desire to bind the West more
closely to the Union during the Civil War prompted the federal govern-
ment to give land away to claimants who had fulfilled residency re-
quirements and submitted minimal paperwork.
16
The homestead laws and the settlement they encouraged did many
things, good and bad. Among these things was the settlement and tilling
of millions of acres of land in the "Great Plow-Up. ' 17 In the long run,
much of this land could not support the communities encouraged to
claim them under generous federal laws.' 8 The property rights remain.
Many, if not most, surveyed townships in western states still contain
one, two or three sections of state land granted by the federal govern-
ment for support of the common schools (77,630,000 acres), 19 universi-
ties, hospitals, prisons and more (21,700,000 acres).20 In most states,
these sections now provide only a tiny amount of the money needed to
run modem schools, land-grant universities, and prisons. For example,
in fiscal year 2006, revenues from state school-grant lands are projected
to provide $31 million (1.1 percent) of Colorado's $2.8 billion school
budget.2'
11. See infra text accompanying notes 12-37.




16. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 393-96 (1968). See
also Wendy McElroy, The Free-Soil Movement, FREEDOM DAILY, May 2001, available at
http://www.fff.org/freedom/0501 e.asp.
17. DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN
WEST 98-99 (1992).
18. See generally JONATHAN RABAN, BAD LAND: AN AMERICAN ROMANCE (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. State of Colorado, Office of the State Auditor, State Board of Land Commissioners Per-
formance Audit (Nov. 2005), http://www.state.co.us/auditor (follow "OSA Audit Reports" hyper-
link; then follow "By Department/Entity" hyperlink; then follow "Natural Resources" hyperlink);
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New Mexico, Arizona, California and southern Colorado contain a
range of ownership configurations that memorialize our struggle with our
national promise in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo to respect property
rights granted by Spain and Mexico before the United States' conquest of
the Southwest. Millions of acres were confirmed through a bewildering
variety of congressionally sanctioned processes; millions more were re-
jected, justly and unjustly.22 Decisions of the California Land Commis-
sion made under the California Land Settlement Act of 185123 and the
New Mexico Court of Private Land Claims authorized by Congress in
189124 confirmed title to huge tracts of land across present day Califor-
nia, Arizona, and New Mexico. Congress, through direct congressional
confirmations of title, confirmed another nine million acres, including
the million-acre Sangre de Cristo Grant in southern Colorado and north-
em New Mexico.25 As important are the tens-of-millions of acres of land
for which these confirmation processes rejected claims.26 In many cases,
Hispanic communities, particularly in northern New Mexico, have never
accepted these deprivations.27
While these efforts were originally intended to protect the rights of
actual former Mexican citizens, through the passage of time, title has
passed to people and corporations who have no connection to the South-
west's Mexican past. In recent decades, the United States Supreme
Court's most ringing endorsement of "special rights" for title descended
see also Colorado State Land Board, http://www.trustlands.state.co.us/Documents/Questions/
General.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006) (total funding to Colorado schools generated from school
trust lands in 2003-2004 was $57.9 million); PAUL TESKE, STEPPING UP OR BOTTOMING OUT?
FUNDING COLORADO'S SCHOOLS 6 (2005), http://www.dkfoundation.org/PDFs/
TeskeFullReport.pdf (total funding for Colorado's K-12 schools in 2003 was $4.2 billion). See
also Branson Sch. Dist. v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 626-27 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding a Colorado
voter initiative which changed management of land-grant lands for schools from "maximum
amount" for public schools to "reasonable and consistent income.").
22. Malcolm Ebright, Introduction to SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS AND THE LAW 3,
3-11 (Malcolm Ebright ed. 1989); See also Federico Cheever, A New Approach to Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants and the Public Trust Doctrine. Defining the Property Interest Protected by the
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1364, 1381-85 (1986).
23. Califomia Land Settlement Act of 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).9 Stat. 631 (1851).
24. Act of Mar. 3, 185 1, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854 (establishing a court of private land claims, and
providing for settlement of private land claims in certain States and Territories).
25. Ryan Golten, Lobato v. Taylor: How the Villages of the Rio Culebra, the Colorado Su-
preme Court, at the Restatement of Servitudes Bailed Out the Treaty of Guadulupe Hidalgo, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 457 (2005); Gregory Hicks & Devon G. Pefia, Community Acequis in Colorado s Rio
Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L.
R. 387 (2003).
26. Cheever, supra note 22, at 1381-89.
27. MALCOLM EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT: A HISTORY OF CHICANERY 28
(1980). For an extensive discussion, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TREATY OF
GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING
COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW MEXICO (June 2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO459.pdf.
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from Mexican grants favored by Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation
on land near Marina Del Rey in Los Angeles County. 
2 8
Millions of acres of the remaining public domain and quite a lot of
private land are criss-crossed or perforated by patented mining claims
under the General Mining Act of 1872, and rights-of-way under a long
ago repealed law generally known as Revised Statute 2477.29 As scholar
Bret Birdsong put it in a recent article:
For 110 years, from its enactment in 1866 until its repeal in 1976,
this obscure statute known as R.S. 2477 granted the right-of-way
across unreserved federal public lands for the construction of high-
ways. For most of its lifetime, the terse and obscure grant caused lit-
tle stir, except for the occasional claim that now private lands are
subject to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way established during earlier public
ownership. Since its repeal, however, R.S. 2477 has become a flash-
point in the ongoing battle for control over western public lands and
the resources they harbor. Throughout the West, states, counties, and
even individuals. and groups pushing for unrestricted motorized ac-
cess to remote public lands are using R.S. 2477 to try to frustrate en-
vironmentally protective measures imposed by federal land
30managers ....
The prairies from Texas to Montana contain irregular jumbles of
government land-the national grasslands-originally created to further
farmers' relief and soil conservation. As mentioned above, the Home-
stead Act of 1862 and similar laws brought millions of settlers to the
prairies. The land could not support them. After the First World War,
sod, which should never have been broken, had been plowed up. 3' When
the dry years came, the land yielded its topsoil to the incessant wind.
The Dust Bowl came to Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, Nebraska, Kansas,
Colorado and the Dakotas.32
Ten-foot drifts of fine soil particles piled up like snow in a blizzard,
burying fences and closing roads . . . Emergency measures were
taken to save the farmers and settlers. The National Industrial Re-
covery Act of 1933 and the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of
1935 allowed the federal government to purchase and restore dam-
aged lands and to resettle destitute families. From these disastrous
28. Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 209 (1984) (holding title descended from
Mexican claims not subject to California's otherwise universal public trust easement).
29. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 20, 28-74 (1992); see also HIGHWAY ROBBERY: HOW A LOOPHOLE IN AN
OUTDATED AND REPEALED ROAD STATUTE THREATENS OUR NATIONAL PARKS, MONUMENTS, AND
OTHER SPECIAL PLACES - ONE MILE AT A TIME, http://www.highway-robbery.org/documents/
Robbery.pdf.
30. Bret Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility for
Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 524 (2005).
31. See DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES 93-105 (1992).
32. See TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO
SURVIVED THE GREAT AMERICAN DUST BowL 145-330 (2005).
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days, a hundred years after the Homestead Act on June 23, 1960, the
National Grasslands were born.
33
The often ignored national grasslands contain four million acres of
land.
3 4
Even some of the great national reservations, the National Forests
and Bureau of Land Management holdings, were created to further poli-
cies that have long since dropped off any legislative agenda. The fear of
"timber famine," so important in establishing the national forests, 35 now
rarely comes to mind. The forage preserved by the Taylor Grazing Act
3 6
fattens an inconsequential three percent of the nation's beef.
37
We do not regularly think of all these manipulations of ownership at
the same time or in the same way. We, like the legislators who author-
ized those manipulations, tend to approach the western landscape the-
matically. We see only those things relevant to what we happen to be
looking for: Hispanic rights, biodiversity, Native American rights, water
supply, and minerals, among other things. But, of course, the western
landscape is not arranged thematically.
The property ownership manipulations of the past two centuries
seem breathtakingly arrogant. As anyone could have told the idealistic,
sovereign agents of the past-whether Civil War Republican, early twen-
tieth century Progressive, or New Deal Democrat-the property rights
have outlasted the policies they were designed to support.
C. Life Among the Ruins
In the inland West, we live among a jumble of grants and claims,
recognized and inchoate, created or suppressed to serve long-abandoned
and half-forgotten policies. We live like medieval Romans, 38 building
cooking fires in the ruined coliseum. The vast ruins around us are linked
in our minds to our strong moral reaction for the reasons that brought
them into being.
33. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, National Grasslands,
http://www.fs.fed.us/grasslands/aboutus/index.shtm, (last visited Apr. 5, 2006); see also National
Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, ch. 48-
49,49 Stat. 115 (1935); 36 C.F.R. § 213.1 (2006) (regulations establishing the National Grasslands).
34. See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, supra note 33.
35. See GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (Kessinger Publishing 2004)
(1910), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-8.txt.
36. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000)).
37. National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, Economic Facts of Public Lands Grazing
(2004), http://www.publiclandsranching.org/htmlres/PDF/FS- Grazing-Economics.PDF.
38. In the early Middle Ages Visigoths and Vandals invaded and sacked Rome. Paula J.
Howarth, Villa Aldobrandini on the Quirinal Hill in Rome (Jun. 1996),
http://www.paulahowarth.com/villa/e-04.htm. Political troubles, with Byzantines, the Lombards, the
establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, and conflicts between the papacy further humbled the
"eternal city." Id. The city was depopulated. Id. The remaining inhabitants dwelt mainly on the
Campus Martius, the low-lying part of the city near the Tiber River. Id. They erected modest dwell-
ings among the monumental buildings of Imperial Rome, by then in ruins. Id.
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It barely requires proof that "life among the ruins" is less than per-
fect. Indian tribes work to regain land and sovereignty lost in the name
of long discredited policies. 39  Hispanic communities try to piece to-
gether rights to coherent territories to support community life and tradi-
tion.40 Wilderness advocates battle over rights of way-crumbling
wagon ruts to long abandoned mines and reservoir sites.41 Unused min-
ing claims frustrate public land planning.42 High plains farmers try to
maintain dwindling communities on land grandly granted to them to set-
tle the West.43  Ranchers in Powder River country discover that Con-
gress's failure to grant them mineral rights to their ranches under the
Stock Raising Homestead Act of 191644 have opened their holdings and
way of life to invasion in the age of coal-bed methane development.45
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe46 and illus-
trated the nature of "life among the ruins." The Southern Ute Tribe had
sued Amoco and a variety of other private parties extracting coal-bed
methane gas out of lands in which the tribe owned the rights to "coal.
4 7
The case was heralded as a struggle between oil and gas companies and
an impoverished Indian tribe.48 Law professors love the case because its
holding turns on the meaning of the word "coal."49 More significantly
for us, the entire dispute-expensive, frustrating and hurtful-arose out
of property-rights allocations made to further long-abandoned federal
policies.50
During the late nineteenth century, the federal government, expend-
ing its energy to sell or give away western lands, made half-hearted ef-
forts to reserve valuable mineral lands. The 1864 Coal Lands Act 5' and
the 1873 Coal Lands Act52 set a maximum limit of 160 acres for individ-
ual entry on coal lands and minimum purchase prices of ten dollars to
39. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
xii, 241, 248-49 (2005).
40. See Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Colo. 2003).
41. See, e.g., sources cited, supra note 29.
42. See Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 28-74.
43. See generally RABAN, supra note 18; EGAN, supra note 32, at 237-41.
44. Enlarged Homestead Acts (Stock-Raising Homestead Act), ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (1916)
(codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 299, 301 (2000)).
45. See Ray Ring, Backlash: Local Governments Tackle an In-Your-Face Rush on Coalbed
Methane, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?
article id= 1371. See generally M. Kristeen Hand & Kyle R. Smith, Comment, The Deluge: Poten-
tial Solutions to Emerging Conflicts Regarding On-Lease Surface Damage Caused by Coal Bed
Methane Production, 1 WYO. L. REV. 661, 667-68 (2001).
46. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
47. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 865-66.
48. See id. at 865.
49. See id. at 865-66.
50. See id. at 868, 879-80.
51. Coal Lands Act of 1864, ch. 205, §§ 2-4, 13 Stat. 343, 343-44.
52. Coal Lands Act of 1873, ch. 279, §§ 1-6, 17 Stat. 607.
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twenty dollars an acre.53 With the dawn of the twentieth century came
claims of "widespread fraud" in the disposition of coal lands and dire
threats of a "coal famine. 54
In 1906, by executive order, President Theodore Roosevelt re-
sponded to these concerns of fraud and resource famine by withdrawing
64 million acres of potential coal lands from the operation of the federal
disposal laws.5 5 Homesteaders, who had entered the land and worked it
in good faith, were to be deprived of any chance of ever receiving title to
the lands they occupied.
6
In 1909 and 1910, Congress enacted a legislative compromise re-
serving the "coal" under the lands in question for the federal government
and allowing all other rights to pass to the apparently deserving home-
steaders. 7
After the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, s some
of the federal "coal" rights created by the 1909 and 1910 laws were
transferred back to the Southern Ute Tribe from which the land (and
coal) had originally been taken. 9
In the 1990s, using technology Theodore Roosevelt would have
admired, but could not have imagined, the successors in title to the
homesteaders began leasing their land for the extraction of methane gas
from the now Indian-owned coal.6°
In 1999, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States
Supreme Court held that "coal," as conceived by the authors of the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 at the beginning of the twentieth century,
did not include coal bed methane. 6' They explained how the Southern
53. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 868.
54. Id. at 868-69.
55. 41 CONG. REC. 2615 (1907).
56. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 869.
57. Id. at 870. While the 1909 Act allowed the federal government to grant land patents to
those people who had already endeavored to make good-faith entries onto the land, it also reserved
for the United States the right to mine and remove the coal. Id. The 1910 Act similarly reserved the
coal rights for the United States in the remaining coal lands that the government had opened up for
new entry under the provisions of the homestead laws. Id.
58. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act) of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codi-
fied in 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)).
59. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 870. The Court said:
Among the lands patented to settlers under the 1909 and 1910 Acts were former reserva-
tion lands of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, which the Tribe had ceded to the United
States in 1880 in return for certain allotted lands provided for their settlement. (citation
omitted) In 1938, the United States restored to the Tribe, in trust, title to the ceded reser-
vation lands still owned by the United States, including the reserved coal in lands pat-
ented under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. As a result, the Tribe now has equitable title to the
coal in lands within its reservation settled by homesteaders under the 1909 and 1910
Acts.
Id.
60. See id. at 870-71.
61. Id at 880.
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Utes ended up with certain rights in the "bundle of rights" to the lands at
issue.62 However, resolving a modem dispute within the frame of refer-
ence created by an ancient compromise (two compromises, if you count
the Indian Reorganization Act) bothered them not at all.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION
We all-Indian nations, environmentalists, public land managers,
city planners, ranchers, developers and farmers-live with bits of the
collective property ownership problem. This realization, in itself, has
some value. At least we can commiserate. But does this realization pro-
vide a path to a collective solution of some kind?
An obvious candidate for "agent of positive change"-a necessary
but insufficient condition for a solution-is the land trust community.
I define that community broadly to include private land trusts (in-
ternational, national, regional and local) and government entities (fed-
eral, state, tribal and local) committed to preserving and promoting vari-
ous public values by buying-up property rights related to land and water.
These are people who transfer property rights in the interest of preserv-
ing environmental, historical, and cultural value.
By law, land trusts must be government or non-profit entities com-
mitted to the public good.63 State conservation easement statutes gener-
ally allow these two types of entities to hold development rights for
someone else's land for purposes of preservation. 64 Generally, conserva-
tion easements can only be created and enforced for specific beneficial
purposes. For example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act only
authorizes conservation easements:
[T]the purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting
natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring the
availability of real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or
open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhanc-
ing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, ar-
chaeological, or cultural aspects of real property."
' 65
62. See id. at 879-80.
63. Jane Prohaska, Outline: Conservation Easement Drafting, SL053 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 219, 221
(2005).
64. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 1(2) (1982). The model statute provides
further clarification on two types of entities:
'Holder' [of a Conservation Easement] means: (i) a governmental body empowered to
hold an interest in real property under the laws of this State or the United States; or (ii) a
charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes or powers
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Land trusts have a broad range of tools for conveying property in-
terests to meet their goals and, in recent decades, an impressive record of
making transactions happen.66  According to the National Land Trust
Census, as of 2003, local and regional land trusts now protect more than
9.4 million acres of open space, in addition to the millions of acres na-
tional land trusts protect; 67 this is a 100% increase over the 4.7 millions
acres protected in 1998.68 As of 2003, more than five million of these
acres were protected by conservation easements, almost 266% more than
in 1998.69
Who better than the land trust community to reorder the jumble of
property rights around us into something that reflects our current values
and priorities? It is only by the voluntary transfer of property rights that
the problems created by the current property configuration can be made
better.
But wait a second! Rather than being "part of the solution" isn't the
land trust community actually "part of the problem"? 70 Their activities,
authorized and shaped by state and federal statute and subsidized by state
and federal tax law or tax revenue, can be seen as another example of
transitory government priorities manipulating perpetual property rights.7'
A number of scholars have pointed out the "problem of perpetu-
ity' '72 in the work of the land trust community. Generally, the restrictions
imposed through land conservation transactions are perpetual. Whether
the land trust community protects land by accepting a conservation
easement that restricts future development of land or by accepting fee
title to land, history strongly suggests that the effects of the property
transactions will outlast the desires of the grantor of those property rights
and probably outlast the vision that inspired the land trust to which the
66. See Land Trust Alliance, About LTA: Our History, http://www.lta.org/aboutlta/
history.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2006); Jessica E. Jay, Land Trust Risk Management of Legal Defense
and Enforcement of Conservation Easements: Potential Solutions, 6 ENVIT. LAW. 441, 451 (2000).
67. Land Trust Alliance, National Land Trust Census, http://www.lta.org/aboutlta/census.
shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. See Duncan M. Greene, Comment, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing the Prob-
lem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 883, 901-05 (2005).
72. See, e.g., id; Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the
Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 756 (2002); Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes:
A Policy Analysis in the Context ofln Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433
(1984); Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11, cmt. a (2000). This section states:
It is inevitable that, over time, changes will take place that will make it impracticable or
impossible for some conservation servitudes to accomplish the purpose they were de-
signed to serve. If no conservation or preservation purpose can be served by continuance
of the servitude, the public interest requires that courts have the power to terminate the
servitude so that some other productive use may be made of the land.
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rights are granted. 73 Arguably, the well-meant activities of the land trust
community will consign our grandchildren to "life among the ruins" in
the same way that the allotment acts, railroad grants and mining claims
of the nineteenth century force us to live among the ruins. Are we mak-
ing the same mistake again?
The answer to this question is complicated. The complete answer
requires transaction-by-transaction empirical research work that, to my
knowledge, has not yet been undertaken.74 But, I have to say that I think
the answer is "no."
While generalizations are dangerous, particularly in the absence of
much data, there is one common characteristic of almost all of the agents
of the land trust community that suggests they may do more good than
harm in the effort to create a property landscape that conforms to the
needs and aspirations of the people who live on the land. That character-
istic is (for want of a better phrase) "local-ness": the concern of the in-
terests of the people in relatively small geographic areas and the land-
scapes in those areas.
The property ownership configurations we contend with today are
the result of sweeping national determinations about who should own
what, where and how. Congress (and occasionally state legislatures),
through mining legislation, land legislation, private land title confirma-
tion legislation, Indian legislation, transportation legislation, water de-
velopment legislation, and economic relief legislation, built property
rights "creating and destroying machines." Once those machines were
released on the landscape, creating and destroying property rights by
adjudication or by rule, Congress had little power to control them and,
generally, little interest in controlling them.
What the land trust community does works in a very different way.
Transactions are undertaken one at a time. Whether the parties to the
transactions are public or private, whether funding comes from the gov-
ernment, private parties or tax incentives, the land trust community re-
makes ownership patterns on the landscape by one parcel and by one
decision at a time.75
73. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1077
(1996).
74. But see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Ease-
ments, 29 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 421, 426-27 (2005). The "problem of perpetuity" is neither new
nor unique to land trusts and their activities. The legal doctrine of cy pres has been developed and
refined over the centuries to deal precisely with the issue presented by acquisitions of land and
conservation easements by land trusts - how to adjust when the charitable purpose to which property
has been "perpetually" devoted becomes obsolete due to changed conditions. Id.
75. See generally BILL BIRCHARW, NATURE'S KEEPERS (2005) (describing the origins of The
Nature Conservancy).
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I think this characteristic is a cause for hope. The land legislation of
the past was enacted largely by people of good will intended to solve
perceived problems. The wrong they did arose largely from their use of
durable tools (property rights) on landscapes they barely knew and their
addiction to the glory of solving problems and making choices on a na-
tional scale. The "local-ness" which is a hallmark for the land trust
community was largely, if not entirely, absent from the property rights
generating and destroying machines that created the problems we see
around us. Those particular titans among the "lords of yesterday" 76 al-
most universally suppressed local concerns in favor of national ones. If
we turn that bias around, maybe we can get somewhere.
II. LOCAL-NESS
Here and there across the West, the land trust community has taken
up the challenge of reshaping the ownership regimes of the past into
something corresponding to modem values and priorities. When they
have done so, they have done so on a local level, concerned primarily
with communities of human users and the health of the land itself.
In the first years of the twenty-first century, the Trust for Public
Lands (TPL), in cooperation with local land trusts and the United States
Forest Service conceived the "Sierra Checkerboard Initiative." 7  A
swath of the West was "checker-boarded" to finance the Transcontinen-
tal Railroad.78 The checkerboard land ownership pattern is still dominant
in a section of the most valued and most used mountain landscape in the
continental United States, California's Sierra Nevada. Between the south
fork of the American River and the North Yuba River, east of the bur-
geoning "gold country" cities of Auburn, Grass Valley, Nevada City and
Yuba City, TPL and its partners hope to fill in the checkerboard to sus-
tain a permanently protected landscape.79
The Science Assessment for the Sierra Checkerboard Initiative, re-
leased by The Conservation Biology Institute in the summer of 2005,
estimates that between 400,000 and 70,000 acres of private land (held by
successors to the Central Pacific Railroad) will need to be protected in
one form or another to protect the biological assets of the northern Si-
erra.
8 0
76. See WILKINSON, supra note 29, at 3-27.
77. Angela Ballard, Closing the Checkerboard, LAND & PEOPLE, Spring 2005,
http://www.tpl.org (follow "publications" hyperlink; then follow "Land & People magazine" hyper-
link; then follow "Land & People Spring 2005" hyperlink).
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. See Ballard, supra note 77.
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Writings about the Sierra Checkerboard Initiative, whether scien-
tific8' or popular,82 are about "the place" itself, not about Forest Service
policy, railroads, California's population or any other larger "national"
issue.
The Navajo Nation established a Land Acquisition fund in 1984.83
"The fund was intended to consolidate the Navajo land base by purchas-
ing allotted lands, expand the land base for more grazing and home-site
areas, create economic development opportunities and to relieve crowded
areas to make land available for the growing Navajo population. 84 The
fund currently contains $37 million.85 According to Navajo President
Joe Shirley, Jr., within ten years that amount is expected to grow, giving
the Navajo Nation huge buying power and enabling it to spend at least
$10 million per year on land purchases. 86 The President's recent state-
ment expressed interest in purchasing nine specific parcels amounting to
more than 22,000 acres.8 7 Almost all of those parcels are in the checker-
board reservation.
88
In two major projects in Colorado, the Trust for Public Land is try-
ing to organize coalitions to put back together what the General Mining
Act of 1872 tore to pieces. To provide prospectors with incentives to
locate valuable mineral deposits on the public land, the 1872 law granted
them the power purchase lands on which they had found such deposits at
bargain basement prices ($2.50 to 5.00 per acre).8 9 In the "high elk cor-
ridor" near Marble, Colorado and in the Mosquito Range behind Fair-
play, Colorado, TPL is "doing deals" to place hundreds of long aban-
doned mining claims back into public ownership. 90 This, they hope, will
eventually provide an ownership regime that supports the current uses of
these lands, recreation and preservation.
In southeastern Colorado, in the much neglected short-grass prairie
country, lies the Comanche National Grassland. According to the federal
government, the Comanche National Grassland includes over 440,000
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 77.
83. Press Release, The Navajo Nation, Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr. Defends Land







89. See WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 48.
90. Trust for Public Land, Mosquito Range Heritage Initiative, http://www.tpl.org (enter
"Colorado" in "Select by State" box; click on "Mosquito Range Heritage Initiative" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006); Trust for Public Land, High Elk Corridor campaign, http://www.tpl.org (enter
"Colorado" in "Select by State" box; click on "High Elk Corridor Campaign" hyperlink) (last visited
Apr. 7, 2006).
10512006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
acres. 91 Those acres are spread almost helter-skelter across Otero, Las
Animas and Baca counties.
From the 1880s, the Homestead Act and its relatives encouraged
settlement on to the short grass prairie lands of eastern Colorado.
92
Towns were established and quickly boomed. Successive episodes of
blizzard, drought and commodity price collapse, and the Dust Bowl of
the 1930s, drove many of those settlers or their children off the land. To
stabilize soil conditions and provide some financial relief, the federal
government bought some of the land back.93 It was another twenty years
before the federal government conceded that these acquisitions were not
temporary and began managing the patchwork prairie holdings as na-
tional grasslands.94 The random nature of government acquisition makes
the grasslands extremely hard to manage. 95
The mission of the Southern Plains Land Trust (SPLT), headquar-
tered in Pritchett, Colorado, just north of the Comanche Grassland hold-
ings, "is to create a shortgrass prairie reserve network that enables native
plant and animal communities to once again thrive, with minimal human
intervention." 96  As SPLT makes clear: "Though our National Grass-
lands hold the greatest promise for large scale prairie preservation, the
U.S. Forest Service remains the greatest obstacle to that goal. 97 SPLT's
first acquisition is "approximately 14 miles west of the town of Spring-
field in southeastern Colorado. The 1,280 acres known as Fresh Tracks
is three miles north of the Comanche National Grasslands. 98
III. MAJOR CONCERNS
A. State Laws
Western environmentalists and western Indian nations share many
characteristics, among these are an abiding presumption that the federal
government, despite all its flaws, is an ally and the reciprocal presump-
tion that states and local actors are, by and large, adversaries. History
bares this out, and history is not to be discounted.
91. USDA Forest Service, Comanche National Grassland-Area Information,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r2/psicc/coma/main/areainformation.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
92. See supra Part I.
93. See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, supra note 33.
94. See id.
95. See Elizabeth Howard, Management of the National Grasslands, 78 N.D. L. REv. 409,
425-27 (2002) (describing the confusing and conflicting management attempts that the Forest Ser-
vice has attempted to implement, and the lack of a clear roadmap for future management of the
national grasslands).
96. Southern Plains Land Trust, About SPLT, http://www.southemplains.org/aboutsplt.org
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
97. Southern Plains Land Trust, SPLT's Mission, http://www.southernplains.org/aboutsplt.org
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
98. Southern Plains Land Trust, Fresh Tracks, http://www.southernplains.org/freshtracks.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
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Relying on land conservation transactions to remake the landscape
of western ownership means relying, to some degree, on state law. State
law is not without its biases. Conservation easement statutes are no ex-
ception. While every western state conservation easement statute author-
izes private non-profits (including environmental groups) to hold conser-
vation easements for purposes of environmental and historical preserva-
tion, only a few statutes specifically recognize the right of the native
people to use conservation easements to preserve their heritage or recog-
nize the right of tribal entities to hold conservation easements.
99
Arizona's conservation easement statute defines a conservation
easement as an easement created to serve a variety of public purposes
"[p]ursuant to a clearly delineated federal, state or local governmental
conservation policy" but makes no reference to tribal government con-
servation policies.100 Arizona defines the holder of a conservation ease-
ment to include "[a] governmental body empowered to hold an interest in
real property under the laws of this state or the United States."'' Again,
the language omits tribes.
Colorado and Utah allow a conservation easement to be held "by a
governmental entity" without further detail.1
0 2
Alaska, Idaho, South Dakota, and Texas, in various forms of the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act, define a holder of a conservation
easement to include "[a] governmental body empowered to hold an inter-
est in real property under the laws of this state or the United States.
'' 03
Again, tribes are omitted.
Nevada defines a holder to include "[a] governmental body empow-
ered to hold an interest in real property,"' 4 neither including nor exclud-
ing tribal entities.
California and Oregon specifically recognize tribal holders of con-
servation easements. California defines the holders of conservation
easements to include "[a] federally recognized California Native Ameri-
can tribe or a non-federally recognized California Native American tribe
that is on the contact list maintained by the Native American Heritage
Commission to protect a California Native American prehistoric, ar-
chaeological, cultural, spiritual, or ceremonial place ... ,,0 Oregon
99. For a discussion of conservation easement statutes as a protector of Native American
sacred sites, see Lawrence Kueter & Christopher S. Jensen, Conservation Easements: An Underde-
veloped Tool to Protect Cultural Resources, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1057 (2006).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-271-2(c)(ii) (20006).
101. Id. § 33-271-3(a) (2006).
102. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.5-104(2) (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-3
(West 2005).
103. ALASKA STAT. § 34.17.060 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 55-2101 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 1-19B-56 (2005); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.001 (2005).
104. NEV. REV. STAT. 111.410 (2005).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.39(c) (West 2005).
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defines the holder of a conservation easement to include "[a]n Indian
tribe as defined [by Oregon statute].' ' 6
Hawaii authorizes "[a]ny public body" to hold a conservation ease-
ment. 10 7 And, Hawaii, alone, specifically authorizes conservation ease-
ments to "[p]reserve and protect the structural integrity and physical ap-
pearance of cultural landscapes, resources, and sites which perpetuate
indigenous native Hawaiian culture."'
10 8
If California, Hawaii and Oregon can do it, why can't any other
western state? 109 Does the fact that conservation easement statutes in
California, Oregon and Hawaii specifically reference indigenous values
or tribal easement holders, mean that statutes in other states' statutes
must be construed as omitting them?
Why would tribal governments want to hold conservation ease-
ments under state law? Efforts to protect tribal culture and values extend
beyond the recognized boundaries of tribal jurisdiction. As the United
States Supreme Court made clear in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation," 0 the holes in Indian ownership
caused by the allotment laws can tear holes in Indian jurisdiction."'
Conservation easements have become important land use regulation tools
in communities, like Boulder, Colorado, with comprehensive zoning
codes.112 Conservation easements could become important land use
regulation tools to allow tribal control of non-Indian land within and
around Indian reservations, but only if it is clear that tribal governments
can hold them and hold them for Indian purposes.
B. Should We Purchase Property Rights to Protect What We Should be
Able to Protect Without Buying Anything?
One of the perennial arguments in the non-Indian land trust com-
munity is to what degree government entities should be willing to pay
(by purchasing conservation easements and other property rights) to pro-
tect public values, when they have the power to protect those public val-
ues through regulation without compensating the land owner who might
injure them. As John Echeverria puts it:
106. OR. REv. STAT. § 271.715 (2005).
107. HAw. REV. STAT. § 198-3 (2005).
108. Id. § 198-1 (2005). See also Jocelyn B. Garovoy, 'Ua Koe Ke Kuleana 0 Na Kanaka'
(Reserving the Rights of Native Tenants): Integrating Kuleana Rights and Land Trust Priorities in
Hawaii, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 523 (2005) (describing kuleana lands in the context of conserva-
tion land trusts).
109. A Westlaw search carried out in March 2006 identified only California, Hawaii, and
Oregon as states whose conservation easement statutes reference Native American, Indian, or in-
digenous peoples.
110. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
111. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422.
112. See generally, Boulder County Colorado, Land Use Department,
http://www.co.boulder.co.us/lu (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (describing Boulder's land use planning).
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[R]egulation and payment cannot simply be viewed as alternative
means for advancing a single overarching goal. Rather, how and
when one tool is used will affect how and when the other tool can be
used, both as a matter of social policy and ultimately, too, as matter
of law. In particular, use of public and private resources to pursue
various conservation goals threatens to weaken society's capacity to
pursue the same or similar goals through regulation. At worst, wide-
spread use of the payment approach has the ironic potential to un-
dermine the cause of environmental protection itself by undermining
a time-tested and effective tool for protecting land.
11 3
This concern about payment and regulation applies in the Indian
context and in the non-Indian one. Will paying non-Indian landowners
to get back land originally unjustly taken from Indian tribes both con-
vince other similarly situated land owners that they too are entitled to
payment and undercut moral claims regarding Indian ownership of the
land?
I believe this is a false dichotomy. Most successful regulatory ef-
forts, no matter how worthy in their own right, have been facilitated with
significant subsidies. If the government wants everyone to paint their
house purple, it is wise to provide purple paint at low cost. Direct subsi-
dies, for example, for water treatment plants, 14 brown-fields redevelop-
ment ll5 and mine land clean-up, 1 6 or indirect subsidies like federal fund-
ing for light rail or reorganization bankruptcy protection for liable parties
under CERCLA (the superfund law),'"' make it easier to get people to do
what regulations require.
In the American West, where the federal government had a hand in
creating most of our land use messes, the line between government sub-
sidies to facilitate regulation and government payments for past respon-
sibilities becomes blurry in the extreme. In all of our checkerboards (real
and metaphorical), the government is not only the sovereign, but it is also
113. John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying To Achieve Conservation Purposes, SJ053
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1141, 1145-46 (2004).
114. The Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF), "provides $4 billion annual in recent
years to fund water quality protection projects for wastewater treatment, nonpoint source pollution,
and watershed and estuary management." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water
State Revolving Fund: America's Largest Water Quality Financing Source,
http://www.epa.gov/owm/cwfimance/cwsrf/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
115. Three EPA financing programs-EPA's flagship effort-have been used extensively to
spur brownfield redevelopment. The Brownfield Revitalization Act authorizes up to $200 million
annually for EPA's site assessment, cleanup, and revolving loan fund capitalization programs (al-
though Congress to date has not provided more than $123 million for these programs and related
operations and support). U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS FEDERAL
PROGRAMS GUIDE (Sept. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/partners/
federalprogramsguide.pdf.
116. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, AML Site Information,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/aml/amlsite/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (describ-
ing abandoned mine land cleanup priority sites throughout the United States).
117. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) (Superfund Act), Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
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a property owner. It hardly seems wrong to force the federal government
to subsidize solutions to problems it created.
CONCLUSION
This caution aside, however, the prospects look good. The land trust
community seems unlike the property rights manipulators of the past. It
seems better suited to solving problems by addressing local problems on
the landscapes on which it operates. We should all make time to gather
some information and give it some thought.
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: AN UNDERDEVELOPED




Conservation easements have become a very successful tool for the
protection of open space, scenic views, and wildlife habitat. Private land
trusts and government agencies hold conservation easements over thou-
sands of square miles across the West, protecting sensitive lands from
such physical invasions as extractive resource development and subdivi-
sion for housing development. The federal government has recognized
the importance of protecting environmentally sensitive lands, and as a
result, federal tax policy provides a significant financial incentive for
private landowners to grant conservation easements over their property
via income tax deductions for donated easements. This tax incentive has
proved to be a powerful lever, used to achieve conservation results that
otherwise may not have been possible.
Relatively little activity has occurred, however, utilizing conserva-
tion easements to protect culturally important lands. As a result, some
uncertainty remains regarding the proper use of conservation easements
as a tool to protect cultural land resources, as well as the interplay be-
tween the state laws that govern their legal enforceability and the federal
tax laws that govern their tax treatment. Just as invasive land uses are
incompatible with some ecological or aesthetic land values, certain land
uses may also be incompatible with the preservation of cultural re-
sources. For the purposes of this article, we will define "cultural re-
sources" as those sites or land areas, with or without structures that are
connected to people, places or events of cultural or historical importance
to Native American tribes, or to settlement and development of the
American West. State laws generally allow for the use of conservation
easements to protect these cultural resources. Such "cultural conserva-
tion easements," however, must be carefully crafted with some of their
legal uncertainties in mind.
In this article, we will examine the laws of six western states and
the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code," or the "I.R.C.") in order to high-
t Shareholder and member of the Conservation Law practice group of lsaacson Rosenbaum,
P.C., Denver, Colorado. The following is an adaptation of Mr. Kueter's remarks made on February
17, 2006 at the Denver University Law Review Symposium, "Borrowing the Land: Cultures of
Ownership in the Western Landscape."
tt J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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light and explain these uncertainties. First, though, we will provide some
necessary background in Part I on the basic legal characteristics and
statutory requirements of conservation easements. Next, in Part II we
will discuss the Code's treatment of historical and cultural resources,
specifically its different treatments of "historically important land areas"
with or without "historic structures." In Part III, we will examine the
state statutes that define the scope of the valid uses of conservation
easements and make them legally enforceable. In Part IV, we will de-
scribe the relationship between conservation easements' enforceability
and deductibility. Finally, we conclude with a brief note about the uncer-
tainty surrounding the ability of Native American tribes to hold conser-
vation easements.
I. SOME BACKGROUND ON CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act (the "Uniform Act") de-
fines a conservation easement as:
[A] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limi-
tations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include re-
tamining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real
property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational,
or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or en-
hancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architec-
tural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.I
As will be discussed in further detail in Part III below, every state has
adopted a conservation easement enabling statute, employing either some
form of the Uniform Act's language or language drafted specifically by
the state legislature.2 The statutory language covering the protection of
historical and cultural resources varies from state to state.
For federal tax purposes, the Treasury Regulations consider a con-
servation easement to be a "qualified conservation restriction," which is
further defined as "a restriction granted in perpetuity on the use which
may be made of real property - including, an easement or other interest
in real property that under state law has attributes similar to an ease-
ment.",3 In order to qualify for a federal income tax deduction, the I.R.C.
requires a "qualified conservation contribution," which must consist of
the contribution of a "qualified real property interest ... to a qualified
organization . . . exclusively for conservation purposes."4 As we will
1. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1) (1982) (noting that the Uniform Conserva-
tion Easement Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1981).
2. 4 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.01 (Michael Allan Wolf, ed.)
(Supp. Rel. 114-3/2006 2006).
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2) (as amended in 1999).
4. I.R.C. § 170(h)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
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show below, a "cultural conservation easement" faces unique challenges
in satisfying this standard.
II. FEDERAL TAX DEDUCTIBILITY OF CULTURAL CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS
In order to meet the I.R.C.'s conservation purposes test under sec-
tion 170(h)(4), a conservation easement must satisfy one of the following
purposes:
(i) the preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation by, or the
education of, the general public,
(ii) the protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or
plants, or similar ecosystem,
(iii) the preservation of open space (including farmland and forest
land) where such preservation is -
(I) for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or
(II) pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local gov-
ernmental conservation policy, and will yield a significant pub-
lic benefit, or
(iv) the preservation of an historically important land area or a certi-
fied historic structure.
5
This section of the Code, together with its corresponding Treasury
Regulations, allows income tax deductions for donations of conservation
easements that exclusively protect historically significant land areas or
structures, subject to some conditions. 6 Federal regulations very specifi-
cally address the protection of properties containing historic structures,
but do not provide equally clear guidance regarding historically impor-
tant properties without such structures. Whether or not a conservation
easement protecting culturally important land or structures satisfies the
Code's conservation purposes test is directly tied to the property's list-
ing, or eligibility for listing, on the National Register for Historic Places
(the "National Register") or within a registered historic district.7 As we
will discuss below, the criteria for evaluating land areas for inclusion on
5. 1.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(a) (2006).
6. l.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(a)(iv); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5); see Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement Donations - A Responsible Approach, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 24-25 (2004) (discussing conservation easement valuation, and of the federal tax
benefits of easements in general). If a donated conservation easement satisfies the Internal Revenue
Code's requirements, the landowner may claim a tax deduction equal to the amount by which the
easement decreases the underlying servient estate's fair market value. Id. at 4. This value is typi-
cally calculated by comparing the underlying estate's fair market value before and after the easement
becomes effective and assigning the difference between the two as the easement's value. Id. at 24.
7. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(B).
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the National Register are quite vague and contribute to the uncertainty as
to whether conservation easements protecting such areas are deductible.
The Code includes "the preservation of historically important land
areas or certified historic structures" in its definition of conservation pur-
poses. 8 The Code further defines "certified historic structure" to include:
[A]ny building, structure, or land area which (i) is listed in the Na-
tional Register, or (ii) is located in a registered historic district (as de-
fied in section 47(c)(3)(B) [26 U.S.C. §47(c)(3)(B)]) and is certified
by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary [of the Treasury] as
being of historic significance to the district.
9
For specific treatment of historically important land areas (as opposed to
historic structures), we must look to the Treasury Regulations.
The Treasury Regulations define the term "historically important
land area" to include:
(A) An independently significant land area including any related his-
toric resources (for example, an archaeological site or a Civil War
battlefield with related monuments, bridges, cannons, or houses) that
meets the National Register Criteria for Evaluation in 36 CFR 60.4;
(B) Any land area within a registered historic district including any
buildings on the land area that can reasonably be considered as con-
tributing to the significance of the district; and
(C) Any land area (including related historic resources) adjacent to a
property listed individually in the National Register of Historic
Places (but not within a registered historic district) in a case where
the physical or environmental features of the land area contribute to
the historic or cultural integrity of the property.
10
Two issues become apparent upon reading the I.R.C. and the Treasury
Regulations. First, both place considerable weight upon a property's
satisfaction of the National Register criteria. Second, whether a specific
property would be considered a historically important land area is largely
a matter of statutory interpretation. Both of these issues engender uncer-
tainty about historically important land areas that should sound a cau-
tionary note for the landowner motivated to protect such lands by tax
deductibility.
The National Register criteria referenced in the Treasury Regula-
tions are intentionally vague, in that they are "worded in a manner to
provide for a wide diversity of resources."" The National Register is
8. § 170(h)(4)(a)(iv).
9. § 170(h)(4)(b) (emphasis added).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(ii) (as amended in 1999).
11. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2006) (listing the National Register criteria).
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intended to protect "[t]he quality of significance in American history,
architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture [which] is present in
districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of
location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and associa-
tion."1 2 In addition to this general quality of historical significance, an
eligible property must also be associated with persons or events with a
"significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history," or "have
yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or
history."' 3 These are quite clearly subjective criteria, designed to en-
compass as wide a range of properties as possible, but also requiring
further analysis and interpretation before a property can be listed on the
National Register.
The National Register regulations provide that the National Park
Service ("NPS") is the agency responsible for administering and evaluat-
ing properties for the National Register.' 4 The Treasury Regulations,
however, do not require that the NPS evaluate and recommend histori-
cally important land areas in order for conservation contributions to qual-
ify for federal deductibility. 15 The problem for landowners thus becomes
one of interpretation: who is to judge whether their property sufficiently
embodies the National Register criteria, and therefore qualifies for fed-
eral deductibility if protected by a conservation easement? While the
Treasury Regulations direct landowners to the National Register criteria
for insight into what might qualify as an historically important land area,
they provide little predictability or guidance as to how the Internal Reve-
nue Service ("IRS") might enforce those criteria.
Just as the National Register criteria leave much to be desired, the
Treasury Regulations are also subject to uncertainty of interpretation.
Subsection A of the relevant regulation refers to "[a]n independently
significant land area including any related historic resources (for exam-
ple, an archaeological site ... ) that meets the National Register Crite-
ria." 16 No standards are included to clarify what makes a land area inde-
pendently significant. An archaeological site would clearly be a histori-
cal resource, but what other features would qualify? Subsection C in-
cludes "[a]ny land area (including related historic resources) adjacent to
a property listed individually in the National Register ... (but not within
a registered historic district) in a case where the physical or environ-
mental features of the land area contribute to the historic or cultural
integrity of the property."'7 Again, who determines when a property's




15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A- 14(d)(5) (as amended in 1999).
16. Id. § 1.1 70A-14(d)(5)(ii)(A) (emphasis added).
17. Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(ii)(C) (emphasis added).
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rity? Landowners can take little comfort in knowing that the IRS will
make such determinations only upon reviewing their individual claims
for deductibility.
Ultimately, landowners wishing to protect cultural resources must
make the strongest possible argument that their property contains as
many of the above culturally significant features as possible. The IRS
has recognized the use of conservation easements as a tool to protect
environmental values for over forty years. 18 To the extent that conserva-
tion easements protecting cultural resource values also protect environ-
mental values, the certainty of their tax deductibility may be strength-
ened by the long-recognized validity of environmental conservation pur-
poses. Where conservation easements are used to protect cultural re-
sources exclusively, however, their deductibility is much more suscepti-
ble to the uncertainties described above. Many of these uncertainties
could be addressed with clarifying legislation, additional regulatory
guidance, or through additional private rulings by the IRS. Until such
clarifications are issued, however, the deductibility of cultural conserva-
tion easements may remain uncertain and unpredictable.
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF CULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
UNDER STATE LAW
As noted above, to be eligible for deductibility under the I.R.C., a
conservation easement (as a "qualified real property interest") must be a
"restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of the
real property."' 9 Conservation easements are largely statutory creations,
since they are granted "in gross" (i.e., to a person or entity, rather than to
the land they encumber, as easements appurtnenant are granted), and
common law restrictions in gross were not assignable and did not run
with the land.20 States created statutes to provide for the assignability
and appurtenance of conservation easements, while preserving their in
gross characteristics. 2 ' Since these statutory creations are intended to
perform a unique role, they must be narrowly tailored to satisfy the con-
servation purposes delineated by each state, and may only be owned, or
held, by statutorily authorized qualified holders.22 Only by satisfying
state statutory requirements can a conservation easement become a le-
gally enforceable restriction on the use of the underlying property.23
18. The IRS first recognized the tax deductibility of qualified conservation easements in a
1964 revenue ruling. Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
19. I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006).
20. 4 POWELL, supra note 2, § 34A.01. Colorado's conservation easement statute, for exam-
ple, declares that "it is in the public interest to define conservation easements in gross, since such
easements have not been defined by the judiciary." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.5-101 (West
2006).
21. 4 POWELL, supra note 2, § 34A.01.
22. See id. § 34A.03[2].
23. Id. § 34A.03[1].
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In order to determine the viability of conservation easements as le-
gally enforceable tools for the protection of cultural resources in the
West, we will briefly examine a sample of conservation easement stat-
utes from six western states: Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, South
Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.24 Five of the states (all except New Mex-
ico) allow for the protection of cultural or historical resources in their
conservation easement statutes. New Mexico excludes cultural and his-
toric resources from its conservation easement statute, and instead pro-
vides for their protection in a separate Cultural Properties Preservation
Easement Act.z5
Each of the six states includes some combination of "cultural, his-
torical, archaeological, architectural, paleontological or scientific" as-
pects of real property in their definitions of conservation (or, in New
Mexico, cultural) easements or conservation purposes.26 Arizona, South
Dakota and Wyoming have all adopted the Uniform Act, and thus share
its language defining a conservation easement as "a nonpossessory inter-
est of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obli-
gations for conservation purposes or to preserve the historical, architec-
tural, archaeological or cultural aspects of real property."27 (emphasis
added) South Dakota has added "paleontological" aspects to its statutory
definition.28 Utah's statute provides merely for the protection of a "cul-
tural ... use or condition consistent with the protection of open land,"
without any reference to historical, archaeological or other uses.29
Colorado law includes "the conservation and preservation of build-
ings, sites, or structures having historical, architectural, or cultural inter-
est or value" as an acceptable conservation purpose.30  New Mexico's
Cultural Properties Preservation Easements Act describes a "cultural
property" as "a structure, place, site or object having historical, archaeo-
logical, scientific, architectural or other cultural significance."'" Mirror-
24. We selected these states in order to address the Symposium's western theme. This article
is not intended to be a comprehensive review of state laws nationwide.
25. New Mexico Land Use Easement Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12-2 (West 2006); New
Mexico Cultural Properties Preservation Easement Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-1, -2 (West
2006). The requirements of the Cultural Properties Preservation Easement Act closely mirror those
of the Conservation Easement Act. Thus, a properly created cultural property preservation easement
would appear to satisfy the deductibility requirements of I.R.C. § 170(h).
26. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-271(1) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2005);
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-2 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-19B-56 (2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-18-2 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-201(b)(i) (2006).
27. ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-271(1) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § I-19B-56(l) (2006);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-201(b)(i) (2006).
28. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-19B-56(l) (2006).
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-2 (2005). One reason that Utah's statute is limited to "cul-
tural" uses only may be that it has a distinct "Historical Preservation Act" to address historical uses
through historic preservation agreements, rather than through conservation easements. Id. § 9-8-
501(2005). For a discussion of historic preservation agreements, see generally Marcia E. Hepford,
Affirmative Obligations in Historic-Preservation Agreements, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 746 (1983).
30. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (2005).
31. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-2 (West 2006).
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ing the requirements for federal tax deductibility, both Colorado and
New Mexico limit the use of easements to protecting only those cultural
resources (again, primarily historic structures) that satisfy the National
Register criteria, or those that are already listed on the National Register
or similar registries.32 Colorado law provides a more objective standard,
since it restricts the application of conservation easements to those build-
ings, sites or structures which have already been listed on some regis-
try.33 New Mexico merely requires that the cultural resource be "deemed
potentially eligible for inclusion" on the National Register, but is notably
silent as to which agencies or individuals are allowed to "deem" the
property potentially eligible for inclusion.34
In addition to protecting appropriate resources, a conservation
easement must also be held by a statutorily-authorized grantee in order to
be legally enforceable. State laws vary slightly, but generally permit two
categories of entities to hold conservation easements - nonprofit entities
organized under I.R.C. Section 501(c)(3), and governmental agencies.35
New Mexico only allows private nonprofit entities, and not government
agencies, to hold cultural resource preservation easements.36 Arizona's
Uniform Act language exemplifies a common requirement that restricts
qualified nonprofit holders to those organized for the protection of the
property features covered by the conservation easement:
"Holder" means ... [a] charitable corporation . . . , the purposes or
powers of which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic or
open space values of real property, assuring the availability of real
property for agricultural, forest, recreational or open space use, pro-
tecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water qual-
ity or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological or cul-
tural aspects of real property.
37
Colorado and Utah, on the other hand, place no restriction on the purpose
or mission of a grantee nonprofit organization.38
32. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(4) (2005); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-2(A) (2006).
33. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(4) (2005).
34. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-2 (2006) (emphasis added).
35. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-271(3) (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(2) (2005);
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-2 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-19B-56(2) (2006); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57-18-3 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-201(b)(ii) (2005).
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-12A-2 (2006).
37. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-271(3) (2005); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-19B-56(2)
(2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-201(b)(ii) (2005).
38. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30.5-104(2) (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-3 (2005). It is
important to note that for federal deductibility purposes, the Treasury Regulations require that "an
eligible donee ... must ... have a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the dona-
tion," and that "[a] conservation group organized or operated primarily or substantially for one of the
conservation purposes specified in section 170(h)(4)(A) will be considered to have the commitment
required."- Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2006). Interestingly, this regulation allows donees organ-
ized for the protection of wildlife habitat or open space to hold cultural conservation easements.
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Ultimately, each state's law allows for the protection of cultural re-
sources with conservation easements, although with some of the same
ambiguity that marks the federal tax regulations' treatment of cultural
resources. Some states - New Mexico and Colorado, for example - have
clearly contemplated and support the use of conservation easements to
protect culturally important land and structures. Utah, however, gives
cultural resources only passing mention in its conservation easement
statute.39 The presence of historic structures and a property's landmark
or historic district designation may strengthen the enforceability of a
cultural conservation easement, or the absence of such features may pre-
clude enforceability.
Thus, while cultural conservation easements must be carefully tai-
lored to address both the resources at issue and the law of the governing
state, they can be used as an effective tool to protect cultural resources in
each of these six western states.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENFORCEABILITY AND
DEDUCTIBILITY
The tax benefits of qualified conservation contributions make the
relationship between enforceability and deductibility a key consideration
in planning and drafting cultural conservation easements. If conservation
easements are to develop as a tool for the protection of cultural re-
sources, then the parties creating cultural conservation easements must
pay careful attention to the uncertainties surrounding such easements,
particularly with regard to potential gaps between state law and federal
tax law. Failure to capitalize on the tax benefits' incentive mechanism
may prohibit the further development of conservation easements as a
cultural protection tool.
As we discussed above, the enforceability of conservation ease-
ments is primarily a matter of state law. State laws delimit the types of
resources that a conservation easement may protect, the qualified holders
that may hold and manage an easement, and the easement's qualities as a
real property interest (i.e., whether and how an easement may be created,
transferred, extinguished or otherwise enforced against others). 40 A con-
servation easement complying with all state statutory requirements is a
legally enforceable real property interest, regardless of whether or not the
easement qualifies its grantor for federal tax benefits. Many conserva-
tion easement grantors are fully compensated for the fair market value of
the easement's restrictions on their property, and are therefore not eligi-
ble for any tax benefits because they have made no charitable contribu-
tion. Another example of an enforceable, but not deductible, conserva-
39. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-2 (2005).
40. For an example of a statutory description of a conservation easement's qualities as an
interest in real property, see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-103 to -108 (2005).
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tion easement is one where the property's surface and mineral estates are
severed from each other, and the possibility remains that "at any time
there may be extraction or removal of minerals by any surface mining
method. '41
Deductibility, on the other hand, is primarily a matter of federal
law.42 As we noted in Part II, the I.R.C. and Treasury Regulations are
less than clear as to whether cultural conservation easements will enjoy
tax benefits, particularly if those easements protect culturally important
land areas containing no historic structures. At a minimum, federal law
seems to require prudent cultural conservation easement donors to apply
for National Register or historic district recognition of their properties
before claiming a tax deduction for their contribution. Depending on
the state, of course, state law may require no such historic designation to
create a fully enforceable easement. Meeting state requirements in the
creation of legally enforceable cultural conservation easements is thus a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the enjoyment of federal tax
benefits for donated easements. This gap between state enforceability
and federal deductibility shrouds cultural conservation easements in un-
certainty, and may stifle the financial incentives that would make their
use more widespread and reliable.
CONCLUSION: CAN NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES HOLD CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS?
Since much of the Symposium's discussion focused on Native
American cultural resources and efforts to protect them, we would like to
briefly address the question of whether the same state enforceability and
federal deductibility requirements discussed above allow Native Ameri-
can tribal governments to hold cultural conservation easements. Al-
though many other legal tools exist for the protection of Native Ameri-
can cultural resources, such as the Archaeological Resources Protection
Act 43 and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
44
cultural conservation easements may offer an opportunity for tribes to
protect culturally important land areas on a scale beyond the archaeo-
logical or grave site. A full examination of the nature of tribal property
ownership and its relation to state or federal regulation is beyond the
scope of this article. A quick look at the state and federal laws examined
herein, however, reveals an odd potential result not seen in other areas of
conservation easement law.
41. The I.R.C.'s prohibition on surface mining appears at I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(B) (2006).
42. Many states also provide for state income tax deductions or tax credits for conservation
easement donations. These tax benefits vary among the states, and some of them mirror the federal
tax benefits. These state tax benefits, however, are beyond the scope of this article.
43. Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 470aa-470nim (West
2006).
44. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-3013
(West 2006).
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Each state's conservation easement statute describes who is quail-
fled to hold an easement. Every state except New Mexico allows gov-
ernmental entities to be grantees of and hold conservation easements.45
Some of the statutes, however, are unclear as to whether a "governmental
entity" must be a political subdivision of the state, or whether a federal
agency or a Native American tribe would also qualify as a governmental
entity.46 Given the unique sovereign nature of tribes as political entities,
it is not clear whether state law permits them to hold enforceable ease-
ments. New Mexico clearly prohibits them from doing so.
The I.R.C. is also unclear as to whether a gift to a tribe would qual-
ify as a gift to a "qualified organization" for tax purposes. The Code
limits deductions for gifts to governmental entities to those gifts made to
"a State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of
any of the foregoing, or the United States or the District of
Columbia ... . ,47 Again, the unique sovereign nature of Native Ameri-
can tribes arguably does not fit into any of the Code's categories.
Even assuming that the tribes would qualify as a governmental en-
tity under the I.R.C., the question of state enforceability remains. The
odd result would arise in New Mexico, for example, where an otherwise
federally valid and deductible conservation easement would fail to meet
the Code's requirements solely because it was granted to a Native
American tribe, an unauthorized holder under state law. Thus, uncer-
tainty also surrounds the potential for tribes to hold cultural conservation
easements over culturally important land areas. This is another area of
both state and federal law that could be clarified through legislation,
regulation or IRS rulings.
45. See supra Part Ill.
46. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-3 (West 2005)("A charitable organization which
qualifies as being tax exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code or agovernmen-
tal entity may acquire a conservation easement by purchase, gift, devise, grant, lease, or bequest."
(emphasis added)).
47. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2005). This is the definition referenced by the qualified conservation
contribution portion of the I.R.C. in § 170(h)(3)(A).
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It has been 175 years since Chief Justice John Marshall described
the relationship of sovereign Indian tribes to the United States as "re-
sembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian" because tribes "look to our
government for protection" and could "perhaps, be denominated domes-
tic, dependent nations."'  Fifty years after the Cherokee cases, this
loosely-drawn analogy, originally based on treaty provisions pledging
the protection of the United States to ensure the sovereign rights of cer-
tain tribes, had transmuted into the legal and historical fact of literal
wardship.2 In United States v. Kagama,3 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an act of Congress extending the criminal jurisdiction
of the United States over crimes committed by Indians against Indians
within Indian country.4 The power of Congress to govern Indian tribes in
this fashion could not be located in any textual provision of the Constitu-
tion. Rather, the Court based such power on the "wardship" status of
Indian tribes:
These Indian Tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communi-
ties dependent on the United States, - dependent largely for their
daily food; dependent for their political rights. They owe no alle-
giance to the states, and receive from them no protection .... From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties, in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power.
5
The Kagama formulation is frequently cited as the basis for the fed-
eral government's exercise of extra-constitutional and extra-statutory
powers, and commentators and tribal advocates have correctly pointed
t Mr. Berkey is a partner at Alexander, Berkey, Williams & Weathers LLP and specializes
in the area of tribal environmental protection, cultural resource protection, water rights and land
claims. He has worked in the field of Indian Law more than twenty-five years, as a staff attorney and
the Washington Director of the Indian Law Resource Center, in Washington, D.C. as a senior trial
attorney in the Indian Resources Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, and in private practice. Mr. Berkey thanks Scott Williams for his assistance
in the preparation of this Article.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
2. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
3. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
4. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 385.
5. Id. at 383-84.
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out that this aspect of the so-called trust responsibility has furnished the
jurisdictional basis for many of the destructive policies and practices of
the United States.6 Yet, tribes and their attorneys have also relied on the
trust responsibility, in particular the lofty rhetoric of a few Supreme
Court opinions, 7 to craft a legal theory designed to hold the federal gov-
ernment accountable for management of Indian land and resources, or in
approving unwanted development on tribal lands.
Although it is now "undisputed" that there is a "general trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the Indian people,"8 the specific
contours of the trust obligation of the United States have been difficult
for courts to define. It was not until United States v. Mitchell in 1983
that the Supreme Court ruled that the Department of the Interior could be
held to account in money damages for its mismanagement of Indian re-
sources.' 0 The reason specific applications of the trust obligation have so
confounded courts may lie in its murky origins. The guardianship anal-
ogy of the Cherokee cases does not fit easily into the trusteeship concept
of the modern cases.' Another possible explanation for the lack of doc-
trinal clarity may concern the difficulty of applying conventional rules of
private trusteeship arrangements to the conduct of federal agencies as
trustees, especially when the goal is to hold the United States account-
able in damages under the Tucker Act. 12 Then again, more pedestrian
concerns may be at play in the judicial reluctance to endorse a legal the-
ory that might subject the federal treasury to a flood of money damage
awards.
Mitchell appeared to give new life to efforts to use trust theories and
fiduciary standards in Indian rights litigation, although its standard of
federal "control or supervision" of trust assets as the prerequisite for trust
duties has proven to be exceedingly difficult to meet., 3 With regard to
6. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal In-
dian Control Law, 31 MICH. J. L. REFORM 899, 950-51 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942) (affirming the
"distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent
and sometimes exploited people.").
8. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
9. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
10. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225.
11. See id. at 235 n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he duties of a trustee are more intensive
than the duties of other fiduciaries.").
12. 28 U.S.C. §1491 (2005). Stating a claim under the Tucker Act requires a showing that a
particular statute mandates compensation against the United States for its violation. Mitchell, 463
U.S. at 217. No such requirement appears to apply to breach of trust suits against private trustees.
13. See, e.g., Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Individual Indian
beneficial owners of mineral interests failed to state a claim against the Secretary of the Interior for
underpayment of oil and gas royalties because the Government's fiduciary obligation is met by
complying with the leases and applicable statutes and regulations.); United States v. Navajo Nation,
537 U.S. 488 (2003) (rejecting a claim of $600 million in damages arising from Secretary of the
Interior's approval of coal lease amendments setting a royalty rate of 12.5% rather than 20% of the
lessee's gross revenues. The Court could find no statute or regulation that created a duty enforceable
in an actioh for damages under the Tucker Act). There are dozens of such cases pending today. See,
1070 [Vol. 83:4
FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
natural resource development on Indian lands, the doctrine of federal
trusteeship is relevant in principally two ways: first as a legal theory to
obtain injunctive relief to stop the federal government from approving
development that Indian tribes and tribal communities oppose; and sec-
ond, as a legal theory to hold the United States accountable in damages
for authorizing development on terms Indian tribes believe are unfair or
unreasonable, or for authorizing development that injures significant
tribal lands or resources.' 4 This Article focuses primarily on the use of
the trust doctrine to obtain injunctive relief, although, as explained be-
low, the courts have imported the standard for stating a cause of action
for damages into claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
In light of the preservation goals of the trust responsibility, natural
resource protection is a logical field for its use. Although the federal
environmental statutes are invariably the core of most Indian environ-
mental cases, in most cases those statutes are inadequate to sufficiently
protect the conservation and preservation values and goals of tribes.' 5 In
particular, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 16 and the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 17 the most frequently invoked
environmental statutes, provide primarily procedural protections de-
signed to ensure a full and complete record on which to assess the impact
of federal actions on the environment. 8 These statutes obligate federal
agencies to take into account the consequences of their actions on the
environment and on historic properties and to consult with the affected
parties to ensure that all potential short term and long term environ-
mental effects are considered.' 9 In virtually every case, courts note that
such statutes do not dictate a particular substantive result.
20
Indian tribes have resorted to trust theories to fill the gaps left by
environmental statutes. The reliance on trust theories for such purposes
raises a number of questions: Can the trust responsibility be used to re-
quire federal agencies to do more than adhere to the procedural require-
e.g., Alan R. Taradash, Tribal and Allottee Trust Asset Cases Pending in 2003: Brief Case Summa-
ries, in COURSE MATERIALS, 28TH ANNUAL FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION INDIAN LAW CONFERENCE
121-29 (2003). The "control or supervision" standard may have been modified by the Supreme
Court in United States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003), where the Court ruled
that statutory language that property is held "in trust" supports a "fair inference" that an obligation to
preserve the property is incumbent on the United States as trustee even if the statute did not ex-
pressly subject the Government to specific management duties.
14. See Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims for Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355,
364-68 (2003).
15. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 117.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2005).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2005).
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47; 16 U.S.C. § 470.
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47; 16 U.S.C. § 470.
20. See, e.g., Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1536
(9th Cir. 1997) ("NEPA is designed to ensure a process, not a result").
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ments of NEPA and NHPA? Is there a legally enforceable obligation on
federal agencies to act in the best interests of tribes in decisions that af-
fect the tribe's environment? Is the "general trust relationship" between
the United States and tribes merely descriptive or does it impose pre-
scriptive legal duties? To take one concrete example, does the trust re-
sponsibility require federal agencies to restore harvestable runs of
salmon in the Pacific Northwest, rather than just viable runs?
21
The federal courts that have addressed these questions have not
given consistent answers. Over two decades ago, several cases raised the
possibility that the trust responsibility could become an enduring source
of authority to enforce the obligation of the federal government to protect
tribal natural resources.22 With few exceptions, however, the efficacy of
the trust doctrine in the environmental area has steadily weakened since
then, a trend that perhaps mirrors the lamentable state of Indian law in
the federal courts generally. 23 The promise of the early cases has thus
not been realized.
In 1980 in Northern Slope Borough v. Andrus,24 Native villages in
Alaska and several environmental organizations challenged the decision
of the Department of the Interior to lease offshore areas in the Beaufort
Sea for oil and gas development.25 The plaintiffs' principal objection
was that the leasing would jeopardize the Bowhead and Gray whale
populations and other animal species that were used by Alaska Natives
for subsistence purposes.26 The plaintiffs' theories of relief included the
trust responsibility and various environmental statutes.27
The district court accepted the villages' argument that the statutes
designed to protect animals from extinction impose a trust responsibility
on the Federal government to "protect the Alaskan Natives' rights of
subsistence hunting., 28  Noting that the trust responsibility does not
"transcend the statutes creating that responsibility," the court nonetheless
relied on the trust doctrine to buttress the Government's statutory duties:
[The trust responsibility] serves three purposes, to wit: (1) it pre-
cludes the use of environmental statutes to undermine the subsistence
21. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and the National Forest: The Case of the
Aboriginal Lands of the Nez Perce, 34 IDAHo L. REv. 435 (1998) (discussing the Nez Perce Tribe's
relationship with the United States Forest Service and the Forest Service's duty to protect treaty
fights and noting the conflict between the tribe and the Forest Service over the standard required by
the United States to provide harvestable runs of salmon).
22. See, e.g., Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225.
23. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980) (epitomizing the
weakening of the trust doctrine in the environmental area). See also Wood, supra note 15 at 211-12
(noting that some courts in regard to public lands have "insisted that a trust duty off the reservation
be predicated on express language in a statute, treaty, executive order.").
24. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 340-41.
27. Id. at 344-47.
28. Id. at 344.
1072 [Vol. 83:4
2006] FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 1073
cultures, (2) it requires the Secretary to be cognizant of the needs of
the Inupiat culture, and (3) it demands of the Federal government
(and thus the courts) rigorous application of the environmental stat-
utes to protect the species necessary for the Inupiats' subsistence.
29
Applying these standards, the court upheld the Native villages'
claims under NEPA and the Endangered Species Act, because of defi-
ciencies in the Environmental Impact Statement and the biological opin-
ion adopted under the Endangered Species Act to reduce the likelihood
that leasing would jeopardize endangered species.
30
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's interpretation of
the trust responsibility, but reversed its conclusion that the trust obliga-
tions had not been met.3' The court concluded that the Secretary of the
Interior had "fulfilled his trust obligation" by giving "purposeful atten-
tion to the special needs of the Inupiats" and "obvious consideration" to
their fears of the impact of the leasing on their subsistence needs.32 The
court further relied on the fact that the Secretary followed the advice and
recommendations of an assistant secretary "which were aimed at easing
any adverse impacts on the Inupiats. The court cautioned, however,
that the trust responsibility does not give the Native villages "an overrid-
ing veto staying the Secretary's hand with respect to other public con-
cerns."
34
The second promising case was Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hodel.35 There, the Tribe sought to overturn the decision of the Depart-
ment of the Interior to sell coal leases on lands adjacent to the Tribe's
Reservation. 6 The Tribe's primary concern was that the Department
failed to adequately consider and mitigate the adverse social, economic
and cultural effects of the lease sale on the tribe.37 The Tribe argued that
the decision to sell the leases violated the trust obligations of the De-
partment, as well as NEPA and the Federal Coal Leasing Act. 8
The district court ruled that the trust responsibility or "special rela-
tionship" is an independent source of legal duty on the Department to
consider and mitigate the potential impacts of the lease sale on the
Tribe.39 The court held that the trust obligation was violated:
29. Id.
30. Id. at 362.
31. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
32. Andrus, 642 F.2d at 612.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 613.
35. [1985] 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3065 (D. Mont. 1985).
36. Hodel, [1985] 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) at 3065.
37. Id. at 3066.
38. Id. at 3067-71.
39. Id. at 3070.
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Ignoring the special needs of the tribe and treating the Northern
Cheyenne like merely citizens of the affected area and reservation
land like any other real estate in the decisional process leading to the
sale of the Montana tracts violated this trust responsibility. Once a
trust relationship is established, the Secretary is obligated, at the very
least, to investigate and consider the impacts of his action upon a po-
tentially affected Indian tribe. If the result of this analysis forecasts
deleterious impacts, the Secretary must consider and implement
measures to mitigate these impacts if possible. To conclude that the
Secretary's obligations are any less than this would be to render the
trust responsibility a pro forma concept absolutely lacking in sub-
stance.
40
More recently, the courts have taken a more jaundiced view of the
trust responsibility as a source of independent duties in environmental
cases. The hostility of federal courts to trust arguments in the environ-
mental area can be illustrated by four recent cases. In Morongo Band of
Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration,41 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled, inter alia, that the Government's duty under the
trust responsibility is discharged by its compliance with its duties under
the environmental statutes.42 In that case, the Tribe challenged a new
aircraft arrival route into Los Angeles that would traverse the Morongo
Reservation and harm the Tribe's religious and cultural practices that
required quiet reservation areas.43 Rejecting the Tribe's argument, the
court ruled that the Government's trust duties were coterminous with its
statutory duties:
Thus, although the United States does owe a general trust responsi-
bility to Indian tribes, unless there is a specific duty that has been
placed on the government with respect to Indians, this responsibility
is discharged by the agency's compliance with general regulations
and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes.
44
The Ninth Circuit followed a similar approach in Skokomish Indian
Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.45 There, the Skoko-
mish Tribe sought judicial review of FERC's denial of its application for
a permit to develop a hydropower facility on the North Fork of the
40. Id. at 3071.
41. 161 F.3d. 569 (9th Cir. 1998).
42. Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 574.
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 574. The court mistakenly relied on Mitchell for the proposition that trust duties
arise only if the Government has assumed "elaborate control" over the trust property. Id. Mitchell
did not require elaborate control as the prerequisite for trust duties; rather, only "control or supervi-
sion" over trust assets is required. Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The Supreme Court [in Mitchell] did not qualify 'control or supervision' with modifiers such as
,significant,' 'comprehensive,' 'pervasive,' or 'elaborate.' Nor did the Court anywhere suggest that
the assumption of either control or supervision alone was insufficient to give rise to an enforceable
fiduciary duty.").
45. 121 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Skokomish River in Washington State.46 The Tribe intended to ensure
that future development on the River would be consistent with its goal to
restore the fishery that had been devastated by an existing hydro-electric
project dam.47 FERC rejected the Tribe's application on the ground that
it conflicted with the relicense application of the existing facility.
48
The Court of Appeals upheld FERC's decision on the ground that it
had properly concluded that the applicable regulations barred the Tribe's
application.49 With little analysis, the court rejected the Tribe's argu-
ment that FERC had "ignored its trust responsibility toward [the
Tribe]. 5° Conceding that the Government's trust responsibility "consists
of acting in the interests of the tribes," the court nonetheless concluded
that the doctrine required no more than compliance with the applicable
statutes and regulations. 51 The court noted that FERC "exercises this
responsibility in the context" of the Federal Power Act (FPA) and en-
dorsed FERC's practice of refusing to "afford Indian tribes greater rights
than they would otherwise have under the FPA and its implementing
regulations. 52 As a result, the trust responsibility does not compel ac-
ceptance of a tribal application that is barred by FERC regulations.
The third illustrative case is Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida
v. United States.53 In that case, the Tribe brought breach of trust claims
against the Department of the Interior and Army Corps of Engineers for
their failure to alleviate hurricane-related flooding on three parcels of
tribal land.54 As manager of Everglades National Park, the federal gov-
ernment had the capability to substantially reduce the level of flooding
inundating tribal lands.55 The district court rejected the claims. 56 The
court culled from the applicable case law the following governing princi-
ple: "[D]espite the general trust obligation[s] of the United States to Na-
tive Americans, the government assumes no specific duties to Indian
tribes beyond those found in applicable statutes, regulations, treaties or
other agreements. 57 The court's review of the applicable statutes and
regulations failed to identify specific enforceable duties to protect the
Tribe's land from flooding.58
46. Skokomish Indian Tribe, 121 F.3d at 1304.
47. Id. at 1305.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1306.
50. Id. at 1308.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1308-09.
53. 980 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
54. Miccosukee, 980 F. Supp. at 451.
55. See id. at 453, 455, 457.
56. Id at 463.
57. Id. at 461.
58. Id.
20061 1075
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The fourth example of the failure of the trust doctrine as a source of
protection for tribal environments is Gros Ventre Tribe v. United
States.59 In that case, the Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation sought
an injunction ordering the Bureau of Land Management to reclaim and
restore abandoned gold mining sites located adjacent to the Tribes' Res-
ervation in Montana. 60 The Tribes relied in part on the federal govern-
ment's trust responsibility to protect tribal land and resources, which had
been poisoned by the mines, as the source of the legal duty to clean up
and restore the mining sites.61 The district court rejected this theory be-
cause it could find no "judicial support for the notion that the trust obli-
gation can be enforced independently of some other source of law."
62
In recent years, trust arguments have been successful only in cases
where the federal agency is defending actions taken to benefit Indian
tribes.63 In such cases, the trust responsibility fills the gap left by am-
biguous authorizing statutes.64 Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers65 is an example. There, a salmon farm
operator sued to enjoin the Corps' decision to deny a permit to farm the
treaty fishing grounds of the Lummi Nation.66 The farm operator argued
that the Corps may not deny the permit solely on the ground that the pro-
ject will be located in waters where the Lummi Nation has treaty fishing
rights.67 The Corps responded that its trust responsibility required it to
consider Indian treaty rights in its decision.68  The court accepted the
Corps' argument. The court concluded that the trust responsibility re-
quires that the Government take appropriate action to ensure that Indian
treaty rights are "given full effect" and that such rights are "not abro-
gated or impinged upon. 69  Such action is required even though the
Corps' reliance on treaty rights is not specifically authorized by its own
regulations.7°
Northwest Sea Farms is an exception to the rather dismal fate of the
trust responsibility in recent Indian environmental cases. Judicial reluc-
59. 344 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D. Mont. 2004).
60. Gros Ventre, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
61. See id. at 1226.
62. Id. at 1227.
63. See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing
how the Secretary of the Interior acted with intentions to protect the needs of all Indian groups);
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1993) (discussing how the trust relationship had a priority to
protect a broad class instead of a subgroup); Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States, 931 F.
Supp. 1515, 1520 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
64. See Northwest Sea, 931 F. Supp. at 1520.
65. 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
66. Northwest Sea, 931 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
67. Jd. at 1519.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1520.
70. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Secretary of
Commerce did not act arbitrarily in construing the trust responsibility as requiring the reformation of
fishing recommendations of the Pacific Fishery Management Council in order to guarantee that the
Yurok Tribe and the Hoopa Valley Tribe would receive their fair share of the salmon harvest).
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tance to impose substantive trust duties on federal agencies can perhaps
be attributed to the following factors: (1) judicial confusion about the
different legal standards for stating a claim for damages against the
United States under the Tucker Act and a claim for injunctive relief un-
der the Administrative Procedures Act; (2) the inherent difficulty of
courts determining the "best interests" of tribes; (3) concern that substan-
tive fiduciary obligations may become an "Indians always win" rule; (4)
the general direction of federal Indian law to rely on statutes and treaties,
rather than federal common law, for the rule of decision; and (5) the mis-
conception that the rationale for the trust responsibility - the need for
federal protection - may have lost some of its force in light of the eco-
nomic gains a number of tribes have achieved through gaming success.
Although no court has expressly articulated these reasons, the trend of
recent results in the Indian trust cases appear to justify such inferences.
Each of these reasons is discussed below.
First, courts have failed to acknowledge and apply the distinction
between stating a cause of action for damages against the United States
under the Tucker Act and stating a cause of action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against federal agencies under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act.71 The failure to appreciate this distinction has resulted in the
erroneous rule that the federal government satisfies its trust obligations if
it complies with applicable statutes, unless a statute or treaty imposes
specific duties apart from such statutes.72 The distinction is important
because, as noted, a damages claim requires a showing that a particular
statute can be fairly read as mandating compensation against the United
States for its violation, whereas an equitable claim under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act requires only a showing that the federal agency ac-
tion is "not in accordance with law" or "arbitrary [and] capricious., 73 It
is simply wrong to import the showing of a specific statutory basis for
damages to equitable claims that are not seeking such relief.
Second, courts may be reluctant to get into the thorny problem of
discerning the best interests of tribes under the trust responsibility, espe-
cially because the tribes themselves are often divided about the proper
course of action in the environmental area. Commentators have noted
this dilemma.74 Even resorting to the original principles of federal Indian
law, such as protection of tribal sovereignty and cultural autonomy, may
71. Examples of these cases include: Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d
468, 471,479 (9th Cit. 2000); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 573-74 (9th
Cir. 1998); Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225-27 (D. Mont. 2004); San
Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 882-84 (D. Ariz. 2003). For criticism of
this line of cases, see Wood, supra note 14, at 363-68.
72. See Wood, supra note 14, at 364-65.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2005).
74. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 15, at 126 ("Virtually any rendition of the 'best interests'
standard will fail to resonate with every tribe and every tribal member," because the tribal commu-
nity is enormously diverse.).
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not be particularly helpful in divining whether a proposed federal action
promotes the affected tribe's "best interests." Is it the best interest of
tribal sovereignty to authorize and locate a solid waste dump on tribal
land?75 To be sure, courts should not shrink from the responsibility of
deciding hard cases or giving force to the trust responsibility, solely on
the ground that the issue presents difficult choices. But it is up to the
tribes and their advocates to develop a coherent formulation of the "best
interest" standard under the trust responsibility, a standard that courts can
apply with reason and predictability.
76
Third, courts may be concerned that enforcement of trust duties
which are not directly tied to statutory or treaty provisions is a slippery
slope leading to a rule that tribal litigants will always prevail. 7 As the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has pointedly noted: "That there is such
a general fiduciary relationship does not mean that any and every claim
by [an Indian party] necessarily states a proper claim for breach of the
trust.' ' 7 8 Especially if the "best interest" standard is a subjective test de-
pending on the tribes' own articulation of their interests, courts may be
concerned about endorsing a standard that has few limits.
Fourth, the pronounced trend in federal Indian law generally away
from reliance on federal common law toward specific statutes and trea-
ties as the rule of decision may have influenced the trust doctrine's fail-
ings in the environmental area.79 The dominance of a textualist judicial
philosophy in the U.S. Supreme Court, as exemplified by Bourland and
similar cases, has made the application of a common law trust obligation
problematic. 80 This trend makes it more difficult for tribes and their ad-
vocates to overcome the presumption of the Mitchell line of cases that
trust duties must be based on specific language in statutes, regulations or
treaties that give the Government control or supervision over Indian land
or resources.
Fifth, anecdotal evidence that a few select tribes have realized eco-
nomic gains from gaming enterprises may lead courts to question
75. See Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
76. Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1981) is an example of the difficulty of deter-
mining where the best interests of the tribes lie. In that case, the court had to decide whether EPA's
redesignation of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation from Class II to Class I under the Clean Air Act
violated EPA's trust obligation to the neighboring Crow Tribe, which claimed that its development
plans were adversely affected by the redesignation. Nance, 654 F.2d at 710-11. The court con-
cluded that because the trust obligations conflicted and that there was a "strong possibility that the
Crow tribe would not be prejudiced at all. . . , we cannot say that there was a breach of the fiduciary
duty to the Crow." Id. at 711-12.
77. Morongo, 161 F.3d at 574; Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191.
78. Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191.
79. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 (1993) ("Having concluded that
Congress clearly abrogated the Tribe's pre-existing regulatory control over non-Indian hunting and
fishing, we find no evidence in the relevant treaties or statutes that Congress intended to allow the
Tribe to assert regulatory jurisdiction over these lands pursuant to inherent sovereignty.").
80. See, e.g., Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687-94.
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whether the underlying rationale for the trust responsibility-that the
tribes literally need protecting by the federal government-holds true
today. This skepticism ignores the reality that the great majority of tribes
still suffer from inordinately high rates of poverty. In the tribal immu-
nity context, the U.S. Supreme Court has questioned whether tribes still
need the protection that doctrine affords:
At one time, the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit might have
been thought necessary to protect nascent tribal governments from
encroachments by States. In our interdependent and mobile society,
however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safe-
guard tribal self-governance. This is evident when tribes take part in
the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now include ski resorts,
gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. In this economic
context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are
dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who
have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.81
Although the Court upheld the Tribe's immunity in the commercial
context in that case, the Court's misgivings about following a doctrine
that some members of the Court believe has lost its historic rationale
could signal a similar re-examination about the need for the trust respon-
sibility.
8 2
In the current hostile legal climate, arguments that the trust respon-
sibility requires federal agencies to act in the best interests of tribes, in-
dependent of their statutory duties, are likely to be greeted with skepti-
cism. The difficult task of developing practical and workable solutions
requires coordinated efforts by Indian tribes, lawyers, and scholars. At a
minimum, trust-related arguments in this area stand a better chance of
success if they are based on a tribal consensus about the core values that
the trust responsibility should preserve and protect. A few modest sug-
gestions are offered here in order to focus thinking toward litigation
strategies that might bear fruitful results.
First, arguments that rely on the trust obligation to require a more
rigorous consideration of the impacts of federal projects on tribal envi-
ronments may find a more favorable reception by courts instructed to
look for a statutory grounding for trust duties. For example, the trust
obligation can more sharply focus the NEPA analysis on the special con-
cerns of tribes for the welfare of the environment.8 3 The trust responsi-
81. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (citation
omitted).
82. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-58.
83. The decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals in Island Mountain Protectors, 144
I.B.L.A. 168, 168 (1998) is an example. In that administrative appeal, the Board vacated the deci-
sion of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to approve expansion of the Zortman and Landusky
Mines adjacent to the Fort Belknap Reservation of the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre Tribes. See
Island Mountain Protectors, 144 I.B.L.A. at 185, 202-03. Among the grounds for vacatur was the
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bility can require the agency to treat Indian communities as tribes, rather
than merely as interested parties, or citizens of the affected area. NEPA
requires a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of proposed
federal action.84 The federal trust obligation can help turn a soft glance,
which agencies too often give actions affecting tribal environments, into
a genuinely hard look. Careful and thoughtful articulation of the con-
tinuing need for adherence to trust standards in this area can strengthen
the duty of federal agencies to rigorously apply the environmental stat-
utes to Indian country. The rhetoric of fiduciary obligations can perhaps
become the reality of legal protection for tribal environmental values and
goals.
Second, the trust responsibility may be useful as a means to require
the federal government to consult with tribes where the statutory duty to
do so is ambiguous. In an unreported decision, the U.S. District Court
for Oregon enjoined federal timber sales in the Winema and Fremont
National Forests that would have damaged natural habitat and resources
on which the Tribe depended.85 The court found that the U.S. Forest
Service had violated its duty arising from the trust responsibility to con-
sult with the Klamath Tribes to ensure that the Tribe's treaty rights will
be protected.86
These approaches, while holding some promise, may be too limited
for those tribes that must rely on the trust responsibility for a source of
substantive legal duties, for want of other efficacious legal theories to
protect their rights. For these tribes, enhanced procedural rights through
trust-infused environmental review or consultation processes may not be
enough to protect their land and resources from harm.87 For them, a
more ambitious approach is needed to empower the trust doctrine with
genuine legal protections. In light of the courts' reluctance to embrace
an expansive view of the trust responsibility in equitable actions, the
development of a cohesive theory of the trust doctrine as a source of sub-
BLM's violation of the trust responsibility owed the Tribes. Id. The Board characterized the trust
obligation as requiring consultation with the Tribes in order to "identify, protect, and conserve trust
resources, trust assets, and Tribal health and safety." Id at 185. The scope of this duty arguably
exceeded the BLM's duty to consult and consider environmental consequences under NEPA.
84. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
85. Klamath Tribes v. United States, No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509, at *1, *9-10 (D. Or.
Oct. 2, 1996).
86. Id. at *7-10.
87. A recent example is Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'n v. U.S. Bureau of Reclama-
tion, No. C 02-02006 SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2005) (order of dismissal) (Yurok Tribe as Plaintiff-
intervenor). The district court there dismissed the Yurok Tribe's claims that the Bureau of Reclama-
tion had violated the federal trust responsibility to protect the Tribe's fishery by refusing to provide
Klamath River flows sufficient to avoid the massive fish kill that occurred on the Tribe's Reserva-
tion in the fall of 2002. Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'n, No. C 02-02006 SBA, at 0-1. The
court concluded that Reclamation had no trust duty to provide such flows because there could be no
violation of the trust responsibility because no source of "positive law" could be identified that
imposed specific fiduciary duties on Reclamation with regard to the operations of the Klamath
Irrigation Project, which controlled the River flows. Id. at 17.
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stantive law will be challenging. Law reform of this kind should be
based on the fundamental principle that federal law should honor and
protect the unique relationships of Indian tribes to their land and natural
environment. That surely was the premise of the trust doctrine originally
and it should be the basis of future efforts to give it genuine legal mean-
ing today.

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: FEDERAL OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT ON PRIVATE LANDS IN THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN WEST
KEITH G. BAUERLEt
For they sow the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.1
This paper examines the conflict that has arisen from, and the op-
portunities that have been created by, the development of federal oil and
gas reserves underlying private lands in the Rocky Mountain West.
Many have characterized this conflict as one of the new, preservationist
West squaring off against the old, extractive West.2 This characteriza-
tion fails to recognize the alliances between new and old West constitu-
encies that this issue has generated, their goals, and the implications for
how oil and gas development will proceed in the region. While these
alliances have been forged across the West, I will concentrate on the
Powder River Basin of northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana
in this paper to demonstrate how these alliances can play an increasingly
important role in shaping the course of oil and gas development in the
region in the 21 st century.
The situation in which property ownership is divided between the
surface and subsurface is known as split estate.3 The federal government
sowed the private surface/federal subsurface split estate whirlwind in the
Powder River Basin with its land disposition statutes of the early twenti-
eth century, in particular the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916. 4
t Keith Bauerle is an attorney with the Denver, Colorado office of Earthjustice; J.D., Uni-
versity of California Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law 1999; B.A., University of Virginia 1991.
The opinions and views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily repre-
sent the views of Earthjustice or its clients. This paper was originally delivered at the Denver Uni-
versity Law Review Symposium entitled "Borrowing the Land: Cultures of Ownership in the West-
ern Landscape," held on February 17, 2006. Mr. Bauerle would like to thank Federico Cheever and
Rachel Arnow-Richrnan, both of the University of Denver Sturm College of Law for their helpful
suggestions, and the editors and staff of the Denver University Law Review for their work on this
piece.
1. Hosea 8:7.
2. See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development: The Costs and Benefits of an
Emerging Energy Resource, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 519, 520 (2003). Mr. Bryner posits that much
of the conflict is "rooted in widely discussed changes in the population of the West as recreational
and preservationist interests increasingly clash with traditional extractive industries." Id.
3. Wyoming Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1245
(D. Wyo. 2005) ("A split-estate is one in which the surface and minerals are owned and controlled
by different parties.").
4. Stock-Raising Homestead Act (SRHA) of 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (repealed 1976,
except § 299, by 43 U.S.C. § 702). Because much of the Basin was patented under SRHA, the
surface estate is now primarily in private or state ownership, whereas much of the mineral estate is
still largely owned by the federal government. Bureau of Land Management, Final Environmental
Impacts Statement, Powder River Resource Area (1984) at 1-1.
1083
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
These federal statutes, while seeking to promote settlement of the lands
by giving them away, reserved the rights to the underlying minerals to
the federal government. In the early part of the twentieth century, when
mineral development involved pickaxes and spades, divorcing the sur-
face from the minerals may have been a good idea. But these days, this
divorce, like many others, has led to much acrimony and many attorneys.
The acrimony is to some extent inevitable given the incompatible
conceptions of property rights present in the split estate situation.
Ranchers and farmers in the Basin, like most ranchers and farmers across
the West, subscribe to the traditional Anglo-American view of property
rights that they own their land from the surface to the center of the earth.6
This conception of surface owner property rights is diametrically op-
posed to the property interests inherent in the split estate situation.7
However, the conflicts would likely not be so acrimonious but for
the legal regimes governing mineral resources. In most states, including
Wyoming, common law has set up the mineral estate as "dominant" over
the surface estate. 8 This generally means that mineral owners are entitled
to access and use the surface estate to the extent reasonably necessary to
develop the minerals. 9 Federal statutes governing mineral extraction on
split estate lands mirror this language, entitling oil and gas companies to
use the surface owner's lands as is reasonably necessary for oil and gas
production.' 0
5. Id. at § 299(a) ("All entries made and patents issued under the provisions of this subchap-
ter shall be subject to and contain a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other minerals
in the lands ...."). The reservation of other minerals has been "read broadly" to include oil, gas,
and other energy resources "in light of the agricultural purpose of the grant itself, and in light of
Congress's equally clear purpose to retain subsurface resources, particularly sources of energy, for
separate disposition and development in the public interest." United States v. Union Oil Co., 549 F.
2d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 911 (1978).
6. Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem of Federal/Private Split Estate Lands,
33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419,423-24 (1998).
7. Michelle Andrea Wenzell, Comment, The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development
Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607, 608 (1993)
(concluding that split estates are antithetical to traditional western concepts of property ownership).
8. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Council, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1245 ("The mineral estate is the
dominant estate.") (citing Mingo Oil Producers v. Kamp Cattle Co., 776 P.2d 736, 741 (Wyo.
1989)).
9. Id. ("In Wyoming, the mineral estate owner has the right to use "that portion of the sur-
face estate 'reasonably necessary' to the production and storage of the mineral ...."). This domi-
nance has begun to be limited in many states by both the judicial doctrine of accommodation and by
state legislation attempting to level the playing field for surface owners. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos &
Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered, and Sequential, State and Local Barriers to Extractive Re-
source Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 1 5-8 (2004); Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946
P.2d 913, 919 (Colo. 1997) (recent example of the application of the accommodation doctrine);
Wyoming Surface Owners Accommodation Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-401 to -410 (2005).
10. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 505 (1928) (interpreting the reservation
of minerals in the Agricultural Act of 1914 and the procedures governing leasing and development
of minerals under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 as dividing lands settled under the Agricultural
Entry Act into surface and mineral estates and making the mineral estate dominant over the surface
estate).
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Oil and gas companies have construed this theory of dominance as
providing them free reign to extract oil and gas with few, if any, con-
straints." The federal government has imposed few constraints of its
own 12 and has further exacerbated conflicts with its policies governing
the leasing and development of its split estate oil and gas resources. For
example, the BLM does not provide landowners with individual notice
before leasing the minerals under their lands. As a result, some surface
owners have been unaware that the gas reserves underneath them were
sold until getting a visit from an oil and gas company representative. 13 In
addition, the surface owner's ability to obtain compensation for damages
to his or her lands is limited. The Stock-Raising Homestead Act only
requires that the mineral developer compensate the surface owner for
"crops" and "improvements" damaged by mining operations, which
terms have been strictly construed by courts to exclude natural vegetation
relied upon by ranchers, non-agricultural buildings and improvements,
and general loss of value of lands.' 4 As a result, oil and gas companies
11. This view (as well as a repugnant view of societal and gender roles) is forcefully ex-
pressed in a statement ascribed by Mary Brannaman to a representative of the oil and gas company
that had leased the oil and gas underlying her and her husband's ranch. "Mary, it's just like you and
I are married. I can do whatever I want, whenever I want, and however I want." See Tom C. Toner,
"The Arrogance of Dominance/The Reason for Split Estate Legislation," Presentation to the 2005
Wyoming State Bar Annual Meeting (quoting the trial transcript from Brannaman v. Paxton Re-
sources, LLC, Civil Action No. 02-2-47 (District Court of Sheridan County, Wyoming) (Trial Tran-
script VI, at 248) (on file with the author)).
12. There are three means by which a mineral owner can gain access to the surface to develop
the oil and gas: (1) by written consent of the surface interest owner; (2) by executing a surface use
agreement for the payment of damages to crops and improvements; or (3) by posting a "good and
sufficient bond" to secure payment of damages to the surface owner. 43 C.F.R. § 3814.1(c) (2006).
Unfortunately these bonds, which can be as low as $1,000 per well site, are hardly ever "sufficient."
For example, the Wyoming State BLM office accepted a surety bond in the amount of $2,176 to
cover nine CBM wells and associated infrastructure, whereas reclamation costs for nearby CBM
wells were estimated at $14,000 per well site, for a total of $126,000. Bureau of Land Management,
Wyoming State Office, Decision on BLM Bond No. WYB000252 (Sept. 7, 2005); Adami Ranch
LLC, Request for State Director Review and Notice of Appeal (Sept. 14, 2005) (both documents on
file with the author). Given the threat of the BLM approving inadequate bonds, many landowners
have little bargaining power and see little choice but to accept what the companies give them in the
surface use agreements. Telephone interview with Jill Morrison, Organizer, Powder River Basin
Resource Council, in Denver, Colo. (Jan. 13, 2006). The BLM does not review surface use agree-
ments. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PERMITTING OIL AND GAS ON
SPLIT ESTATE LANDS AND GUIDANCE FOR ONSHORE OIL AND GAS ORDER No. 1, INSTRUCTION
MEMORANDUM NO. 2003-131 (Apr. 2, 2003), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy03/im2003-
131 .htm.
13. This lack of notice prompted Representative Salazar to publicly pressure the BLM's
Colorado State office to defer leasing 17,500 acres of split estate lands in western Colorado in May
2005. Donna Gray, Critics Say BLM Not Notifying Public of Natural Gas Drilling, ASPEN TIMES,
June 15, 2005, available at http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20050615/NEWS/106150029/-
1/rssOl. Montana Gov. Schweitzer, a rancher himself, has remarked that the BLM has created ill
will by "failing to have the common courtesy of contacting ranchers to let them know the minerals
beneath them were being sold." Todd Wilkinson, Energy Boom is Crowding Ranchers, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, May 10, 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0510/pO1 s02-usju.html.
14. The Supreme Court has held that the SRHA does not require compensation for impair-
ment of surface resources that do not constitute crops or permanent improvements directly related to
agricultural production. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co, 277 U.S. at 505. This presents a problem in the
Basin because the naturally growing forage upon which ranchers rely to feed their livestock is not
compensable because it is not a "crop." See Gilbertz v. United States, 808 F.2d 1374, 1380 (10th
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are free to externalize the majority of the costs of developing the re-
source and place them on the surface owner.
At first glance, this could be viewed as merely a dispute over prop-
erty rights. However, that would ignore the fact that the issue for the
landowners is the viability of their ranches and farms, which viability
depends on the health of the land. It is the threats posed by oil and gas
development to the health of their split estate lands that caused the con-
servation community to become involved. Conservationists have recog-
nized, as have the landowners, that neither the BLM, which leases the
federal oil and gas, nor the state agencies that also regulate aspects of the
subsequent development, are protecting lands across the West. With
respect to the Powder River Basin, agrarian and conservation interests
agree that neither the BLM nor the state of Wyoming have addressed the
big problem concerning coalbed methane production - water.
Coalbed methane (CBM) is natural gas found in coal seams.
15
These coal seams are also aquifers, containing water. The gas is held in
the coal seams by water pressure. To get the gas out, one must remove
that pressure, and hence, remove the water.16 In the Powder River Basin,
one must pump out a lot of water to get to the gas. The BLM projects
that a decade's worth of CBM development in Wyoming's portion of the
Basin will produce three-million acre-feet of water.
17
This massive dewatering of coal seam aquifers poses a huge threat
to ranchers and farmers who depend upon that water for domestic pur-
Cir. 1987) (damage to grasses that previously grew on well and road locations is not compensable).
Nor are landowners compensated for the diminution in their land's value. Holbrook v. Cont'l Oil
Co., 278 P.2d 798, 804-07 (Wyo. 1955). For a disturbing example of how this could play out in a
residential and hardrock mining context, see CHARLES WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN:
LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 60-61 (1992). See also George C. Coggins, Over-
coming the Unfortunate Legacies of Western Public Land Law, 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 381 n.
141 (1993) ("It is still theoretically possible for a hardrock mineral prospector to start digging
trenches in suburban backyards, if the subdivision was patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act of 1916.")
15. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fid. Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir.
2003).
16. Id.; see also GARY BRYNER, COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN
WEST: PRIMER (July 2002), http://www.colorado.edu/Law/centers/nrlc/publications/
CBM Primer.pdf which provides a comprehensive overview of coalbed methane, and the accompa-
nying Case Study 1 by Diana Hulme which provides a detailed exposition of the issues surrounding
CBM development that constitute the basis for the conservationist and agrarian alliance discussed in
this article. Supra at 86-06. For more information concerning CBM and water issues, see also
RUCKELSHAUS INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, FINAL REPORT PREPARED
FOR THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF WYOMING, WATER PRODUCTION FROM
COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN WYOMING: A SUMMARY OF QUANTITY, QUALITY AND
MANAGEMENT OPTIONS (Dec. 2005), http://www.uwyo.edu/enr/ienr/CBMWaterFinalReportDec
2005.pdf.
17. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT AND PROPOSED PLAN AMENDMENT FOR THE POWDER RIVER BASIN OIL AND GAS
PROJECT 2-26, Thl.2-8 (Jan. 2003) http://www.wy.blm.gov/nepa/prb-feis/index.htm [hereinafter
POWDER RIVER IMPACT STATEMENT].
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poses and for ranching and agricultural operations. 8  Yet neither the
BLM nor Wyoming have policies in place to prevent their wells from
going dry or to make sure they have adequate replacement water for the
decades it will take the aquifers to recharge.
Pumping hundreds of billions of gallons of water from the subsur-
face to surface also creates correspondingly huge problems of disposal.
Where does one put close to a trillion gallons of water in an arid land-
scape?' 9 In Wyoming, the preferred method of disposal is to dump it on
the surface, either in streambeds, dammed-up streambeds, or in specially
constructed wastewater pits, because that is the cheapest means of dis-
posal. 20  But dumping enormous amounts of water on the surface of an
otherwise arid landscape creates drastic changes in the ecosystems, espe-
cially in streams that ran only seasonally or in response to rainfall before
CBM development.2'
To make matters worse, while the wastewater is usually safe for
livestock, and in some cases, for people to drink, it can degrade soil and
is often unfit for irrigation.22 The situation, then, is that CBM production
in the Powder River Basin will produce close to a trillion gallons of wa-
ter that cannot be disposed of untreated onto the surface without causing
permanent harm to the land and the people who live there.
Not only are these environmental threats severe, their extent is im-
mense. The Powder River Basin covers approximately 25,800 square
miles, larger than Massachusetts and New Hampshire combined, of roll-
18. Groundwater in the Basin is a precious resource, essential for domestic uses and livestock.
See JOHN WHEATON & JOHN METESH, MONT. BUREAU OF MINES AND GEOLOGY, POTENTIAL
GROUND-WATER DRAWDoWN AND RECOVERY FROM COALBED METHANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE
POWDER RIVER BASIN, MONTANA 2, 5 (May 2002), http://www.mt.blm.gov/mcfo/cbm/eis/
CBM3DGWReport.pdf ("Domestic and livestock water supplies are dependent on ground-water
resources.").
Although the use of groundwater only represents 3 percent of the total water use, it is ex-
tremely critical because it provides almost 100 percent of the domestic water for farm-
steads. It also constitutes the largest percentage of dependable stock water, because the
groundwater is not seasonal or affected by drought, like surface water.
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MGM'T, FINAL STATEWIDE OIL AND GAS
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE POWDER RIVER AND
BILLINGS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLANS 3-32 (Apr. 2003), http://www.mt.blm.gov/mcfo/cbm/eis/
volume 1/Chapter3.pdf.
19. See POWDER RIVER IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 17, at 2-26. Table 2-8 calculates a
total of 3,069,665 acre-ft. of water, which is the equivalent of 1.00025472 x 102 U.S. gallons.
20. The Bureau of Land Management proposes to dispose of this water in one of two principal
ways: (1) putting it in infiltration pits, impoundments, or reservoirs; and (2) directly discharging it
onto the ground or into ephemeral and intermittent drainages. See id. at 2-27.
21. See Wyoming Outdoor Council, 153 I.B.L.A. 379, 388 (2000) (stating "water production
from CBM extraction in the Powder River Basin is on a magnitude that presents unique problems").
22. See N. Plains Res. Council, 325 F.3d at 1157-58 ("We hold that the unaltered groundwater
produced in association with methan gas extraction, and discharged into a river, is a pollutant within
the meaning of the CWA."). The Ninth Circuit accordingly determined that CBM wastewater is a
"pollutant" under the Clean Water Act. Id.
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ing upland plains in northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana.23
The BLM estimates that in the eight-million-acre area where CBM de-
velopment will occur in Wyoming, approximately seventy-six percent of
the surface land is privately-owned while most of the oil and gas rights-
as much as sixty-three percent in some areas-are federally-owned.24
Putting the numbers together, it becomes plain that the close to a trillion
gallons of wastewater threatens to irreversibly alter the ecosystems and
decimate ranchers' and farmers' livelihoods on millions of acres of split
estate lands.
Given the magnitude of the threats, it is obvious why the interests of
conservationists have aligned, but it is also important to realize that this
alliance is more than a marriage of convenience. As mentioned above,
the Basin's ranchers and farmers maintain a traditional western culture of
ownership putting them at odds with those who seek to use their lands
for mineral development. But these ranchers also share a culture of
ownership with conservationists in that they consider themselves stew-
ards of the land.
This concept of stewardship and its concern for future generations
mirror the core values of the conservation movement.25 For example,
Jeanie Alderson was a plaintiff in one of the cases challenging the
BLM's plan for developing CBM in the Montana portion of the Powder
River Basin.26 She and her husband run the Bones Brothers Ranch with
her father Irv Alderson near Bimey, Montana. The Aldersons, like many
members of WORC, joined the litigation in an effort to preserve it for
future generations, like the grandchild that Irv Alderson hopes to take
hunting with him on their ranch someday.
These shared values have laid the groundwork for a new alliance of
the old west and new west. The Northern Plains Resource Council has
led efforts in Montana to better protect that state's rivers and streams
from CBM wastewater, and the Powder River Basin Resource Council
has been leading the charge on that front in Wyoming.27 Both the Pow-
23. U.S. ENV'T. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 1, attachment
5 (June 2004), http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uic/cbmstudy/pdfs/completestudy/attachment056-5-
04.pdf.
24. See POWDER RIVER IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 17, at xv. "The proposed project
would occur in a Project Area of almost 8 million acres." Id. at 3-229-30.
25. See, e.g., Jim DiPeso & Tom Pelikan, The Republican Divide On Wilderness Policy, 33
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 339, 343-44 (2003) (stating "conservation and environmental protection
are consistent with traditional conservative values of prudence, stewardship and intergenerational
equity").
26. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Clark, No. 03-70-
BLG-RWA (D. Mont. Feb. 17, 2004). This case was subsequently transferred to Wyoming. See,
e.g., Amended Order on Initial Pretrial Conference, W. Org. of Res. Councils v. Clark, No. 04-CV-
0018-i (D. Wyo. Mar. 8, 2004).
27. The Northern Plains Resource Council ("NPRC") brought and won a case establishing
that CBM wastewater is a "pollutant" under the Clean Water Act. N. Plains Res. Council, 325 F.3d
at 1163. NPRC subsequently petitioned the Montana Board of Environmental Review to adopt a
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der River Basin Resource Council and its parent organization, the West-
em Organization of Resource Councils, have been partnering with con-
servationist groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council and have
been represented by conservation, rather than property rights, law firms
in challenging Montana and Wyoming plans for CBM development.28
These rancher/green alliances show that the fight in the Powder
River Basin is therefore not simply an instance of preservationist inter-
ests fighting with traditional extractive industries. 29  Rather, the
rancher/green alliance catalyzed by oil and gas development in the west
is one of old west agrarian interests joining with new west conservation-
ist interests against a common, old west extractive foe.3 °
I believe this distinction is important for a number of reasons. The
first is that political and legal developments demonstrate that this pro-
gressive agrarian and conservation alliance has been able to achieve re-
sults that neither camp would have been able to achieve on its own. The
best legal example of this is likely a case brought by the Powder River
Basin Resource Council and the Wyoming Outdoor Council challenging
an Army Corps of Engineers Clean Water Act permit that allowed oil
and gas companies to dam streambeds to construct reservoirs to hold
CBM wastewater.31 In its decision reversing and remanding the Army
Corps permit, the Wyoming District Court held that the Corps had
"clearly failed to address the concerns of. . . private landowners" in
making its decision to authorize the permit, and that this failure "re-
flect[ed] indifference to the interests of surface owners of split-estates. 32
The Court was not pleased with the agency's indifference: "Nowhere
rule to reduce the environmental impacts of CBM wastewater by: (1) repealing an antidegradation
exception; (2) requiring that it be injected into the ground; or (3) in cases where reinjection is not
feasible, requiring treatment of the wastewater before it is discharged. The Board adopted the peti-
tion's antidegradation request, rejected reinjection, and has deferred a decision on whether to require
treatment. Associated Press, CBM Water Injection Rejected, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Mar. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2006/03/24/news/state/52-cbm-injection.txt. The
Powder River Basin Resource Council has petitioned Wyoming's Environmental Quality Council to
amend Department of Environmental Quality rules to require true beneficial use of coalbed methane
water that is discharged as a byproduct, Press Release, Powder River Basin Resource Council,
Landowners: Close CBM Discharge Water Loophole (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.powderriverbasin.
org/cbm/pressreleases.shtml (follow "Press Packet: CBM Water Quality Rule Making" hyperlink;
then follow "Press Release/Member Statements" hyperlink).
28. See sources cited, supra note 26. Plaintiffs in both cases, who include the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council and the Wyoming Outdoor Council are represented by Earthjustice.
29. See, e.g., Bryner, supra note 2. See also, David R. Little, Local Regulation of Oil and Gas
Operations: The Rockies Experience, in DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND CONFLICTS IN MODERN GAS
AND OIL PLAYS, pt. 7, at 7-7 (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found., Mineral Law Series No. 4,
2004) ("In many instances, it is no doubt true that preservationists and recreationists are simply no
longer willing to share public and even private lands with mineral developers.").
30. In this respect, this agrarian/conservation alliance is implementing a larger, more cohesive
progressive campaign that some have posited is necessary for traditional conservation groups to
remain viable. See MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2004), http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death-of Environmentalism.
pdf.
31. Wyoming Outdoor Council, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
32. Id. at 1246.
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does the [decision] express or demonstrate a consideration for those indi-
viduals whose livelihood depends on the vitality and sustainability of the
land. The Court cannot accept the Corps' summary dismissal of the rea-
sonably foreseeable impacts to private ranchlands. 33
Neither the ranchers and farmers, nor the conservationists, would
have likely achieved this victory had they gone it alone. Rather, it was
the combination of the expertise of the conservationists with respect to
the Clean Water Act, 34 the National Environmental Policy Act,35 and the
statutes' environmental purposes with the expertise of the ranchers and
farmers regarding what the challenged permits were doing to their prop-
erty interests in their lands that won the case.
Furthermore, in failing to recognize the old and new west interests
that have aligned in the alliance, many commentators have also missed
the mark with respect to its goals by characterizing them as preservation-
ist.36 On the contrary, in response to the CBM development in the Pow-
der River Basin, green groups have allied with the ranchers and farmers
in what is essentially a conservationist, rather than preservationist, ef-
fort. 3 7 In the Powder River Basin, neither party to the alliance is seeking
to put large areas off limits to CBM development. Rather, the groups
have throughout their political, media and legal work sought only to en-
sure that the development happens in an environmentally responsible
manner.
38
One of the reasons for this focus is that it would be impossible to
stop natural gas development in the Rocky Mountain West, and particu-
larly CBM development in the Powder River Basin. The more important
point is that no one wants to. Conservationists and ranchers and farmers
all recognize that natural gas, while not a panacea, is a cleaner-burning
fuel than coal and that it can serve as a bridge fuel to this nation's energy
33. Id. at 1246-7.
34. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
35. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
36. Bryner, supra note 2 at 520 (discussing how "recreational and preservationist interests"
are opposing CBM extraction); Little, supra note 29.
37. See Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge And Profit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting
Controversy And The Core Purposes Of America's National Parks, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 452
(1999) (characterizing preservationists as those "who believed nature should be protected in a state
unaltered by man" in contrast to conservationists, "who believed in the wise use of all nature's re-
sources for the greatest benefit of humanity"). I would further clarify that by "preservationist," I
would borrow loosely from Joseph Sax, modifying it from the noun to the adjective to mean a view
that seeks to maintain lands in their natural state without any industrialization. See JOSEPH L. SAX,
MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS 115 n. 1 (1980).
38. See, e.g., Legislative Hearing on Energy Policy Before H. Resources Comm., 108th Con-
gress (2003) (statement of Eric Barlow on behalf of the Western Organization of Resource Councils
and Powder River Basin Resource Council) (Mar. 19, 2003), http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/
archives/108/testimony/ericbarlow.htm; Northern Plains Resource Council, Doing It Right: A Blue-
print for Responsible Coal Bed Methane Development in Montana, http://www.northernplains.org/
ourwork/doingitright (last visited Apr. 13, 2006).
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future.39 That is why conservation groups have concentrated their pres-
ervationist efforts-trying to keep oil and gas development out en-
tirely-on only a small portion of the landscape that is just too ecologi-
cally important and/or fragile to drill. For instance, preservationist ef-
forts have focused on areas like Otero Mesa in New Mexico because it is
the North America's largest and wildest Chihuahuan Desert grassland
remaining on public lands.4 °
Whereas in the context of the split estate working landscapes in the
Powder River Basin, the progressive rancher/green alliance is trying to
protect these lands not by keeping development out, but rather by trying
to ensure that it is accomplished in a responsible manner that protects the
environment and cultural heritage for future generations. I believe that it
is important to keep this overarching goal in mind because it can and
should inform policy makers as to how development should proceed in
the Powder River Basin. Not only does this goal resonate in the cultural
context of borrowing the land that is the subject of this symposium, but
also in the context of sustainable development.4
Sustainable development is a buzzword not often heard in the
Rocky Mountain West. 42 Most of the legal literature on sustainable de-
velopment, especially that concerning energy resources, has focused
heavily on international development.4 3  Looking forward, however, I
39. See, e.g., NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, A RESPONSIBLE ENERGY PLAN FOR
AMERICA 17 (2005), http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/rep/chap3.asp ("Natural gas is not sufficiently
clean to be considered the long-term answer to America's energy needs, but it can act as a bridge to
greater reliance on cleaner and renewable forms of energy.").
40. See, e.g., Associated Press, State to Battle BLM Over Drilling Otero Mesa, THE FREE
NEW MEXICAN, June 8, 2005, http://www.freenewmexican.com/news/41212.html.
41. "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT: OUR COMMON FUTURE, 43 (1987), http://www.are.admin.ch/are/en/nachhaltig/
intemational-uno/unterseite02330/. At the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, countries endorsed a global plan of action for sustainable devel-
opment, Agenda 21. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14,
1992, Agenda 21, 1.1, 1.3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151.26, http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/
documents/agenda2l/english/agenda2ltoc.htm. To implement Agenda 21, they also adopted a set of
twenty-seven principles in the Rio Declaration. United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/r/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M 874 (1992), www.un.org/documents/ga/confl51/aconf15126-
lannexl .htm.
42. This is not to suggest that sustainable development is a concept never applied to the
American West. See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST 118-
20 (1992); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 293-306 (1992) (describing
how sustainable development might proceed in the American West). For a recent examination of
what happens after the current energy boom plays itself out, see Ray Ring, Gold from the Gas
Fields, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 28, 2005, at 8, available at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid=15938. However, it is apparent that the princi-
ples of sustainable development are but rarely applied to oil and gas development in the Rocky
Mountain West.
43. See, e.g., Jay G. Martin and Ann L. MacNaughton, Sustainable Development: Impacts of
Current Trends on Oil and Gas Development, 24 J. LAND, RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. 257, 264
(2004); Patricia Nelson, An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a
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would argue that there is a need and an opportunity to incorporate princi-
ples of sustainable development to better plan for oil and gas develop-
ment in the Rocky Mountain West. In a subsequent article, I will de-
velop and substantiate this argument and explore its legal and policy
implications in contexts including litigation and legislation.
In the meantime, I will offer a short explanation of how this could
benefit decision makers and stakeholders with respect to CBM develop-
ment in Montana's portion of the Powder River Basin. The plan for de-
veloping the federal CBM resources there is currently in flux. In Febru-
ary 2005, the Federal District Court in Billings Montana ruled that the
BLM's plan for developing thousands of coalbed methane gas wells in
Montana's portion of the Basin was illegal under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act due to the agency's failure to consider an approach
that would "phase[]" or stage the CBM development over time and geog-
raphy.
44
The rancher/green alliance, as well as the Northern Cheyenne Tribe,
promoted such carefully paced development throughout the NEPA proc-
ess. They demonstrated how phasing or staging of development to dis-
tribute its impacts over time and geography provides arguably the best
means of ensuring the sustainability of the land and its resources in per-
petuity. For example, by spreading the number of CBM wells developed
in a given watershed over time, the amount of wastewater produced
within that watershed at any given time, and its attendant impacts on the
ecosystem, ranches and farms, could be reduced. Likewise, spreading
development out over a longer period of time could help to prevent an
economic boom and bust cycle and its socio-economic harms. Both geo-
graphic and temporal phasing of development would thus further sus-
tainable development goal of "equitably meet[ing] developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations
' 5
While development of CBM, like other mineral resources, cannot be
termed sustainable in the strict sense because the resources themselves
are non-renewable, the overarching purpose and tenets of sustainable
development are nonetheless applicable and could be effectuated via a
phased development alternative. This has been pointed out by Charles
Wilkinson, who has remarked that "the idea of sustainability can easily
be adapted to mineral development through attention to the duration of
the mining activity. Carefully paced mineral development lasting, say,
Path to Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 615, 615
(2004); Judith Kimerling, International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: The Privatiza-
tion of EnvironmentalLaw, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289, 291 (2001).
44. See Order in consolidated cases, at 11-19, N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Bureau of Land
Mgmt., No. CV 03-69-BLG-RWA, and N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, No. CV 03-78-BLG-RWA
(D. Mont. Feb. 25, 2005).
45. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 41, at 3.
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as long as forty or fifty years, depending on the circumstances, can be
considered sustainable.
' 6
Now that the BLM has been forced to revisit its plan for developing
CBM resources in Montana's Powder River Basin, it should look to this
principle and how it has been effectuated in oil and gas development to
plan and pursue phased development lands in the Basin. Using sustain-
able development principles and practice offers the agency the best op-
portunity to strike a balance that will both satisfy the nation's need for
natural gas with its long-term interests in maintaining the nation's lands,
local communities, and cultures.
46. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN, supra note 42, at 300.
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